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The goal of this thesis was to analysis the Islamic State’s apocalyptic nature by
studying both classic Islamic eschatology and the Islamic State’s online magazine Dabiq.
In order to conduct this research, I separated my thesis into two separate angles of
approach. The first angle (chapters one & two) exclusively looked at Islamic eschatology,
classic apocalyptic texts, shifts in how literature was written over time, and on examples
of modern messianic revolutions occurring. In this way, I attempted to emphasize how
extra-Qur’anic texts have played a large part in providing details for what Islamic
eschatology entails. I also looked at modern examples of messianic movements,
including in Mecca and Sudan. I concluded by analyzing the shift modern apocalyptic
literature underwent beginning in the late 20th century. This highlighted how apocalyptic
literature stated focusing on the actions of Western forces—much like the Islamic State
has done today.
The second angle of approach derived from the final chapters. I looked at the
foundation and development of the Islamic State beginning in the early 21st century with
Al-Qaeda in Iraq. I proceeded to emphasize how messianic speculation influenced the
actions and strategies of Islamic State in Iraq and later ISIS. The final chapter, the crux of
my thesis, was an analysis of the Islamic State’s written primary source, Dabiq. I
researched all thirteen issues of the magazine for evidence of apocalyptic nature existing.
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I highlighted how Dabiq is filled with apocalyptic references and classic apocalyptic
hadiths.
The objective of this thesis was to provide a multifaceted analysis of the Islamic State.
It attempted to approach the Islamic State from two different angles to show why
apocalyptic thought first arises, how it has led to revolution, and how the Islamic State
mirrors those cases. With the Islamic State, a wide variety of interpretations have formed
on what it wants and what it is fighting for. Whereas religious motivation has often been
dismissed, I used this thesis to emphasize that both religious and apocalyptic motivation
have been one of many influences behind the formation and development of the Islamic
State.

vii

Introduction
On August 19, 2014, the nation watched in horror as a man with a British accent,
dressed in black, threatened President Obama and the American military for its recent
bombings in Iraq and then, in “retaliation” beheaded the American hostage James Foley.
That man, given the title of “Jihadi John,” was later identified as Mohammad Emwazi
and has since been killed in a drone strike. In-between his threats and the execution of
Foley, Emwazi emphasized that an established Islamic caliphate had been accepted by a
“large amount of Muslims.” While the media latched onto the actions conducted in the
video, it was Emwazi’s choice of words that caught the attention of jihadists and the
scholars who study them—as he had meant to convey a specific message. An Islamic
caliphate had been established and any aggression against this caliphate from the United
States would result in warfare. For the first time, Western media and the American public
were introduced to the profoundly violent, apocalyptically inspired, Islamic militancy
calling themselves the Islamic State.
This declaration of the caliphate, a political-theological idea traced back to early
Islamic history, is an important first step to understanding ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria)1 as a distinct terrorist organization. The announcement of the caliphate in 2014
marks a pivotal moment in history for jihadists, scholars, and the American government
alike. With the declaration of a caliphate, ISIS and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi began to
demand bay’ah (oath of loyalty or allegiance) from every Muslim and all terrorist
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Originally named ISI, Islamic State in Iraq, the group has recently been called by a variety of other names
after gaining territory in Syria. They are often referred to as ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), IS
(Islamic State), or more recently in an effort to disclaim their legitimacy they have been given the title of
Daesh in Arabic. For the sake of clarity, I will stick to identifying them as either the Islamic State or ISIS.
To create a separation in the timeline, any information after 2013 will refer to the group as ISIS or the
Islamic State.
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organizations, including from Al-Qaeda and its current leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.2 It
will remain unknown how significant of an impact this declaration of a caliphate will
have on jihadist militancy and American foreign policy in the years to come. Yet at the
moment, it appears that global attention has shifted from Zawahiri’s Al-Qaeda to alBaghdadi’s caliphate—a place claiming to be open “to all Muslims.”
One of ISIS’s characterizing features—distinguishing it from Al-Qaeda, in
particular—is its emphasis on apocalyptic theology. This theology appears to be rich in
reinterpretations of the use of jihad, the purpose of fitna (civil strife or war amongst
Sunni and Shi’a Muslims), the purification of Islamic lands, and the role Muslims are to
play during events leading to the Final Hour—in which the Great War or al-Malhamah
al-Kubra will take place prior to the Day of Judgment.3 While ISIS is not the first or only
Islamic movement to advocate violence through reinterpretation of Islamic eschatology,
its end time vision of the world remains a serious component in understanding its thought
process, strategies, global appeal, and thus should not be so easily dismissed.
To better understand ISIS, we ought to investigate and take seriously the apocalyptic
narrative that it has constructed and appears to be influenced by. Therefore, I argue that
the Islamic State’s apocalyptic theology remains central in understanding a number of its
characteristics—how it began, how it interprets the use of force, its rampant killing of
Sunni and Shi’a tribes, its appeal to foreigner fighters, and why it is that the Islamic State
seeks to “govern” territory through a strict interpretation of Shari’a Law. In this way, my
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Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2015),
179.
3
David Cook, Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic. (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 2002.), 21.
This term roughly translates to “Armageddon” according to most sources, though the phrase akhir alzaman (end of times) is also used in place of it in some sources. Using David Cook’s definition of
Malhamah, the term translates as “a specific type of apocalyptic battle within the genre of fitan.”
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thesis presents an additional lens for understanding the Islamic State. It does so while
acknowledging that other academic approaches (including political, social, and economic
analyses) also have much to contribute in wider discussion of the Islamic State’s nature.
This thesis, however, will exclusively focus on the Islamic State’s apocalyptic
theology, religious motivations, and how both seem to be influencing the group’s
formation and ongoing development. By using this particular method of approach, I will
demonstrate how this component (among others) can provide a multifaceted
understanding of ISIS—that to this point has been nonexistent or easily dismissed. I
recognize no single approach is more “correct” than the next, but dismissing religious
factors and motivation may further stunt a wider understanding for what ISIS is pursuing
and fighting to achieve.
Interestingly, this method of analysis (so far) has appeared to have been glossed over
and dismissed by scholars and government officials alike. Rarely has the Islamic State’s
apocalyptic nature been treated as an important feature of understanding the group’s
motivations and actions. The exception to this has come from Graeme Wood’s Atlantic
article What ISIS Really Wants and more recently from William McCants The ISIS
Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State.4 Wood’s
article, however, resulted in an immediate and global backlash after being published
online in early 2015. The criticism that Wood received seems to have been a result from
his argument that the Islamic State was religiously and apocalyptically motivated. He
began his article stating “The Islamic State is no mere collection of psychopaths. It is a
religious group with carefully considered beliefs, among them that it is a key agent of the
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It is within these two texts that I first began to take serious the benefits of analyzing the Islamic State
through an apocalyptic lens, and I owe much of my analysis to the work conducted by these two scholars.
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coming apocalypse.”5 Wood would go on to support this claim by arguing that Islamic
eschatology (and the events detailed inside it) have remained at the forefront of ISIS’s
pursuit of establishing a caliphate, and that they should not be so easily overlooked as just
political or nationalistic aspirations disguised as in religious clothing.
With this analysis, Wood also critiques scholars who have tended to dismiss religion
from being a serious motivating factor in the pursuits of terrorist organizations such as
ISIS. Wood states that dismissing religious motivation entirely has tended to lead
scholars and Western government officials to both misunderstand “the nature of the
Islamic State.”6
This misinterpretation, according to Wood, has been a result from approaching the
Islamic State from what he terms as a “monolithic” methodology in studying terrorist
organizations. Wood posits that since Al-Qaeda (the most notable terrorist organization)
fought for “specific political concessions, such as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Saudi Arabia,” those viewing ISIS today have also been led “to rehearse this
observation—that jihadists are modern secular people, with modern political concerns,
wearing medieval religious disguise—and [then] make it fit the Islamic State.”7 This
“monolithic” approach is a direct a result from refusing to take the Islamic State at its
word of being religiously motivated, a refusal to examine its literature as possibly
apocalyptic, and a refusal to analyze the Islamic State as a separate entity from AlQaeda—with separate aspirations and agendas.
Wood concludes his piece by stating, “Muslims can reject the Islamic State; nearly all

5

Graeme Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants." The Atlantic. (February 16, 2015.)
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/, 1.
6
Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants," 5.
7
Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants," 4.
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do. But pretending that it isn’t actually a religious, millenarian group, with theology that
must be understood to be combatted, has already led the United States to underestimate it
and back foolish schemes to counter it.”8 It would be from this analysis that Wood drew
his heaviest criticism from scholars, government officials, and Muslims across the
world.9 His claim that ISIS may be seriously motivated by religious and apocalyptic
aspirations came off, to many, as an attack against the entire Islamic tradition—not just
ISIS.
Jack Jenkins, in What the Atlantic Gets Dangerously Wrong about ISIS, counters
Woods publication by how he claims it unknowingly asserts that the Islamic tradition and
Islamic texts are the motivating factors behind the Islamic State’s actions and
motivations. Jenkins counters Wood’s claim by arguing ISIS was really just
“misinterpreting” ancient texts in order to rationalize violence and that describing ISIS as
“Islamic” was an inaccurate assessment.10 Jenkins continues to contend that Wood’s
declarations about ISIS are in themselves dangerous by how they “appear to have fallen
prey to an inaccurate trope all too common in many Western circles: that ISIS is an
inevitable product of Islam, mainly because the Qur’an and other Islamic texts contain
passages that support its horrific acts.”11
Such an approach from Jenkins, however, avoids a multifaceted analysis of the Islamic
State—one which this thesis attempts to contribute to. By erroneously divorcing ISIS
from its sources of inspiration and the tradition it is claiming to be a part of, there is an
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Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants," 5.
Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants," 5. Wood would come under fire for his assertion that ISIS was
“Islamic. Very Islamic.”
10
Jack Jenkins, "What The Atlantic Gets Dangerously Wrong About ISIS." February 18, 2015.
http://thinkprogress.org/world/2015/02/18/3624121/atlantic-gets-dangerously-wrong-isis-islam/,
11
Jenkins, "What The Atlantic Gets Dangerously Wrong About ISIS."
9
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entire piece of the Islamic State that has been overlooked and dismissed. What currently
appears to be a sudden fear of associating “all of Islam” with ISIS, has now resulted in
avoidance of acknowledging the extra analysis is when approaching the Islamic State as
this thesis attempts to do. Despite the backlash to Wood’s piece, this thesis attempts to
only provide another angle of understanding the Islamic State—not the angle. In this
way, this thesis hopes to bring to light possible benefits of studying the Islamic State and
its literature as both being apocalyptic in nature.

My Three Claims
This thesis will not join the debate on whether the Islamic state is “Islamic” or not, but
rather will take the Islamic State’s claim of being motivated by the Final Hour as a
serious motivating factor behind its actions. As I will demonstrate, analyzing the
apocalyptic nature of ISIS provides additional windows of analysis for how the group
was able to popularize across the world and amass large portions of territory in such a
short time frame. This method of approach will not only demonstrate why apocalyptic
theology has played a central role in the Islamic State’s formation and development, but
also how ISIS understands itself within Islamic history and how it approaches the
necessary steps in fulfilling that role today. In light of such, this thesis makes three claims
in regard to the Islamic State’s apocalyptic theology.
First, I argue there needs to be a foundational understanding of Islamic eschatology,
what it entails, why it first formed, and how it developed over time due to the
sociocultural, political, and theological environments that apocalyptic authors were living
a part of. Without a baseline understanding of this information, the narrative that the
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Islamic State seems to be referencing becomes easier to be overlooked or misinterpreted.
As will be continuously noted, the Islamic State’s own apocalyptic narrative seems to be
heavily influenced by one particular classic narration of the end times—which David
Cook defines as the A’maq Cycle.12
For ISIS, the world is heading towards a climactic and unavoidable end, where
“pious” believers will be witnesses and combatants in battles against Christians (Rum or
Byzantines), Jews, non-believers, and the Dajjal (Antichrist).13 These details, however,
are not randomly chosen by ISIS from a slew of sources, but rather all follow a distinct
classic apocalyptic narrative.—the A’maq Cycle. This cycle, we find, is heavily
concentrated on the return of Isa (Jesus), a global fitnah (occurring to show clear
separation between apostates and “true” believers), the Dajjal, the conquering of Rome
and Constantinople, and finally on what Cook coins as “The Moral Apocalypse.” 14
Understanding the Islamic State as an apocalyptically inspired group, which has
constructed its narrative around the details of the A’maq Cycle; additional insights can be
discovered in the Islamic State’s formation and ongoing development. Without
understanding what this classic cycle entails and how it developed, there can be no grasp
on the Islamic State’s own apocalyptic narrative. Therefore, I argue there needs to be first
an understanding for what classic texts related to the A’maq Cycle entail, how the cycle
first formed, and why the cycle has been able to be adopted by the Islamic State today for

The A’maq cycle will remain the focus of this thesis and research. It tends to heavily focus on a final
confrontation between Christians and Muslims prior to the Hour. The historical context of this cycle and
more specific details on it will be discussed in more depth toward the end of Chapter One when discussing
the hadith literature and Kitab al-Fitan.
13
Jean Pierre Filiu and M. B. DeBevoise, Apocalypse in Islam. (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2011), 3.
14
Cook, Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic, 238. The “Moral Apocalypse” describes an inherent desire, from
the apocalyptic author or believer, to repair what they see as a deteriorating state of society, Islamic
tradition, and the world physically and morally.
12
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the basis of its own narrative in the 21st century.
Similarly, I argue that messianic speculation, apocalyptic literature, and violent
revolution (or all three at once) tend to arise when Muslim communities perceive
themselves as being under high levels anxiety, persecution, violence, and/or increased
immorality. Since these common feelings within Muslim societies historically produce
apocalyptic literature, I hope to display how the Islamic State’s online magazine Dabiq
may also be the manifestation of similar feelings. In this way, Dabiq becomes an
additional insight into the outlook, theology, motivation, and shared anxieties of the
Islamic State.
Second, I argue acknowledging the Islamic State’s apocalyptic nature provides
additional insight into the group’s current military tactics, way of governing, use of
indiscriminate violence, and may possibly offer new perspectives for how ISIS plans to
combat Western forces in the near future. For example, understanding the Islamic State’s
apocalyptic theology helps further illuminate why ISIS chose to fight for control of Dabiq
in Syria, why it is attacking Sunni and Shi’a tribes in spite of backlash from the larger
Muslim community, why it attempts to govern regions through a strict interpretation of
Shari’a Law, and also may explain why ISIS remains adamant in urging America to put
“boots on the ground” in Syria despite being outnumbered and outgunned militarily. In
this manner, approaching the Islamic State from an apocalyptic angle provides new
perspectives on a number of its tactics and strategies that can benefit the wider discussion
of what ISIS wants.
Third, I argue approaching the Islamic State’s Dabiq online magazine as an
apocalyptic literature produces an additional insight for the group’s appeal and
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fascination, which has already brought into Iraq and Syria between 15,000-20,000 foreign
recruits.15 While appeals of being a part of an Islamic caliphate or the ability to conduct
unrestricted violence have both been the popular analysis for the Islamic State’s success
in drawing in recruits so far, this thesis attempts to highlight why the appeal of being
witnesses of Final Hour should not be dismissed as irrational. An apocalyptic appeal
may, in fact, further explain upon why the Islamic State has been able to become popular
across the world in such a short time frame—particularly amongst foreign recruits.

Why Study Apocalypticism?
Islamic apocalyptic literature has recently been found to be quite beneficial for Islamic
scholars and historians alike. While the field remains relatively new and unexplored in
the West, scholars such as David Cook have begun to emphasize the benefits Islamic
eschatology can provide for scholars. This is largely due to how apocalyptic literature
now is viewed as providing deeper levels analysis for the political, theological, and
societal structures of the particular communities where apocalyptic authors were writing
from. Therefore, understanding the historical context of when apocalyptic literatures were
written plays an enormous role for comprehending the details found inside them.
Hayrettij Yücesoy, in Messianic Beliefs & Imperial Politics in Medieval Islam, notes
that messianic literatures have become increasingly significant for understanding Islamic
history by how they tend to provide additional insight for how authors were “perpetuated
by a particular mindset and outlook—an ideological illusion that served as a lens through

15

Stern and Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, 76.
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which historical actors saw political realities and projected action.”16 For Yücesoy,
messianic belief and the apocalyptic literature produced from it provides insight into how
certain authors viewed their society, their religious tradition, and how they saw both
being fixed in the future. Yücesoy also notes that the earliest apocalyptic literatures,
developed within the first two centuries after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, have
become particularly important by how they “offer a unique perspective on the mentalities
and overriding concerns of those involved in the events of the early Abbasid period and
on how the creators and transmitters of prophecies perceived their sociopolitical
realities.”17 Other scholars, in a similar way, claim apocalyptic literature tends to be a
direct reflection of how authors saw “themselves and the directions of their society’s
development.” 18
In this fashion, apocalyptic literature is not just a narrative on how the world is going
to end, but is also a personal assessment of the current state of society, morality, and the
Islamic tradition’s future. David Cook, in his extensive research on Islamic apocalyptic
literature, further argues that these authors also tended to see themselves as “creators,
looking ahead toward the inevitable end of the world and the meeting with God.”19 As
creators, these authors were inclined to look at everything around them as indisputable
evidence of the inevitability of the approaching Hour and demanded its audiences react
accordingly. In this way, as creators of its own literature (Dabiq), ISIS has created an
apocalyptic vision of the world where time is running out for each human to “exit from

Hayrettin Yücesoy. Messianic Beliefs and Imperial Politics in Medieval Islam: The ʻAbbāsid Caliphate
in the Early Ninth Century. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2009, 8.
17
Yücesoy, Messianic Beliefs and Imperial Politics in Medieval Islam, 11.
18
Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature, 2.
19
David Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press,
2005), 3.
16
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the darkness of shirk (apostasy).”20
Apocalyptic creators, Cook further notes, tend to support their narratives with two
definitive themes—time “because it is so unbelievably short” and meaning because it “is
to be found in everything.”21 The Islamic State’s narrative, fueled by these same themes,
places the group in a distinct moment in Islamic history—the period leading up to the
Final Hour where time becomes shortest and meaning most important. For ISIS, the only
undertaking left for the individual is the choice of living as an apostate in the “land of
nonbelief” or as a believer in the “land of Islam,” where the self-declared caliphate was
awaiting them.
By taking Dabiq as an apocalyptic literature, fresh insight in how ISIS is viewing
itself, the society it is living a part of, and the future projection of the Islamic tradition all
become more apparent. Despite Dabiq sharing a variety of characteristics with other
apocalyptic texts, such an analysis of the magazine has, so far, been entirely dismissed.
This thesis, however, approaches the Islamic State as apocalyptically motivated and its
written text as an apocalyptic literature. In this way, new windows for viewing the
Islamic State, its anxieties, and its future strategies are produced. David Cook, writing
years prior to the formation of ISIS, foresaw apocalyptic speculation becoming
popularized within a modern Muslim society—especially one possessing high levels of
anxiety, violence and warfare, distrust governmental powers, and uncertainty for the
future trajectory of the Islamic tradition. Cook writes:
Then as now, people desired to see meaning in the suffering and uncertainty that
they experience constantly. If one knows that suffering is leading somewhere and
is part of some divine plan, and then it becomes bearable…Muslim apocalypses
are designed to encourage and to warn the believer, and to show him his place in
20
21

Dabiq 3:15
Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature, 3.
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that plan. The material here is also designed for those who are pessimistic about
the ability of Islam to change the world in the short term…to believe that the
world is coming to an immediate end—it is a given that the present form of
religion is insufficient for the purposes of achieving one’s goals. The very
adoption of a worldview that leads to a messianic future implies that the present
system is at least partially a failure.22
Apocalyptic literature, from this angle of approach, is no longer a paranoid belief, but
rather is a view of the world (singular or communal) that attempts to make sense of
current events and the trajectory of the Islamic tradition. When messianic speculation is
no longer discredited as being taboo or the mindset of fanatics, scholars are able to open
new innovative approaches for why Muslim societies turn to apocalyptic sources and
begin to desire a drastic, cosmic, or divine alteration to the present state of reality—
suddenly viewed as a failure for how the future was supposed to look. Apocalyptic
literature, at the very least, should be continued to be analyzed by modern academia, and
those studying ISIS specifically, because “historians are bound to consult any shred of
evidence that they can find.”23
In much the same way, scholars analyzing the Islamic State today should examine
every piece of evidence provided, especially when it is directly produced by the Islamic
State. Even the most “un-believable” details of its apocalyptic narrative, such as the
appearance of the Dajjal, should not be so easily dismissed. These details have within
them a deeper context than what is found on the surface. For within discussion of the
Dajjal and who he might be, fears and anxieties rampant amongst Islamic State members
may be discovered. David Cook was one scholar who saw the deeper benefit of studying
apocalyptic literatures beyond such un-realistic details.
He writes, “Quite a number of the historical apocalypses and even the nightmare
22
23

Cook, Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic, 312.
Yücesoy, Messianic Beliefs and Imperial Politics in Medieval Islam, 10.
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metahistorical apocalypses are strongly reminiscent of events that really occurred. After
all, when one examines even something as extreme as the mass slaughter perpetrated by
the Sufyani or the Dajjal, it is not so different from the behavior of al-Hajajj Ibn Yusuf alThaqafi, the infamous governor of Iraq…The difference is the interpretation given to the
events, and the conclusion to which they lead.”24 The writing transforms from a text
describing the end of the world to a “reflection of a person’s position on social and
political matters.”25
While the names may be changed at times, analyzing apocalyptic literature provides
fresh insight into how a specific community is feeling—through the writing of an
individual—during a moment where everything begins to be viewed as in a state of
turmoil—physically, morally, and spiritually. In a similar approach, understanding ISIS
as apocalyptically inspired group provides additional insight into a variety of social and
religious issues facing those living throughout the Middle East, especially in war-torn
Iraq and Syria during the 21st century.

Possible Problems with Apocalyptic Study
As important as studying the possible insights found in apocalyptic literature, the
small number of English speaking scholars has made this particular field relatively small
and uncharted. David Cook, perhaps the leading scholar of this subject, argues the lack of
interest may be the result of modern scholars regarding “the field…as entirely irrational
and…its [apocalyptic] writers as unstable, or even as lunatics” but does warn that such a
perspective becomes challenging when a “substantial proportion of a population—even if

24
25

Cook, Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic, 20.
Yücesoy, Messianic Beliefs and Imperial Politics in Medieval Islam, 16.
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not the majority—shares a particular world-view.”26
A serious study of this subject should not dismiss messianic belief as just fanatical
speculation of the future. Rather, analyzing apocalyptic literature can be understood as
providing another angle in why apocalyptic tends to arise in the first place. Yücesoy
claims the negative attitude for studying such a subject may be the result of theoretical
and methodological changes that academia underwent in the 19th century. He writes:
Our perceptions of the ideas, events, and individuals of the early Abbasid period
have developed following a set of intellectual and ideological premises that were
popular in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Scholars had thought that
the ‘national’ ambitions of Arabs and Persians played a major role in generating
the Abbasid revolt and, later, the civil war…Even today this sectarian and
nationalistic outlook permeates the thoughts of many scholars in regions where
nation and community building efforts are under way. Furthermore the legacy of
historical positivism, which claims the ability to find facts and sort subjective
claims from objective reality, still lingers in scholarship in various manifestations,
arriving in many cases at normative conclusions about the entirety of Islamic
religion and culture.27
For Yücesoy, the manner in which scholarship developed in the 19th century(in
particular when discussing Islamic history) helps explain why messianic belief today is
often being re-interpreted into secular and nationalistic rhetoric. This, I argue, has also
led to Wood’s assessment that modern approaches to jihadist groups tends to encompass
a “monolithic” approach that adamantly denies religious motivation as being a serious
factor in groups like the Islamic State’s actions and aspirations. Dismissing such
contributions as only political, economic, or social becomes counterintuitive in
developing a multifaceted analysis of the Islamic State.
Another argument often made, in regards to the Islamic State’s apocalyptic nature, is
that if such does exist it is only really held by a small number of members. Another
26
27

Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature,
Yücesoy, Messianic Beliefs and Imperial Politics in Medieval Islam, 5.
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common claim made is that “it is impossible to know whether Baghdadi and other ISIS
leaders truly believe that the end times are near or are using these prophecies
instrumentally and cynically to attract a broader array of recruits.”28 Both of these
approaches, however, avoid taking serious the notion that a large aspect of the Islamic
State’s motivation and recruitment revolves around an apocalyptic narrative that ISIS is
openly discussing. Dismissing the Islamic State’s apocalyptic theology and constructed
narrative (found in Dabiq) avoids a complete comprehension for what the group is doing,
what it is fighting to achieve, and how ISIS plans to go about achieving such goals.

Chapter Breakdown
I have chosen to separate this thesis into two distinct sections to best cover the Islamic
State’s apocalyptic nature. The first section (Chapters one & two) exclusively focus on
the development and transformation that Islamic eschatology and apocalyptic literature
has undergone over time. This will be done while also providing specific examples of
when messianic speculation tended to arise within Islamic societies. In this way, I
highlight how the initial details of Islamic eschatology first formed in the Qur’an,
transformed in the first two centuries after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, and how
the early extra-Qur’anic texts were heavily influenced by the events occurring around the
time they were written—including civil wars, theological debates, and battles against the
Christian Byzantine Empire. In this manner, I bring to light the historical context of the
sources that the Islamic State seems to be influenced by and referencing throughout
Dabiq. This is especially important in regards to the A’maq Cycle, which formed and
developed during this specific period in Islamic history.
28
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Chapter two will proceed to look at exclusively at messianic speculation leading to
revolution—including in Sudan, Iran, and Mecca. The second half of the chapter will
then look at the transformation apocalyptic literature underwent toward the end of the
20th century and the beginning of 21st century—a time that saw the attacks of 9/11, the
American invasion of Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In this way, Chapter
two highlights examples of both messianic uprisings and the radical shift apocalyptic
literature begin to undertake only in the last three decades. In this way, Chapter two lays
the foundation for how apocalyptic speculation has already produced modern revolutions
and how apocalyptic literature has changed in a manner that provided room for increased
anxiety and widespread distrust of Western forces—in particular the United States of
America.
Chapter three begins the second angle of approach in analyzing the Islamic State’s
apocalyptic nature. Rather than exclusively analyze Islamic eschatology, this chapter will
instead focus on the development and formation of the Islamic State over the 21st century.
Beginning with the founder of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, this
chapter will highlight how apocalyptic speculation has been able to develop and adapt
alongside the trajectory of the group from AQI to its present manifestation of the Islamic
State or ISIS. This chapter will help emphasize how messianic speculation first became
rampant following the 2007 announcement of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), how such
speculation nearly led to the complete collapse of ISI in 2009, and how the group
changed its messianic focus from the Mahdi to the A’maq Cycle beginning in 2010 under
the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Chapter four will exclusively analyze all thirteen issues of the Islamic State’s Dabiq
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online magazine. By taking the apocalyptic theology of the Islamic State seriously and as
an important motivating factor in its ongoing development, Dabiq provides fresh insight
into the Islamic State’s motivations, theology, end goals, anxieties, recruitment, and
future strategies in combatting its enemies. Being the crux of my argument, this chapter
will focus on highlighting exactly how Dabiq is influenced by the A’maq Cycle, how it
shares common conspirator views of the world (as modern novels have), and how the
Islamic State is using Dabiq to lay out its attempts at igniting a global religious war
between “true” Muslims and everyone else. In this way, Dabiq becomes an additional
perspective for what the Islamic State wants and how it is going about achieving those
goals.
Pierre Filiu, a scholar of contemporary apocalyptic literatures, noted in the early 21st
century that Islamic eschatology was not only a strong source of inspiration for Muslims
historically, but warned that it may once again be tapped into to provide room for
jihadists to defend the use of wide-scale violence. While writing prior to the formation of
the Islamic State, Filiu seems to have foreseen a terrorist organization taking advantage
of Islamic eschatology in the manner that ISIS seems to have done today. He writes:
Yet one day a larger and more resourceful group, eager to tap the energy of the
‘masses’ as a way of achieving superiority over rival formation, may be strongly
tempted to resort to the messianic gambit. An appeal to the imminence of
apocalypse would provide it with an instrument of recruitment, a framework for
interpreting future developments, and a way of refashioning and consolidating its
own identity. In combination, these things could have far-reaching and deadly
consequences.29
Nearly three years later the Islamic State has fulfilled Filiu’s prediction. By focusing
on Islamic eschatology, the Islamic State cut itself off from Al-Qaeda, called for violent
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jihad against everyone opposed its rule (including Sunni tribes), introduced a strict
version of Shari’a Law, has blown up ancient buildings across Iraq and Syria, legalized
slavery, slaughtered minority religious tribes such as the Yazidis, and claimed that the
announcement of an established caliphate was the first step in fulfilling prophecy. These
strategic moves, alongside an increase in violence toward Muslims across the region,
were not just tactics in pursuit of nationalistic agendas—but instead seem to stem from
the desire to be a part of something much bigger than a government or nation-state.
The actions and motives of the Islamic State, I argue, orbit around a prophesied
victory against the greatest of odds in attempt to protect and purify the Islamic tradition.
The Islamic State’s apocalyptic outlook, in this way, impacts its actions, goals,
recruitment, and theology—and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Without
approaching the Islamic State’s apocalyptic nature as being another serious motivating
factor behind its actions, we ultimately lose sight of a critical component of the group;
one that is influencing its development, recruitment, and strategy in combatting
opponents. The Islamic State, I argue, has been able to combine the words and traits of
classic apocalyptic narratives with an offensive jihad to create a theological movement
that does not stop with airstrikes, the death of a leader, or the loss of a province. Rather
the Islamic State sees itself only stopping with the end of the world, and this is a
dangerous analysis to be overlooked.
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Chapter 1: Islamic Eschatology and the Development of Apocalyptic Literature
As the centuries wore one, the apocalyptic viewpoint of history became more and
more the hallmark of the early traumatic period, and not something necessary for the
Muslim community to continue to develop, since it had developed its own view of
history….we find that historical apocalyptic material is not only relevant in the time it
was created, but is universally relevant and is in constant use and reuse, with the aid of
new interpretation, until our own time.30
David Cook
Before approaching the Islamic State’s own literature, there needs to be further
analysis on possible reasons for why Islamic eschatology began developing so early in
Islamic history. By looking exclusively at what is found in the Qur’an, hadiths, and Kitab
al-Fitan, a gradual development arises in the characteristics that would continue to
influence apocalyptic literature throughout time. If we are to take the Islamic State’s
apocalyptic narrative seriously, with regard to being an additional insight into its outlook
of the world and itself, then it becomes necessary to first look at the sources that ISIS has
been citing and referencing in Dabiq.
Thus, it becomes vital to not only recognize how Islamic eschatology formed but also
within what social and political environments the literatures were written. This becomes
especially important in understanding why the Islamic States has relied heavily upon the
classic sources to construct its own narrative. For example, it would be found in the early
extra-Qur’anic sources the first reference of the Dajjal, battles against Christians, the
return of Jesus and his defeat of the Dajjal, and a global fitna (civil strife or war) amongst
Muslims signifying that the Hour was nearing. As we will later find, all of these issues
have been incorporated into the Islamic State’s own apocalyptic narrative today. In this
way, it becomes crucial to discover how these topics became not only a part of the
Islamic State’s narrative, but also why they were adopted into Islamic eschatology in the
30
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first place.
Understanding the atmosphere in which these literatures were being written will
provide only a more thorough understanding of a variety of terms, references, and end
goals used by ISIS, and will also highlight that apocalyptic literature first arose by way of
early Muslim communities attempting to make sense of the political and sociocultural
environments that they were living in. In this way, along with an absence of apocalyptic
detail in the Qur’an, Islamic eschatology would dramatically develop after the death of
the Prophet Muhammad by beginning to incorporate events occurring during the first two
hundred years after his death. This was often done in an attempt to resolve widespread
anxieties and uncertainties shared by the Muslim community that began looking to the
Final Hour as guidance on how to properly conduct itself in preparation for it.
As will be noted, Islamic eschatology did not develop overnight but has instead
undergone a variety of changes and additions, as a result to the social environments that
the authors were living a part of. Additionally, understanding what is found (or not
found) within these early literatures will help us better grasp the Islamic State’s
apocalyptic literature today and why it is that ISIS decided to choose the classical A’maq
Cycle as inspiration for its own narrative. By examining these historical literatures and
the additions they made to Islamic eschatology, we will uncover numerous similarities
between what is found in them and what the Islamic State is referencing today to support
its narrative and legitimacy as a “prophetic” caliphate.
Approaching historical apocalyptic literature, however, is no easy task and has been a
subject that only a small number of modern scholars have studied and written on—in
some cases entire books discussing classic sources in the from the first two centuries after
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the death of the Prophet Muhammad.31 For this reason the scope of such an entire study
remains well beyond my own research. Since this is the case, I rely on two foundational
works in Islamic eschatological studies for this section: David Cook’s Studies of Muslim
Apocalyptic and Hayrettin Yücesoy’s Messianic Beliefs & Imperial Politics in Medieval
Islam. My contribution will be to draw out the aspects of both works that relate directly
to the development of the A’maq Cycle, which I argue are the foundation of the Islamic
State’s current apocalyptic narrative.
In addition, I will discuss how apocalyptic speculation may have begun in the Islamic
tradition as early as the first twelve years of the Prophethood of Muhammad, fashioning
the early Meccan Surahs of the Qur’an. I will also note how most of the details of Islamic
eschatology and the A’maq Cycle originate directly from the authoritative hadith
collections of Burkari, Muslim, Dawud, and Nu’aym Ibn Hammad’s Kitab al-Fitan. The
scope of research will only be looking at the eschatological narratives from within the
Sunni tradition.32

Cycles of Classical Apocalyptic Literature
We begin this section by first describing the material in the Qur’an that, according to
Cook, demonstrates the first apocalyptic speculation arising within Islamic Eschatology.
Cook divides the classic material (Qur’an, hadiths, Kitab al-fitan, etc) into four distinct
categories in order to allow a deeper study of both common and differing themes of these
See David Cook’s Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic and Hayrettin Yücesoy’s Messianic Beliefs & Imperial
Political in Medieval Isla. Both of these sources were major contributions to this chapter and I owe my
thanks to the extensive work both of these scholars have accomplished on the subject matter.
32
Abbas Amanat’s Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi’ism remains a source I reference periodically,
especially when discussing issues in Chapter Two like the Iranian Revolution. Shi’a apocalyptic literature,
however, has become its own distinct field of study and Cook devotes an entire chapter to the subject. It is
important to note that this subject will be beyond the scope of my own research and specifically plays no
part in understanding ISIS’s narrative.
31

21

earliest literatures. These four major categories are then broken up into sixteen distinct
cycles—each with its own narrative, characters, citations and references, and “enemies”
that will be combatted in battles prior to the Final Hour.33 The differences between these
cycles are occasionally trivial, but at other times they can be quite extensive in describing
what is going to happen during the Final Hour. This discrepancy is often due to the time
period that the apocalyptic author was living in, the issues the society was facing, and the
geographical location the author was living in.34 According to Cook, each cycle should
thus be categorized both by its historical context as well as the material that is discussed
within it.
Using this method of approach, Cook formed the four major classifications of Islamic
apocalyptic literatures—historical apocalypses,35 metahistorical apocalypses,36 messianic
apocalypses,37 and moral apocalypses.38 Cook also found that it would difficult, if not
impossible, to isolate a specific author or literature into just one of these categories. For
this reason, many authors and texts can be a part of differing cycles depending on what
33
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issue they are discussing. For example, Nu’aym b. Hammad’s work (discussed below), at
times, falls under both historical apocalypses and metahistorical apocalypses due to the
amount of sources he cites in his Kitab al-Fitan. One of Nu’aym’s greatest contributions
to Islamic eschatology, however, has been the narratives found within what Cook defines
as the A’maq Cycle—the focus of this thesis. This specific cycle, dealing with a final
battle against Christians, experienced revivals of attention during specific time periods in
Islamic history. This included during the Crusades when war between Christians and
Muslims were at the forefront of the minds of Muslim communities and apocalyptic
authors. In this way, Cook finds that the A’maq Cycle is not “only relevant to the time in
which it was created, but is universally relevant and is in constant use and reuse, with the
aid of new interpretation.”39
This cycle has, I argue, once again become the main source of inspiration in modern
times for the Islamic State’s own apocalyptic narrative, which is heavily focused on
fighting Christians prior to the Final Hour. In this manner, we find that the A’maq Cycle
has its own distinct narrative, characteristics, foes, and understanding for how the end of
the world is going to occur—all stemming from the social and political environments of
the first two hundred years after Muhammad’s death when the Muslim empires were in
constant battle with the Byzantine Empire. This was also a time where there was constant
civil wars occurring internally within the Muslim empire, including the Abbasid
revolution in the middle of the 8th century. As will be noted later, these political and
social issues would help lay the foundation for the A’maq Cycle and allow it to remain
relevant over the course of Islamic history through modernity.
It is, however, important to note that there are many discrepancies between the vast
39
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amount of cycles and classic apocalyptic narratives. Since this is the case, it has become
quite problematic, if not impossible, to find any baseline commonality for what Islamic
eschatology involves. For this reason, I found it best to start with the source of greatest
authority within the Islamic tradition, i.e. the Qur’an. This analysis of the Qur’an will
attempt to demonstrate how eschatology first arose, as well as how eschatology largely
developed from extra-Qur’anic sources.

The Qur’an and Eschatology
When attempting to study the broad subject of Islamic eschatology it is critical to
begin with the Qur’an in order to detect what information is or is not found within the
Islamic tradition’s Holy Scripture and source of highest authority. Since the Qur’an is
thought of as being the direct word of God, it tends to be looked at first for resolving any
spiritual or political issue occurring in a Muslim society. Much like how Islamic Law
would develop through this understanding of the Qur’an’s role in answering questions
during the Middle Ages, apocalyptic authors also tended to view the Qur’an as
possessing higher authority on the end times than other pieces of literature and text within
the tradition. Yet overtime, it will be extra-Qur’anic sources that begin to be most
referenced and cited as sources of authority within Islamic eschatology, specifically in
the late 20th century novels and the Islamic State’s Dabiq.
The reason for this development of citing extra-Qur’anic sources, I argue, was due to
the lack of detail provided in the Qur’an and the vast amount of apocalyptic narratives
developed in the hadiths and Kitab al-Fitan following the death of the Prophet
Muhammad’s death in 632 C.E. Nevertheless, the Qur’an remains important text for this
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research in a number of ways. Alongside providing the first details of Islamic eschatology
on the Final Hour, the Qur’an also provides an opening into the earliest thoughts, fears,
and anxieties of the Muslim community living in Mecca under the guidance of the
Prophet Muhammad. In this manner the Qur’an can, when observed through an
apocalyptic lens, be understood an additional insight into why apocalyptic speculation
arises in Muslim communities.
Cook claims that while “we will never know what exactly the beliefs of the Muslims
in this early period…we understand that the Qur’an is the only certain representative of
the first Muslims” but that it should be still be understood as “an eschatological book not
an apocalyptic book.”40 In this way, Cook highlights two substantial points in regard to
the importance of the Qur’an in the study of apocalyptic literature. First, the Qur’an
should be understood as eschatological literature rather than an apocalyptic text. Second,
the Qur’an is possibly the only “certain” representation of the early Muslim community
that scholars have today, and can be analyzed as being able to provide insight into the
feelings and motives of the early community living under persecution and oppression
from the Quraysh (leading tribe of Mecca at the time).
The latter proponent of Cook’s statement, claiming that the Qur’an is eschatological
rather than apocalyptic, is important to emphasize below. For Cook, the reason behind
this discrepancy is due to the fact that while there is mention of a coming Day of
Judgement (Yam al-Hisab),41 there remains no clear timeline or detail of events (such as
battles) or figures (such as the Dajjal) found with the Qur’an. The reasoning behind this
is that the Qur’an provides a certainty that the end of the world will occur, but fails to
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mention exactly how it will come about or how believers should act prior to its
appearance.
The scholar John B. Taylor makes similar claims about the eschatological
characteristic of the Qur’an but takes a different angle of approach to support his claim.
Taylor argues that the Qur’an is eschatological by how it tends to place its readers into
immediate end time scenarios. This feature constantly demands the reader’s to draw their
attention to their own piety instead of wider and communal issues that will be occurring
during the Final Hour. Taylor contends that the Qur’an’s eschatological message is
“didactic” in this way because it attempts to continuously remove speculation of the Final
Hour “from the background of men’s minds,” by placing “the Judgement and the Afterlife…to the forefront.”42
In this manner, the Day of Judgement demands constant attention from the reader
since each person will be judged according to their own deeds and piety. Taylor goes on
to describe the Qur’an as “a book of promise and threat concerning men’s reward or
punishment on the Last Day”43 rather than a book discussing a “cosmic time scale” like
most apocalyptic literatures attempt to do.44 In this light, the Qur’an lacks providing
ideas on battles, the Dajjal, the Mahdi, or the Byzantines—even though most of these
subjects have dominated Islamic eschatology outside the confines of the Qur’an.
To further support his claim, Taylor discusses how the Qur’an often positions the Day
of Judgement as imminent and that it will appear so swiftly that no one will be able to
avoid it. For Taylor, the Qur’anic mention that “the matter of the Hour is as a twinkling
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of the eye or nearer,” re-enforces the didactic nature of the Qur’an.45 Norman O. Brown,
similarly, argues that while Christian apocalyptic authors have been able to point to the
Books of Revelation, Daniel, or Ezekiel as sources of authority for interpreting the end of
the world, there remains no parallel component found in the Qur’an.
Unlike the Bible’s narrative “running from Genesis to Apocalypse,” the Qur’anic
narrative of the end times “is not reached at the end of a line” but rather implies
“eschatology can break out at any moment.”46 This echoes the arguments that John
Taylor previously made on the didactic nature of the Qur’an. Since the Qur’an’s
structure and layout is from longest to shortest Surah (and not a beginning and end), the
text is able to continuously warn readers that the Day of Judgement is approaching. By
lacking precise details on what will exactly occur, while also promising the inevitability
of the Hour, the Qur’an becomes an eschatological text that may be highlighting the
feelings of the first Muslim community who may have been preparing for the Final
Hour’s manifestation at any instant.

Signs of the Hour in the Qur’an
Without a clear description for what is to occur during the Final Hour within the
Qur’an, there has been a wide range of speculation and disagreement among Muslims
and scholars alike in filling in missing details. Since the Qur’an often has been described
as an eschatological text due to the lack of such detail, it is important to note that the text
does still make mention of signs of the Hour (ashrat al-Sa’a) that are to appear during the
Final Hour—not prior to it. This phrase is used over forty times within the Qur’an, as
45
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well as another common phrase “there is no doubt that the Hour will come,” which can
be found in Surahs (Chapters) 18:21, 22:7, 40:59, and 45:32.47 Yet, the context of these
passages tends to reiterate the concept that the Final Hour had already begun and
judgment is approaching. Signs of the Hour also tend to be understood as coming directly
from the mandate of God and thus inescapable. The Signs, in this way, serve the purpose
of both verifying to believers that the Final Hour had started and as punishment sent
against non-believers.
An example is found in Surah 44:10-12 where there is mention of a smoke coming
upon the earth during the Final Hour, “Then watch though for the Day That the sky will
Bring forth a kind Of smoke plainly visible Enveloping the people: This will be a Penalty
Grievous. (They will say) ‘Our Lord! Remove The Penalty from us, for we do really
believe!” Another example is found in Surah 27:82 where there is mention of a Beast
coming to earth as punishment against non-believers, “And when the Word is Fulfilled
against them (the unjust) We shall produce from the earth A Beast to (face) them: He will
speak to them, For that mankind did not Believe with assurance in our Signs.”
In this way, both of these Signs of the Hour serve as divine punishment against those
who denied the message of Muhammad or the existence of God. It is, however, important
to note that the word “signs” can and often does serve a multitude of functions outside of
association with the Final Hour. Descriptions of signs, in this way, are typically
referenced as either proof of God’s existence, the divine power of God, or the legitimacy
of God’s prophets—all of which have tended to be continuously denied by non-believers.
For example, in Surah 40:81 there is made mention of God’s signs provided to humanity

47

Cook, Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic, 270.

28

in hopes of them believing in God’s existence, “And he shows you (always) His signs:
then which Of the Signs of Allah Will ye deny?” In a similar fashion, Surah 30:22 claims,
“And among His Signs Is the creation of the heavens And the earth, and the variations In
your languages and your colors; verily In that are Signs For those who know.” These
examples help stress that the term “signs” can, and often are, mentioned outside the
context of being associated with the Final Hour.
Signs, however, have been typically understood in later apocalyptic literatures as
being directly related to the Final Hour and as means for the world to begin realizing the
immediacy of the Day of Judgement. In this way, Signs are typically separated into
“Lesser Signs of the Hour” or “Greater Signs of the Hour.” The Lesser Signs usually
include events such as “natural events designed to warn humanity that the end is near and
to bring people into a state of repentance.”48 These Lesser Signs also tend to be less
apparent than the greater signs and can be easily over-looked—especially among nonbelievers. For Cook, the Lesser Signs tend to be applicable to any society across time and
space and thus are used by authors for “inciting apocalyptic enthusiasm at any given
time.”49 This has most especially become the case in modern apocalyptic literatures
where current events are inherently tied to being the Lesser Signs of the Hour.
The Greater Signs of the Hour, however, usually are projected to come at the end of
the Final Hour, are entirely unavoidable, and tend to be associated with what information
is provided within the Qur’an. Cook defines the Greater Signs as “a series of events of
ever-increasing severity that will precede the end of the world, at which time the damned
will be judged and the blessed will begin to taste the pleasures God has in store for them
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in heaven.”50 Another scholar claims the “major signs will include the decline of Islam
[and] altering the natural order such as the sun rising in the west or the eclipse of the
sun.”51 In this manner, the Greater Signs often do appear in the Qur’an but tend to be
either cosmological or natural disasters. Examples of such include the “Sun rising in the
West” (44:10), the ripping apart of the sky (84:1), and the appearance of Yajuj and Majuj
(Gog and Magog) 18:94.52
These Qur’anic signs, however, remained to be understood as being enacted by the
will of God and are nothing Muslim communities can stop or prevent. Rather, they serve
as indications that the Final Hour is concluding and that Judgment will soon commence.
It would appear, however, that two of the most cited and referenced signs of the Hour
taken from the Qur’an tend to be the appearance of Gog and Magog and the Second
Coming of Jesus. The appearances of both of these characters come towards the end of
the Hour and are essential in bringing about the messianic future.

Gog and Magog
The figures known as Gog and Magog have, overtime, become two of the most
referenced Signs. They tend to be understood as being punishments for humanity’s
disbelief. Surah 18:94 describes them, “They Said: ‘O Dhu al Qarnayn! [Often associated
with Alexander the Great] The Gog and Magog (people) Do great mischief on earth:
Shall we then render thee Tribute in order that Thou mightiest erect a barrier between us
and them? On that day We shall Leave them to surge Like waves on one another; The
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trumpet will be blown, And We shall Collect them All together.”
There has been speculation, within the Islamic tradition, that the barrier mentioned is
the Great Wall of China and was constructed by Alexander the Great. In this way, the
tradition believes this barrier will keep the two creatures hidden from earth until the
sound of a trumpet blast. Whether these two characters are actual ‘beasts’ or metaphoric
manifestations of foreign tribes (both explanations have been given in apocalyptic
literatures), they are usually understood as bringing widespread destruction to the world
and will be nearly unstoppable.
While typically viewed as “the peoples of the East,” Gog and Magog have also
historically been understood as being a “nomadic invasion.”53 In much the same way that
the A’maq cycle received revitalization during the crusades, Gog and Magog would end
up receiving large amounts of attention and speculation within apocalyptic literatures
during the Mongol Sack of Baghdad in 1258 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979. It is, however, important to note that the two figures oddly do not play any large
part of the Islamic State’s narrative. This, I argue, has been a result of ISIS constructing
its apocalyptic narrative through the A’maq Cycle which had developed when Muslims
were combatting the Byzantines rather than nations from the East. The evolution for how
apocalyptic writers would discuss and reference Gog and Magog is mentioned here to
emphasize the continuous shifting that can occur with interpreting Qur’anic signs of the
Hour. This, again, is often a result of the social and political environments of the time and
region in which apocalyptic literatures were being written.
Another notable feature of these characters (shared across apocalyptic narratives),
Cook notes, is that they tend to be described as engaging in horrific acts of moral
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indecency including eating corpses and aborted fetuses.54 For this reason, Cook places
Gog and Magog into the “Messianic Apocalypse” category because their appearance
during the Final Hour is meant to bring to reality the “justice and righteousness lacking in
the everyday commonplace world [that] can only be restored by a messianic figure by
means of the sword.”55 Through this analysis of their end time role, Gog and Magog have
been understood as being sent by God as a divine punishment because “things need to
sing as low as possible before they can be purified and be cleaned up.” 56 The appearance
of Gog and Magog, in this way, must be followed by the appearance of this messianic
figure capable of destroying the two figures prior to the Day of Judgement.

The Second Coming of Jesus and Fitna
The end time role of Jesus as a messianic figure has been disputed historically, but
apocalyptic scholars and some Muslims point to Surah 4:157-158 as evidence of his
eschatological appearance. “They said ‘We killed Christ Jesus The Son of Mary, The
Messenger of Allah’—But they killed him not. Nor crucified him…For of a surety They
Killed him not—Nay, Allah raised him up Unto himself; and Allah is Exalted in
Power.”57 Within this Surah is a dispute on whether or not Jesus was crucified, where
apocalyptic writers (and Muslims) tend to agree that he was instead raised up to heaven
waiting for his appearance during the Final Hour.
Another, and more notable, reference of Jesus’s eschatological presence in the Qur’an
comes from Surah 43:61. This passage is from the viewpoint of Jesus (according to some
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commentators) where he was noted as stating, “And this shall be A Sign (for the coming
Of) the Hour (of Judgement): Therefore have no doubt About the (Hour), but Follow ye
Me: this is a Straight Way.”58 In this way, it would appear in the Qur’an that Jesus
possesses a critical role during the Final Hour. The return of Jesus and his role in the final
battles of al-Malhamah al-Kubra have historically been referenced in apocalyptic
literatures, but only received revitalization within the last few decades—including
playing a major part in Islamic State’s own apocalyptic narrative. For example Issue 5 of
Dabiq states:
A number of the narrations concerning the events that take place in Sham as the
Hour draws closer include the mention of Isa Ibn Maryam (Jesus)…These
narrations typically speak of the final battles that the Muslims will engage in with
the Christians and Jews, including the confrontation in which the Muslims are led
by Isa against the Dajjal. If Allah had willed, He could have left the Muslims to
witness this epic engagement under the leadership of an ordinary man from
amongst them. Instead, He decreed that it would be a Prophet.59

In this way, the Islamic State understands and views Jesus as playing a pivotal part in
its constructed narrative. This again is due to how his eschatological role developed from
the A’maq Cycle. In most classic apocalyptic accounts, Jesus is viewed as coming to
earth and being among the final group of Muslims during Morning Prayer before
proceeding to kill the Dajjal (Antichrist). Other notable accounts mentioned that Jesus
would “destroy” the cross upon his appearance. This served as a way of stressing the
theological debate between Christians and Muslims and emphasizes that Jesus would not
understand why the former would worship his crucifixion instead of God. Both of these
Islamic apocalyptic understandings may have been a direct result of the theological
disputes occurring between Christians and early Muslim communities in the centuries
58
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after Muhammad’s death.60
What these examples highlight, however, is that Jesus adopted a large role in Islamic
eschatology despite the lack of detail found within the Qur’an. Both ISIS and other
apocalyptic literatures and narratives understand Jesus playing an important role in the
Final Hour despite the lack of specificity in the tradition’s source of authority. There is
mention of him in the Qur’an but such references lack any discussion of a final
confrontation with Gog and Magog or killing of the Dajjal—the latter being a major point
of emphasis in the A’maq Cycle. Cook claims that this may have been a result because
early on in Islamic history, “Jesus’ position…was very much in flux…and apparently the
combination of the polemical relationship with Christianity and the developing cult of the
Prophet’s family ensured that he was gradually reduced to…the Dajjal Cycle, in which he
remains to kill the Dajjal.” 61 While the messianic role of Jesus during the Final Hour is
referenced in the Qur’an, there appears to again be ample evidence that the majority of
his narrative developed in the extra-Qur’anic sources.
In a similar manner, another major missing apocalyptic feature of the Qur’an, which
would later became a major point of emphasis for how Muslims would begin discussing
the signs of the Hour, is the term fitna. This term seems to have been developed in extraQur’anic sources during the centuries after Muhammad’s death—largely due to the
influence of Nu’aym’s Kitab al-Fitan on Islamic eschatology. Whereas the term is later
identified in these extra-Qur’anic sources as meaning civil strife, war, or internal disorder
amongst the Muslim population prior to the Final Hour, the Qur’an never mentions it in
such a manner. The scholar Hayrettin Yücesoy points out that the term is never

60
61

Cook, Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic, 104.
Ibid., 139.

34

mentioned alongside of or in connection with the apocalypse or Final Hour within the
Qur’an. Rather fitna is typically discussed within the Qur’an as meaning either a civil
trial (Q 8:28), dissension (Q 37), seduction (Q 7:27), persecution (Q 2:191), or plots of
conspiracy (Q 9:47-48).62
Yücesoy notes, “Given this absence of any apocalyptic meaning attached to the term
fitna in the Qur’an, its apocalyptic connotations must therefore be ascribed to the civil
war generation in the decades following the death of Muhammad.”63 In this light, it
would be the civil wars that would begin to understand the term in an apocalyptic
manner. Cook describes that from this change that occurred the term would begin to be
understood in apocalyptic literatures as a “continual down-spiral of events…leading to a
very narrow point through which only the best can pass. This point is the crisis point, the
fitna.”64 The French Scholar Jean-Pierre Filiu also notes that the phrase undertook an
apocalyptic connotation in the centuries after the death of the Prophet Muhammad where,
“the end of times [were] generally treated under the rubric of dissension (fitan, plural of
fitna), for quarrels among Muslims, it was believed, must inevitably accompany and
precipitate an apocalyptic course of events.”65
Here again there begins to be evidence to support that major aspects of Islamic
eschatology, especially the Islamic State’s narrative, developed from outside the Qur’an.
With such a lack of specificity in regard to what the “Signs of the Hour” represented in
the Qur’an, early Muslim communities would only have been provided with a promise
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that the world would end prior to the Day of Judgement.66 The lack of detail found in the
Qur’an on identifying lesser signs occurring within society allowed for early Muslim
societies, after the death of Muhammad, to begin speculating on clues for when the world
was going to end.
According to the Qur’an, however, such details are only known by God. This notion
expands upon the notion that the Final Hour could appear at any moment and believers
should be prepared for it. Surah 16:77, for example, states, “To Allah belongeth the
Mystery of the heavens and the earth. And the decision of the Hour (of Judgement) is as
the twinkling of an eye, or even quicker: For Allah hath power over all things.”67 Similar
assertions can be found in Surah 7:187, “They ask thee about the Final Hour—when will
be its appointed time?” While Surah 31:34 repeats this view, “Verily the knowledge of
the Hour is with Allah alone,” as does Surah 33:63 “Men ask thee concerning the Hour:
Say, ‘The knowledge thereof is with Allah alone.”68 Believers were not left without any
indication on the details regarding the Final Hour, but rather were left, in the Qur’an,
with a promise that only God would know when it is going to occur.

Muhammad and Apocalyptic Inclinations in Mecca
While it is important to note information on the signs of the Hour within the Qur’an in
order to highlight how Islamic eschatology developed from extra-Qur’anic materials, it is
also vital to discuss possible explanations for why apocalyptic speculation may have been
a part of the scripture at all. As Cook stated, “While we will never know what exactly the
beliefs of the Muslims in this early period…we understand that the Qur’an is the only
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certain representative of the first Muslims.” Through this mode of thought there can now
be a deeper analysis on the early Muslim community’s possible anxieties during the
lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad.69
There is no absolute certainty of such a claim, but there remains a strong possibility
that these early apocalyptic references and claims arose due to high levels of religious
persecution and oppression the first Muslim community faced in Mecca from the leading
Quraysh tribe. By analyzing the specific time period prior to Muhammad’s migration to
Medina, I argue that apocalyptic speculation was heavily discussed in the revelations
given between 610 and 622 C.E due to the persecution the community was facing at this
time. Recently, as Cook has attempted to argue, there has been an increase of contentions
that the Qur’an’s eschatological narrative may have been a result of a mass sharing of
religious texts in the region, especially in regard to the Books of Daniel and Revelation.70
While this approach has become a topic of research for a variety of current Islamic
scholars, I find that such a method of approach (for this thesis) fails to offer additional
insights for how apocalyptic thought may have played a major motivating factor behind
the development of the early Muslim community.
Rather, I approach this specific timeframe by bracketing the Qur’an away from any
possible outside textual influence from other religious scriptures. I attempt to view the
Qur’an as a literature containing the views and anxieties that may have been held by
Muhammad and/or early Muslim community (much the same way I do with Dabiq in
Chapter four). Through this method of approach, I was able to uncover similar traits
between how the Prophet Muhammad may have viewed the Meccan society of his time to
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that of later apocalyptic authors understandings of their own societies.
Cook has stated that, “The very adoption of a worldview that leads to a messianic
future implies that the present system is at least partially a failure,” and I find that this is
common trait for all Islamic apocalyptic/eschatological narratives. This notion has been
reinforced with how the Islamic tradition views history prior to either the birth of
Muhammad in 570 or his first revelation in 610 C.E. as being a part of al-Jahiliyyah (the
age of ignorance). The time period before the advent of Islam is traditionally viewed as
being spiritually and morally blind, practicing the worship of many gods, and a time ruled
by tribal affiliations through bloodlines. The Islamic tradition’s designation of the time
prior to Muhammad’s Prophethood as being in a state of ignorance highlights that the
early communities were viewing the system they were living a part of as a failure and in
need of sweeping change.
Whether this means that change would be as a result of the end of the world or another
factor remains up for debate, but by approaching of the Qur’an as an eschatological
literature there is evidence that Muhammad and his earliest followers may have possessed
similar, if not identical, worldviews that later apocalyptist authors did. The desire for
change of the present system, for Muhammad, centered on the notion that he had been
given the duty of bringing monotheism and the religion of Abraham to the Arabs who
were (at that time) practicing paganism. Some of his earliest revelations centered on
conveying the message of tawhid (One God) and is found in Surah 112, “Say: He is One,
God the Self-Sufficient, He did not beget, nor was He begotten, And unto Him there is
equal no one.”
Muhammad’s attempt to convey a new religious monotheistic message resulted in
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opposition and persecution from the leading Quraysh tribe in a number of ways. Early on
counterclaims to his message came in the form of reports and accusations that
Muhammad was either possessed, a poet, or a soothsayer rather than the messenger of
God. These accusations were done in a manner to somehow delegitimize the message that
Muhammad was giving to the Meccans but were adamantly refuted within early Meccan
revelations including in Surah 69:40-41, “That this is Verily the word of an honored
messenger; It is not the word Of a poet: Little it is Ye believe!”
Whereas accusations such as this were the first levels of persecution that Muhammad
faced when preaching his religious message, there soon came violent threats against the
converts to Islam, political boycotts of Muhammad’s followers that were merchants,71
and even an alleged plot to assassinate Muhammad.72 This only became more prevalent
once Muhammad began amassing a larger community of followers in Mecca and began
challenging the Quraysh leaders who were in charge of the Ka’ba and the trade circles
within Mecca.
By making a claim that he was receiving revelations from God, Muhammad seemingly
placed himself above the leaders of Mecca and endangered their positions of power. By
the year 615, only two years after his call to public preaching (that came to him in a
revelation from the Angel Gabriel) one of the opponents of Muhammad’s message,
named Abu-Jahl, began to establish economic sanctions against the Muslim community
of Mecca—including a report that Abu Bakr (the first caliph after Muhammad’s death)
71
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would lose nearly 35,000 dirhams between the time that he converted and the time the
community migrated to Medina in 622 C.E.73 Under the leadership of Abu-Jahl, Meccan
tribes opposing Muhammad’s message would form an alliance and boycotted
Muhammad, the early converts to Islam, and Muhammad’s uncle’s Hashim tribe (that
had been offering Muhammad protection).74
As a result of these economic sanctions and physical threats, and after the death of his
uncle Ali Talib, Muhammad chose to migrate his community to the city of Yathrib (later
changed to Medina) they would be free to practice their faith without persecution and
oppression. Other faults of Meccan society that was at the forefront of the early Islamic
message included social injustices and worshiping of many gods at the Ka’ba (which
housed over 360 different gods at the time). This became extremely problematic since
Muhammad claimed the structure had been established by Ishmael and Abraham
centuries prior and should only be where the worship of the One God took place. One of
the examples of Muhammad’s social critique of the Meccan society can be found in
Surah 93:9-11, “As for the orphan, oppress not, As for the beggar, refuse not, As for thy
Lord’s mercy, expatiate.”75 This helps demonstrate that early on in Muhammad’s life as a
prophet there was high concern about the injustice befalling Meccans as well as that he
believed his religious movement would resolve those issues and bring the society back to
worshiping the one true God.
The early disagreements with the Meccan leaders and Muhammad’s desire to migrate
his community away from persecution and oppression to a region where they could freely
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practice their religion would later be referenced and used as an example for how Muslims
should conduct themselves when facing similar threats over the course of history. Such
an example has once again been used, discussed in chapter 4, by the Islamic State with
how they are claiming, “The first priority is to perform Hijrah from wherever you are to
the Islamic State, from dar ul-kufr (land of disbelief) to dar ul-Islam (the land of
Islam).”76 Here, in a similar manner to Muhammad’s migration to Medina, there has been
a call for “pious” Muslims to leave a land where they are oppressed to a land where they
are welcomed and can practice their religion without fears of persecution from
governments. It would only be once the community lived in Medina that the focus of
Muhammad’s message would turn toward political questions as well as warfare with the
Quraysh leaders of Mecca.
Looking at the Qur’an and the early Meccan period (610-622), we discover that while
the earliest Surahs discussed a broad range of spiritual themes—one major one was the
coming Day of Judgment. Carl Ernst, for example, attempted to develop a more complete
understanding of not only when revelations were given to Muhammad (in Mecca or
Medina), but has also attempted to pull out the major themes of each Surah. Ernst’s
analysis highlighted that it was during the early Meccan years that Muhammad’s
revelations gravitated toward end time speculations and a certainty of the coming Day of
Judgement where the non-believers and pagans would be punished. The fact that the very
structure of the Qur’an, from longest Surah to shortest, is composed of early Meccan
Surahs, mid-late Meccan Surahs, and Medinan Surahs made such an analysis no easy
task. Yet by looking apocalyptic references in these early Surahs alongside what was
occurring to the community while in Mecca, there is evidence that Muhammad and his
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early followers were at least discussing an approaching Day of Judgement in line with
high levels of religious persecution and economic oppression.
It would be impossible to prove such with absolute certainty, but it does become more
plausible when analyzing the feelings and fears of the early Muslim community in Mecca
alongside the revelations that were being given to Muhammad during this time period.
William Montgomery Watt, in his extended work on the biography of Muhammad,
theorizes that the “new religious movement of Islam must somehow or other have risen
out of the conditions in Mecca in Muhammad’s time” and that “a new religion cannot
come into being without a sufficient motive.”77 What this motive was, whether a demand
for social justice or a strong belief in an approaching Day of Judgement, may never be
entirely discovered, but Watt’s statement clues us into reasons for why the Islamic
tradition was able to spread so quickly.
It is through this reasoning that there has recently been an increase in arguments that
Muhammad may have seen himself as the final warner of the things to come.78 One of the
earliest revelations to Muhammad is thought to have been “O though wrapped up (In a
mantle!) Arise and deliver thy warning! And thy Lord Do thou glorify And thy garments
Keep free from stain! And all abomination shun! Nor expect, in giving, Any increase (for
thyself)! But, for thy Lord’s (Cause) Be patient and constant! Finally, when the Trumpet
is sounded, That will be—that Day—A Day of Distress—Far from easy For those
without Faith.”79
In this light, not only was Muhammad bringing a warning to the Meccan society of
their actions, but also insists there would be a repercussion for those who deny his
77
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warning on the Day of Judgement. Such an underlining theme of Muhammad’s earliest
message, while debated amongst scholars, provides additional understanding for how
Muhammad may have been viewing the society around him and that they would be soon
punished during Final Hour. This is not to imply that there were not also other major
themes and motivations behind the earliest revelations—such as the oneness of God,
power of God, role of prophets, etc.—but that one major theme during the early Meccan
period was discussing the Day of Judgement and punishment to those who deny the
reality of the one God.
Watt, however, does hypothesize that there may have already been an occurring shift
in thinking in Mecca during the decades prior to Muhammad’s first revelation, and this
was due in large part to the influx of trade occurring in the region.80 Watt speculates that
the development of the Islamic tradition may have been influenced by material changes
to the society, “from a pastoral, nomadic economy to a mercantile one…The essential
situation out of which Islam emerged was the contrast and conflict between the Meccans
nomadic outlook and attitudes and the new material environment in which they found
themselves.”81 This line of thinking, however, may be a result of more modern
approaches and skepticism of the energy and appeal of apocalyptic belief in communities
under high levels of oppression and persecution.
Brown counters and argues that the development and use of apocalyptic speculation
could have been one of the only ways to generate a religious revolution in the Arabian
Peninsula during the seventh century. He writes, “to start a new civilization is not to
introduce some refinement in higher culture but to change the imagination of the
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masses.”82 For scholars such as Brown, there would have needed to be a major inspiration
for early followers of Muhammad to spread their message. The religious transformation
of Meccan society should not be simplified to being exclusively the result of economic
innovations and influx of trade on the region, but may have also been largely influenced
by the religious undertones of Muhammad’s message. In a similar thought Yücesoy
contends that, “Despite their manifest religious character, messianic beliefs are actually
this-worldly and…criticize the existing social and political order and the way that power
is distributed in society, and demand an overhaul of society.”83As we will later discover,
the appeal of apocalyptic speculation can be quite empowering to pockets of believers
under the weight of oppression who view their society as a failure and in need of drastic
change.
Ernst’s separation and dissection of Surahs in the Qur’an, by when they were
revealed, has helped create a new discussion of the message of Muhammad in the first
decade of his Prophethood by highlighting that the Day of Judgement was a common
theme. Ernst additionally points out that it is during these early Meccan Surahs that the
coming Final Hour was described as “a vision to masterfully display not only a
transforming vision of divine punishment of the iniquitous cities of the past but also the
pure vision of reward and punishment in the events at the end of time.”84 Some scholars
have even recently suggested that an immediate belief in the end of world may help
explain unsolved questions plaguing the Islamic tradition since the death of
Muhammad—especially why it was that he did not openly choose a successor during his
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lifetime.85
What these scholars have done in their groundbreaking research is provide a fresh and
innovative approach for understanding not only the social conditions that the Islamic
tradition may have developed under, but also why apocalyptic speculation may have
become an integral proponent of the tradition’s projection and the literatures written after
the death of Muhammad. Yet it remains important to note that the Qur’an, while being
the earliest literature of the first Muslim community, remains partial in describing how
the end of the world was going to occur. As will be shown below, the majority of the
details and characteristics of Islamic eschatology developed from extra-Qur’anic sources
such as the hadith collections and Kitab-al-Fitan. Before continuing onto this point I use
Rudi Paret’s summary for what the apocalypse looks like within the Qur’an:
The earth begins to move violently. It staggers, quakes, and is crushed and
flattened. It brings forth what is inside of it and empties itself. Like a mirage the
mountains assume variable forms. They collapse, are like teased wool and
disintegrate into sand and dust. Heaven will be like molten metal and rent
asunder, split open and full of gaping holes. The sun will be coiled up. The moon
darkened…Indeed the images of the events on the last day…have been designed
and formulated with the intention to shock the audience, to foreshadow the terror
that, at some time in the future, on the last day, will seize all of creation.86
I use this summary to highlight the major details within the Qur’anic narrative of the
end times. Most notably that destruction and Judgment will “seize all of creation,” which
implies that no individual will be able to avoid the ever approaching Day of Judgement
and that they will be either rewarded or punished according to their deeds. This is a
similar concept that the Islamic State expresses within its own apocalyptic narrative,
where ISIS openly discussed in Dabiq that there is now no longer a “grayzone” among
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the world’s population. According to this dissolution of the “grayzone” in the Islamic
State’s narrative the Final Hour does not allow for any level indecisiveness on the part of
the individual. In a similar manner the Islamic State has constructed an apocalyptic
narrative that forces the individual to decide between belief and dis-belief and that they
will be punished accordingly.
Another important facet in Paret’s summary is on the emphasis of natural and
cosmological events as being signs of the end of the world. There remains no mention of
a fitna amongst Muslims, the Dajjal, wars against Christians, or the killing of apostates,
Jews, and non-believers. Yet all of these details have since become integral components
of Islamic apocalyptic literature, both in the classic sources as well as in modern novels
in the 20th century. The inherent lack of discussion within the Qur’an on these subjects
highlights the influence extra-Quranic sources have had on Islamic eschatology, and has
offered apocalyptic authors the ability to interpret and reinterpret a vast amount of extraQuranic materials to fit their own narrative.

The Apocalypse and Extra-Qur’anic Sources
The inherent lack of detail on the signs of the Hour found in the Qur’an and the
sudden death of Muhammad may have been the leading reasons behind the gradual
increase in extra-Qur’anic eschatological writings to develop in the three centuries
following 632 C.E. Particularly within the Sunni Tradition the death of Muhammad
meant that there could be no additional revelations, prophets, or prophecies in the world.
Since this is the traditional understanding from the Sunni tradition, it remains reasonable
that the earliest Muslim communities may have still been anticipating the coming Day of
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Judgement in the years following Muhammad’s death. This may have even been more so
with the circulation of a hadith claiming that Muhammad told his followers asking about
the Final Hour, “If this young boy lives, he may not grow very old till (he would see) the
Last Hour coming to you.”87
If there were still apocalyptic speculations present in the Muslim community they may
have been anticipating it would occur sooner rather than later, and would have been
viewing everything in the world as being signs that the end was near. What is clear is that
details such as where the final battles would take place and the identity of the Dajjal are
entirely absent from the Qur’an and must have developed in extra-Qur’anic sources.88
These missing details were, as we now know, later inserted into the Islamic
eschatological narrative and over the course of history have become essential details to
how the Final Hour was going to occur. These additions were in large part a result of
hadith (sayings or examples of the Prophet Muhammad) collections of Muhammad ibn
Isma’il al-Bukhari (b. 809), Abu Dawud (b.817) and Abu al-Husayn Muslim (b. 816),89
and from Nu’aym ibn Hammad’s (b. 771) Kitab al-Fitan.90
Scholars and Muslims alike have historically viewed the early hadith collections of
Bukhari, Dawud, and Muslim as the leading authentic and authoritative works that were
collected during the first centuries after the death of Muhammad.91 All three of these
divide a vast amount of narratives and supposed sayings coming from either Muhammad
or his early followers in order to separate the most authentic accounts from those that
were thought to be less accurate. The hadiths deemed more authentic typically gained a
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higher level of authority within the Islamic tradition due to possessing a stronger isnad
(chain of transmission). The isnad traces itself back to the sayings of the Prophet
Muhammad, or an early companion of his, through a variety of witnesses who claim to
either have heard it directly from Muhammad or from someone else who did. For
example, with the hadith mentioned above, the isnad would be “Anas reported that a
person asked Allah's Messenger as to when the Last Hour would come.”92
In this manner the more closely an isnad was to either Muhammad or an early
companion the more authenticity and authority it received. Since these three authors
became leading authorities through their collection of the most authentic hadiths, their
writings on the Final Hour have also become influential and authoritative. In fact, the
Islamic State’s references to the Day of Judgement tend to also be taken from the works
of one or more of these men as a way of supporting their narrative. Issue 1 of Dabiq, for
example, references a hadith found in Muslim’s collection,
The Last Hour would not come until the Romans would land at al-A'maq or in
Dabiq. An army consisting of the best (soldiers) of the people of the earth at that
time will come from Medina (to counteract them). When they will arrange
themselves in ranks, the Romans would say: Do not stand between us and those
(Muslims) who took prisoners from amongst us. Let us fight with them; and the
Muslims would say: Nay, by Allah, we would never get aside from you and from
our brethren that you may fight them. They will then fight and a third (part) of the
army would run away, whom Allah will never forgive. A third (part of the army)
which would be constituted of excellent martyrs in Allah's eye, would be killed
and the third who would never be put to trial would win and they would be
conquerors of Constantinople. And as they would be busy in distributing the
spoils of war (amongst themselves) after hanging their swords by the olive trees,
the Satan would cry: The Dajjal has taken your place among your family. They
would then come out, but it would be of no avail. And when they would come to
Syria, he would come out while they would be still preparing themselves for
battle drawing up the ranks. Certainly, the time of prayer shall come and then
Jesus (peace be upon him) son of Mary would descend and would lead them in
prayer. When the enemy of Allah would see him, it would (disappear) just as the
salt dissolves itself in water and if he (Jesus) were not to confront them at all,
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even then it would dissolve completely, but Allah would kill them by his hand
and he would show them their blood on his lance (the lance of Jesus Christ).
This particular hadith was also a major point of emphasis in Nu’aym’s Kitab al-Fitan
and has since become an integral proponent of the A’maq Cycle. The cycle receives its
name from the piece of land that the final battles between the Romans (Byzantines or
Christians) and Muslims would take place. Included in it is also mention of the Dajjal,
three groups of Muslims that will exist during the Final Hour, and the return of Jesus
(Isa). This insertion into Islamic eschatology becomes especially important due to the
notion that the Islamic State’s apocalyptic narrative seems to be gravitating around this
A’maq Cycle and makes constant references to its narration on how the end of the world
is going to occur. According to Cook, the A’maq Cycle is “is fundamental to the study of
Muslim apocalyptic, since the basic story line is repeated in most of the major
traditions.”93 Cook’s point highlights the continued influence that the early hadiths have
had over time on Islamic eschatology and even today remains so with ISIS’s apocalyptic
narrative.
As this hadith highlights, there was a rapid expansion of detail for how the end of the
world would occur between what is found in the Qur’an’s narrative compared to what is
found in hadiths and Kitab al-Fitan. This example helps demonstrate there being an early
desire by early Muslims to fill in the missing gaps of the Qur’an and may have been a
direct result from the political situation of the time this cycle was being constructed.
Cook notes, “It is rather interesting to speculate that the Qur’anic prohibition [on
predicting the time of the Hour] may have led to the development of apocalyptic
traditions in another way, since merely watching the signs and portents of the end was not
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prohibited, and even encouraged, and so this could have assisted the legitimization of this
activity at its beginning.”94 In this way the early Muslim communities would have been
expecting that the end could occur at any moment and would have possibly been viewing
everything around them as being signs of its nearness.
It would seem that the titles these three hadith collectors gave their books on
apocalyptic sayings and narratives tended to only further emphasize the idea that the
Final Hour was coming. For example, Bukhari titled his section of apocalyptic hadiths
and sayings Book of Afflictions and the End of the World, while Dawud titled his Kitab
al-malhamah, and Muslim gave his the title of The Book of Tribulations and Portents of
the Last Hour and devoted nearly 143 hadiths for discussing signs of the Final Hour.95
Within these books were the sayings and accounts of the Prophet Muhammad and his
earliest companions. The amount of additions brought to Islamic eschatology through
these collections is quite numerous and remains by itself an entire realm of study and
analysis, but I will make mention of some of the lasting additions they developed that
have become points of interest for later apocalyptic authors.
One of these major contributions was a detailed account of the character of the Dajjal.
The Dajjal, while not mentioned in the Qur’an, has become one of the most referenced
figures throughout Islamic apocalyptic writings. It is central to note that all three of these
apocalyptic collections make reference to the Dajjal as well as his physical
characteristics—which would later be adopted by modern authors when attempting to
argue who the Dajjal would be. The most noteworthy account, and perhaps the first to be
recorded, on the Dajjal comes from Bukhari’s Book of Afflictions and the End of the
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World:
The Prophet mentioned the Masih Ad-Dajjal in front of the people saying, Allah
is not one-eyed while Masih Ad-Dajjal is blind in the right eye and his eye looks
like a bulging out grape. While sleeping near the Ka`ba last night, I saw in my
dream a man of brown color the best one can see amongst brown color and his
hair was long that it fell between his shoulders. His hair was lank and water was
dribbling from his head and he was placing his hands on the shoulders of two men
while circumambulating the Ka`ba. I asked, 'Who is this?' They replied, 'This is
Jesus, son of Mary.' Behind him I saw a man who had very curly hair and was
blind in the right eye, resembling Ibn Qatan (i.e. an infidel) in appearance. He was
placing his hands on the shoulders of a person while performing Tawaf around the
Ka`ba. I asked, 'Who is this? 'They replied, 'The Masih, Ad-Dajjal.' 96
Within this same collection from Bukhari another narration of the Dajjal reads, “The
Prophet said, No prophet was sent but that he warned his followers against the one-eyed
liar (Ad-Dajjal). Beware! He is blind in one eye, and your Lord is not so, and there will
be written between his (Ad-Dajjal's) eyes (the word) Kafir (i.e., disbeliever)."97Yet
another account of this figure reads, “Once Allah's Messenger stood amongst the people,
glorified and praised Allah as He deserved and then mentioned the Dajjal saying, I warn
you against him (i.e. the Dajjal) and there was no prophet but warned his nation against
him. No doubt, Noah warned his nation against him but I tell you about him something of
which no prophet told his nation before me. You should know that he is one-eyed, and
Allah is not one-eyed."98
Perhaps one of the leading reasons that the accounts of this Dajjal from Bukhari have
become so authoritative and re-cycled within the Islamic tradition has been a result of
coming from the mouth of the Prophet Muhammad. Muslim’s collection would later
receive a large amount of respect and would become another leading authority on the
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subject of the end times and the role of the Dajjal by way of his collection being
approved by Bukhari and being able to “expand the chronology of the major signs and
portents of the Hour.”99 Cook further notes, “Theologically the Dajjal defines evil and
everything that he does is diametrically opposed to God’s purposes on earth.”100 Through
these hadiths the Dajjal’s appearance would adopt retaining the word kufr on his forehead
so that all Muslims would be able recognize him as being evil and something to avoid.
These early descriptions of the Dajjal would help provide later literatures, especially
modern novels in the late 20th century, the notion that the Dajjal would be an infidel and
opposing the laws of God.
Although the Dajjal’s appearance first occurs in Burkari’s Book of Afflictions and the
End of the World, the Dajjal’s appearance would actually only become known as a sign
of the Hour in Dawud’s Kitab al-Malhamah and Muslim’s The Book of Tribulations and
Portents of the Last Hour. In these two works the Dajjal “acquires considerably greater
stature” as being a major sign of the Hour and helps articulate how he has since become
such an integral figure in Islamic eschatology.101
We were sitting in the shade of the chamber of the Messenger of Allah discussing
(something) and when we mentioned the last hour, our voices rose high. The
Messenger of Allah said: The last hour will not come or happen until there appear
ten signs before it the rising of the sun in its place of setting, the coming forth of
the beast, the coming forth of Gog and Magog, the Dajjal (Antichrist), (the
descent of) Jesus son of Mary, the smoke, and three collapses of the earth: one in
the west, one in the east, and one in the Arabian Peninsula. The last of that will be
the emergence of a fire from Yemen, from the lowest part of Aden, and drive
mankind to their place of assembly.102
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In this narration, opposite of what was discussed before, the Prophet Muhammad
warns his early community that the end of the world would not occur until after a series
of events unfolded. These events, while most are found in the Qur’an, now suddenly
include the appearance of the Dajjal as being a sign to the people. Along with this Dawud
also made mention that, “The Prophet said: The greatest war, the conquest of
Constantinople and the coming forth of the Dajjal (Antichrist) will take place within a
period of seven months.”103
Yet another addition made to Islamic eschatology that would be formed in these hadith
collections would be the narration of the Euphrates River. As will be pointed out in
chapter 2, this hadith would receive a revitalization of attention during the 20th century
with the oil boom in the Middle East. This hadith soon became a major sign of the Hour
that would become apparent for Muslims to witness and prepare for the Day of Judgment,
“The Last Hour would not come before the Euphrates uncovers a mountain of gold, for
which people would fight. Ninety-nine out of each one hundred would die but every man
amongst them would say that perhaps he would be the one who would be saved (and thus
possess this gold).”104
These few of hundreds of examples help emphasize how later literatures began adding
additional signs and narrations to what was provided in the Qur’an. These signs now
included social, economic, and military happenings that Muslims could begin to point to
as evidence that the end of the world was appearing. The addition of the Dajjal into
Islamic eschatology would give birth to a vast amount of speculations and anxieties on
who the Dajjal would be and where he would come from in the proceeding centuries after
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these hadith collections. As we will see in Chapter 4, the Dajjal has now become a staple
point of the Islamic State’s own apocalyptic narrative where they constantly cite hadiths
to support its claims. These hadiths, alongside the writings of Nu’aym Ibn Hammad,
would open up the floodgates for further additions to begin being made to Islamic
eschatology—including most importantly who would be fought prior to the Hour. More
notably, we find it is the social and political environment Kitab al-Fitan was written
under that would influence Islamic eschatology and help develop the A’maq Cycle into
one of the most cited narrations of the Final Hour, including today with the Islamic State.

Nu’aym Ibn Hammad’s Kitab al-Fitan
Nu’aym Ibn Hammad’s contribution to the development of Islamic eschatology comes
primarily from his work Kitab al-Fitan, which shared many of the hadiths collected by
the authors mentioned above. Nu’aym was considered a part of the learned religious class
of his time, was born in Khorasan, studied in Iraq and Hijaz, and eventually moved to
Egypt to become “one of the prominent hadith scholars.”105 Kitab al-Fitan is now thought
of as being constructed between the years of 831-844 C.E. and is thought to have
possessed the prophecies of the first two hundred years of Islamic history in
chronological order starting with the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad.106 This work,
according to Cook, “is of central importance to the study of Muslim apocalyptic. By
virtue of the early date of composition, and the fact that he worked in Syria…the key area
of apocalyptic speculation…Nu’aym should be considered the collector of first and
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second-century AH apocalyptic.”107
Cook later points out that Nu’aym’s work was even more important for the
development of Islamic eschatology for how it provided additional accounts of end time
narratives that were left out of the hadith collections of Dawud, Muslim, and Burkari. In
this way Kitab al-Fitan was able to include in it many of the narrations and sayings that
the hadith collections found less authoritative or accurate. He notes, “Without Nu’aym,
we could suspect this process [of removing certain narrations on the Final Hour] had
taken place, but could prove it only with much more difficulty.”108 Yücesoy also points
out the importance of Kitab al-Fitan by claiming “without [it] the majority of prophecies
that it contains would have been lost, and many of the details of the civil war would have
been unknown to the modern reader.”109
In this way Kitab al-Fitan is not only important to the materials it preserved dealing
with apocalyptic narrations, but was also one of the only texts to survive that possessed a
large amount of information on the civil wars that were occurring during the first two
centuries of Islamic history. In this way the text should be understood as vital not only for
apocalyptic literature but also for modern scholars attempting to re-construct the
historical events of that specific time period. For this reason Yücesoy claims that
apocalyptic literature from this time period should be understood beyond just being
messianic speculations since they often are “a reflection of a person’s position on social
and political matters...[that] offer information about the speakers mind with little
mediation.”110
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Being an extra-Qur’anic text outside the realm of even the hadith collections places
Kitab al-Fitan into a unique area of influence on the development of Islamic eschatology.
The amount of additions that flooded Islamic eschatology by way of Nu’aym’s work
remains quite extensive, and as mentioned earlier, his narratives have been spread across
nearly every cycle of Cook’s own analysis of Islamic apocalyptic literature. More
importantly “Muslim messianic and apocalyptic sensibility developed a discourse
through supplementing and interpreting the Qur’an in light of the political and
sociocultural transformation in the first two centuries after the death of Muhammad” and
this proved to be especially true with Kitab al-Fitan. 111 In this manner, of being outside
of the authority of hadiths and the Qur’an, Kitab al-Fitan’s influence may have set the
example for how later apocalyptic literatures would begin to look at a variety of texts and
sources for constructing their narratives. With Kitab al-Fitan came the inclusion of
narrations that were not limited to the traditional sources of authority within the Islamic
tradition.
Nu’aym’s greatest contribution, however, especially for ISIS’s apocalyptic narrative,
comes directly from the Kitab al-Fitan’s expansion of what is discussed in the A’maq
Cycle. While using the hadiths mentioned above, this text also was able to incorporate the
political and sociocultural issues that were occurring during the time of his writing into
additional facets of what will occur during the Final Hour. Since the A’maq Cycle seems
to be what the Islamic State has adopted into its own narrative, it becomes more essential
to look at the additions Nu’aym provided to the broader scope of Islamic eschatology as
well as why these were added. Similar to how the early Meccan Surahs heavily discussed
the Day of Judgment due possibly to the society it had developed under, the social and
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political environment of Nu’aym’s own life further stresses how Islamic apocalyptic
literature tends to develop in times of widespread anxiety, persecution, or warfare.
Cook places Nu’aym’s contributions to the A’maq Cycle as being a part of the
Historical Apocalypses category because they tend to possess “recognizable historical
personalities, and a historical sequence of events that [eventually] leaves reality at a
particular point and moves into the realm of fantasy.” 112 With this understanding the
A’maq Cycle seems to have developed as a part of the continuous warfare arising against
the Byzantine Empire as well as the civil wars and Abbasid revolution during the first
two centuries after the death of Muhammad. Cook points to one specific detail of the
cycle as supporting his claim, “You will launch three raids on Constantinople. As to the
first, you will meet tribulation and hardship. As to the second, there will be a truce
between you and them (the Byzantines), such that the Muslims will build in it mosques
and you will raid together with them beyond Constantinople…”113
By analyzing this part of Kitab al-Fitan’s contribution to the A’maq Cycle, Cook
claims the first raid stems from historical reality and was a representation of Mu’awiya’s
failed attempt to conquer the Byzantines in 679, which then resulted in the Muslims
paying a tribute to the Byzantines.114 The latter details of this narration, for Cook, are
understood as being a part of this unknown future but are to help calm any anxiety that
may be widespread in his society. The building of mosques in Constantinople are meant
to emphasize that the Muslim empires would soon be able to take conquer Constantinople
to the degree that they will begin building mosques within the city. The final detail on
raiding together with “them beyond Constantinople” thnn goes on to state that the
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Christians and Muslims will team up to defeat a common enemy before fighting each
other prior to the Final Hour.
Then the Byzantines will send to you asking for a truce and you will make truce
with them. On that day a woman will cross the pass to Syria safely and the city of
Caesarea in Anatolia will be built (rebuilt). During the truce al-Kufa will be
flattened like leather—this is because they refused assistance to the Muslims of
Syria [thought to be referencing Iraqi Muslims], and God knows whether, in
addition to this desertion, there was another event that made attacking them
permissible. You will ask the Byzantines for assistance against them, and they
will assist you, and you will go until you camp with them on a plain with hills.
One of the Christians will say: ‘By means of our cross you obtained the victory;
therefore give us our share of the spoils, of the women and children.’ You will
refuse to give them of the women and children, so they will fight and then go and
return [to the Byzantine Empire] and prepare for the final apocalyptic battle
(malhamah)” with another version ending slightly different, “You have only
gained victory over them because of the cross, and the Muslims say: ‘Nay,
because of Allah and His messenger we have obtained victory over them.’ It goes
back and forth between them, whereupon the Byzantines become anger, and one
of the Muslims rises up and breaks the cross.115
In this way, Nu’aym becomes one of the leading contributors to the development of
the A’maq Cycle, which is rooted in historical events while also dwelling in fantasy and
future speculations. The regions of conquest and the enemies fought within it are directly
plucked from the historical and political happenings of Nu’aym’s time period and are
then re-approached. According to Kitab al-Fitan, the Byzantines (Christians) would first
team up with Syrian Muslims in order to defeat a group of Iraqi Muslims that both groups
were combatting at the time. After their victory, the Byzantines suddenly attempt to give
credit to the cross (Jesus) whereas the Muslims refuse to give the glory to anything other
than God. Cook notes that such a notion of “hatred of the cross” would later become a
“recurring polemical theme throughout Muslim apocalyptic” and may have resulted
directly from this narration.116
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As for the Iraqi Muslims that are alluded to in this narration, Cook claims that their
role was perhaps pointed to in order to highlight a possible “division between the two
groups of Muslims so deep that the Muslims of Syria turn[ed] to the Byzantines for aid in
punishing the Iraqis.”117 This latter aspect of the narrative is speculated to be one of the
leading reasons that later apocalyptic literatures would begin to speculate that the Final
Hour would occur when there was widespread strife amongst the Muslims community.
In a similar light, another example of one of many additions that Kitab al-Fitan
provided to Islamic eschatology was this notion that fitna would be a major sign of the
Hour. According to Nu’aym there would be four fitnahs (civil strife/war) occurring
within the Muslim community prior to the Day of Judgement, three of which that had
already occurred during his time of writing. These included “the caliphate of Ali...Ibn alZuayr’s revolt in 683…the revolt of the Abbasids between 747-750…and the last [being
the appearance] of the Dajjal.”118 For this reason Cook states that early on in Islamic
history there may have been similar notions shared between the words fitna and
malhamah. This, he finds, would help explain how the word fitna, which had no Qur’anic
interpretation of occurring towards the end of days could have begun to be discussed as
such. He argues, “In contrast to the word fitna, the term malhamah appears to be attached
for the most part, to the capture of Constantinople or the battles in the A’maq. It would be
fair to say that in many cases a malhamah is a specific type of apocalyptic battle within
the genre of fitan. Of course, it cannot be denied that in many cases the two terms are
used interchangeably, especially in the early literature of Nu’aym and his
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contemporaries.”119
While this short analysis only scratched the surface of the additions that Nu’aym’s
work and the hadith collections provided for Islamic eschatology they were essential to
briefly mention. Kitab al-Fitan would become one of the first sources outside the Qur’an
and hadith collections to play a major role on the trajectory on how Islamic apocalyptic
literatures would be written. Nu’aym’s inclusion of differing narrations alongside the
hadiths collected by Muslim, Burkari, and Dawud allowed for his work to become one of
the leading sources of authority on end time narrations. Nu’aym also became one of the
first authors to write an apocalyptic text by way of incorporating the political and
sociocultural events occurring around him into his narration—a tactic that has since been
mimicked constantly. His ability to work from outside the confines of the Qur’an and
hadith collections would be mirrored in apocalyptic literatures over the course of the next
thousand years. Yet it would not be until the end of the 19th century in British colonized
Sudan that one man would combine these classical narrations of the Christians/
Byzantines with the increase of Western influence in Muslim societies in order to stir a
violent revolution that would send shockwaves across the world.
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Chapter 2: Modernity: Apocalyptic Literature and Messianic Revolutions
In a millennial momentum, common to all apocalyptic trends, a crucial shift occurs
from dormant aspiration to keen ambition. This turning point invariably pertains to
crossing a psychological barrier, one which divides adherence to the established belief
system from an experiences of rebirth and in turn discovering a communal identity with
like-minded individuals…In the visions of the End we observe the ideals of generations,
utopian dreams and nightmare, fanatical obsessions with providential plan, and prospects
for a regressive or progressive future; a mirror to societies’ innate ears and aspirations.120
Abbas Amanat
Understanding the earliest developments of Islamic eschatology, the environment they
developed in, and the continual influence each had on the succeeding centuries after
Muhammad’s death provides the foundational terms, battle scenarios, and geographical
locations of interest for Muslims over the course of the next twelve centuries. While
slight changes occurred periodically due to certain historical events, such as the crusades
and Mongol invasion, it would not be until the end of the 19th century that an unexpected
and widespread alteration would occur within Islamic eschatology. The arrival of
Western colonialization, specifically in the Middle East and North Africa, re-ignited the
end time anxieties and suspicions that had animated the early Islamic world.
With this sudden increase in anxiety, a new wave of revolutionaries and authors were
able to look into any number of narratives for guidance and inspiration. By citing and
interpreting classical sources in the wake of what was occurring around them, these
revolutionaries and authors become tormented with worry that Muslims were being
politically oppressed, religiously persecuted, living in an immoral world, and such was all
due to the invasion of Western nations.
This chapter will demonstrate those points by discussing three revolutions that were
possibly inspired by messianic speculation, the shift in how apocalyptic literature was
120
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written beginning at the end of the 20th century, and on how the literature became
increasingly focused on the actions of the United States at the start of the 21st century.
The revival of apocalyptic anxiety may only have been further driven with the rapid
advancement of technology over time. The development of book publishing companies in
the 20th century and the creation of the Internet in the 21st century would allow any
number of authors with the ability to personally interpret classic sources in order to
construct their own narrative the means to reach the masses. This means for anyone and
everyone to become an authority on end time speculation would bring with it the space
for radical interpretations to arise. This would later cultivate an increase of “conspirator”
undertones that insinuated that Israel, Shi’a Muslims, and/or America were a part of a
worldwide agenda against the Islamic tradition. In much the same way, discussed in
Chapter 4, the Islamic State’s media and own end time narrative would adopt a variety of
characteristics from these modern literatures—including this speculation of a worldwide
agenda being led by the Dajjal against the Islamic tradition.
The Islamic State’s narrative, however, did not appear out of thin air but rather
developed from the changes modern apocalyptic literature experienced during the late
20th century. By noting instances of apocalyptic speculation that led to revolution and the
development of the literature it seems that the revival of end time speculation, Western
colonialization, and violent jihadist movements arose virtually at the same time. Yet these
three issues are rarely studied alongside each other, and this, as is the case with ISIS’s
apocalyptic narrative, results in an incomplete analysis of what was occurring. With the
historical apocalyptic literatures discussed in the previous chapter providing insight into
the historical context for the narratives being cited and re-interpreted by the Islamic State
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today, it is only from understanding the development and evolution in how these classical
sources would begin to be read, interpreted, and by whom such was being done that helps
situate ISIS propaganda into a modern extensive line of Islamic eschatology. Now
focused around notions involving the state of Israel, the Dajjal, and Western influence in
the Middle East, the Islamic State constructed a view of the world that could only be
resolved through use of force.

Modern Revolutions and the Sudanese Mahdi
While 1979 may be where the most recent explosion of apocalyptic speculation
leading to a revolution, there are previous examples during European colonization in the
19th century. In 1881, after nearly sixty years of British colonial influence in Sudan,
Muhammad Ahmad ibn ‘Abd Allah (also known as Shaykh Muhammad Sharif) tapped
into the widespread discontent with British influence on Sudan’s Muslim society by way
of apocalyptic jihad. The impacts that Western colonialization had on Sudan’s
government, trade, and society became leading causes of unrest in Sudan at the time.
Muhammad Ahmad, known as being a pious practitioner of the Islamic tradition, viewed
his society as falling away from the example of the Prophet Muhammad by adopting
Western values and customs. By studying classical apocalyptic sources, Ahmad began to
find that all the events occurring around him were pointing to the appearance of the long
awaited Mahdi who would bring justice to the world. This belief was only enhanced by
the approaching year 1300 of the Islamic Calendar, which for some signaled a pivotal
moment in Islamic history. It was during the year 1299/1881 C.E that Ahmad would
proclaim himself as the long awaited “Mahdi” by claiming the title was given to him by
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the Prophet Muhammad in a dream.121
Through this claimed communication with the Prophet Muhammad, Ahmad publicly
proclaimed that he was given the “task of erasing the corruption and decay that plagued
the Muslim community and restoring the unspoiled Islam of the Prophet’s time.”122
Possessing this outlook on the world, Ahmad judged society as being morally corrupt,
due to Western influences, and in need of quickly returning to how Islamic society
functioned during the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Some of Ahmad’s major critiques
against his society included unlawful taxes, restrictions on veiling, and government
leaders being infidels disguised as pious Muslims.123 Whether or not Ahmad actually
believed himself to be the Mahdi, or if it was used to legitimize his movement is not
necessarily important.
What is essential to understand is that Ahmad believed that his society was decaying
in front of his eyes, and that the only way to counter this was to bring sweeping changes
to the nation. Perhaps the title of Mahdi was just used as a source of inspiration and
recruitment, or maybe it was an actual belief of his. What is certain is that Ahmad was a
major critic of the increasing British influence on Muslim societies and felt that violence
had become the only option left in combatting the influence. As the scholar Abbas
Amanat notes, Ahmad believed that “To rebuild the Prophet’s sharia, which has been
‘obliterated’ by the enemies of Islam, and to restore the ‘true religion,’ like Muhammad,
he had to resort to the sword in order to remove not only the spurious four schools of
Sunni law and to replace them with ‘pure Islamic rules’ and ‘god’s punishing limits,’ but
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also to declare jihad against the most virulent enemies of Islam."124
For Ahmad the Mahdi, violence and jihad of the sword had become the only option
left for Muslims to revert back to how they are “supposed” to live. Muhammad Ahmad
may have declared himself Mahdi in hopes of tempting Sudanese Muslims to an uprising
against the ruling British, or perhaps he actually believed that he was in fact the Mahdi—
that may never be entirely known—but what is known is that he undertook the title and
engaged quite successfully in offensive violence against the established government of
the time. Ahmad saw the value of tapping into apocalyptic speculation for stirring a wider
revolution. Much like the Algerian “Mahdi” Bu Ziyan, who, in 1847, called for jihad of
the sword against French rulers under the impression that he was the Mahdi; Ahmad was
viewing the increase of Western colonialization with a messianic lens. Through this lens
Ahmad argued jihad was justified “to destroy this world in order to construct the other
world.”125
With this line of thinking, the destruction of this world is simply the first step in the
construction of the next world which is to occur after the Day of Judgement. As the
Mahdi, Ahmad would theoretically have been able to justify any of his actions under the
pretense that the Final Hour is approaching. Ahmad also purposely attempted to
constantly mirror actions the Prophet Muhammad had done with his early community
when they were persecuted by the Quraysh tribe in Mecca. In this way Ahmad would be
perceived as acting as closely to the example of the Prophet as possible, legitimizing his
uprising. For example, Ahmad called for a mass Hijrah (emigration) “from Aba to Qadir
to the safety of the Baqqara tribes in Kordofan” in order to portray the move as “a
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symbolic act of breaking with unbelievers and striking a new covenant with his
‘helpers.”126 Ahmad wanted to present each of his actions as representations of the
actions that the Prophet Muhammad undertook during his own time living under
persecution and oppression in such a way that it allowed his followers to perceive their
actions in unison with the actions of the early Muslim community.
A mass Hijrah away from “unbelievers” was not the goal for the proclaimed Mahdi
but simply the first step. As the Prophet Muhammad had done over a thousand years
prior, Ahmad believed that battles would be the next step in establishing the Muslim
community in the region. In 1883 Ahmad’s radical call was materialized by followers
taking up arms, battling against British and Egyptian forces, and earning a major victory
near El-Obeid. It was there that Ahmad announced he would continue the revolution until
he was leading prayer in Mecca, Medina, Cairo, and Jerusalem—echoing the regions of
conquest within the classic eschatological narratives.127 This early victory, much like the
Prophet Muhammad’s victory at the Battle of Badr, brought with it more benefits for
Ahamd’s revolution and as legitimacy to his title of the messianic Mahdi who, according
to prophecy, could not be defeated. The more victories Ahmad achieved, the more
credible his revolution became. For it was at the Battle of Badr, outnumbered in some
accounts 300 to 3,000, that Muhammad and the earliest Muslims were able to defeat the
Quraysh army. Many Muslims point to the piety and trust in God’s mission possessed by
those early followers as reason for their decisive victory in wake of the greatest of odds
against them.
In much the same way, Ahmad’s followers may have been greatly inspired by their
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early victory. It was in 1885 that the British backed regime would collapse after the selfproclaimed Mahdi marched against the capital city of Khartoum, won a decisive victory,
and executed the British Christian governor Charles Gordon.128 Suddenly the
believability of his message—shown through these decisive victories—resonated across
the Islamic world. A self-claimed Mahdi had just revolted against a Western colonial
power and won, a result that sent ripple effects across the Middle East. It was shortly
after this major victory, however, among rampant speculation that Ahmad could not die
prior to the eschatological conquest of Jerusalem, Ahmad became ill and passed away. 129
The territory he fought over and gained control of eventually would fall back under
British/Egyptian control by the year 1889.
The sudden and unexpected death of the man claiming to be the Mahdi extinguished
the apocalyptic aspirations of his followers and ended the movement as quickly as it had
arisen. The revolution, however, resonated across the world and provided Western
leaders new worries on what could occur amongst Muslims under the influence of
apocalyptic speculation. Western nations, as well as Islamic governments, were shown
firsthand the power messianic speculation could have amongst Muslim populations in
colonies. By the same token, Muslim populations were shown the power that could be
tapped into with apocalyptic speculation. Islamic universities and religious institutes
across the Middle East, especially in Egypt, would become especially wary of this
potential threat. Following the death of Ahmad, universities and governments alike began
countering any predictions on when the end of the world would occur or the appearance
of messianic figures.
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For example, in 1942 a leading member of religious studies at al-Azhar attempted to
discredit and extinguish the increase of apocalyptic rumor by disclaiming the “various
uncertain and contradictory traditions dealing with the descent of Jesus after the
appearance of Al-Dajjal.”130 Since the eschatological narrative of Jesus returning during
the events of the apocalypse insists that Jesus is in Heaven waiting until the Final Hour to
occur—the religious scholars of al-Azhar found it best to discredit these traditions as
coming from “Jews who became Muslims” and thus they held no strong authority on
Islamic eschatology.131 The notion that leading Islamic scholars were anxious about
widespread speculations that the end of the world was near illustrates at least a substantial
amount of the population was discussing the possibility of Jesus returning in their
lifetime.
The revolution of the Sudanese Mahdi and this later declaration against speculating on
the return of Jesus from leading religious leaders in Egypt highlights that apocalyptic
speculation was blossoming. At the same time, there was a gradual increase of outside
influences on the Middle East, especially coming from the West, and this was adding fuel
to a fire that was waiting to erupt again. It would, however, not be until decades later that
apocalyptic speculation would gain traction once again in the Middle East resulting in
another revolution—one that was quite successful.

The Iranian Revolution of 1979
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the deliberate effort from Islamic religious
scholars may have weakened the high levels of apocalyptic speculation during the
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beginning of the 20th century following what had happened in Sudan. The speculation,
however, once again began to resonate across Islamic societies with the increase of
Western influence on the region, the establishment of the state of Israel, and the
increasing distrust of America’s role as a world power. The formation of the Jewish State
of Israel in 1948 became one of the leading factors in the increase of apocalyptic
speculation—due largely to the acceptance of Jerusalem being a place of eschatological
importance. It was, however, not until the year 1979 that apocalyptic speculation hit the
tipping point across the Middle East. For both Sunni and Shi’a Muslims, November 20,
1979 was, according to the Islamic calendar, the beginning of the fifteenth century and a
date that some apocalyptic narratives claimed would be a pivotal moment in Islamic
history.132
The year would end up being a decisive one in two of the leading Islamic nations, Iran
and Saudi Arabia. While the majority of examples discussed previously have dealt
exclusively with Sunni apocalyptic literature, I find that the example of the Iranian
Revolution in 1979 also highlights how influential millenarian belief can be on Muslim
feelings of political oppression and religious persecution. While Iran’s revolution brought
about sweeping changes, and whereas Saudi Arabia’s revolution was undertaken by a few
hundred soldiers, both cases highlight that apocalyptic speculation has led to revolution.
More importantly, both show that belief in the coming end of the world, a battle against
evil, and a pushback against a perceived immoral society and government was at the
forefront of the movements.
Following Khomeyni expulsion to France, supporters of his revolution began
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appealing to apocalyptic speculation in a manner not seen before in hopes of ushering in
a new way of life in Iran. In a public broadcast of the “Prayer for the Return of Ayatollah
Khomeyni” connections were drawn between the Imam’s return to Iran and the Mahdi’s
prophesized return:

The Imam must come back
So that Good will be installed on its throne,
So that Evil, betrayal, and hatred
Will disappear for ever and ever.133
The return of Khomeini was viewed by the Iranian population as the return of God’s
Law over the Laws of man—especially those of American derivation. This view of what
Khomeini represented attempted to separate Iran, and perhaps the entire world, into two
distinct camps—one of Good and one of Evil. The Iranian media argued the return of
Khomeini was a representation of justice and morality taking over an unjust and immoral
world, one that had existed under the influence of the American government. The media
even later attempted to link some cosmological signs of the Hour to the revolution. For
example, along with speculation that Khomeyni was the awaited Mahdi, rumors were
spread that Khomeini’s face could be seen on the moon as a result of the Qur’anic sign of
the Sun rising from the West.134
This, of course, never occurred but in 1979 Khomeini returned to Iran with
overwhelming support, toppling the then current regime, contested American influence
on Iranian society, and founded the Islamic Republic just prior to the start of the fifteenth
century of Islamic history. On November 5 Khomeini announced his movement was not
only against America’s influence on Iranian politics, but was now also a part of a grander
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scheme and eschatological battle against Satan. For Khomeini American society,
morality, and government were all “the ultimate taghut [corrupter of Earth], the demonic
idol associated in the Qur’an with Satan.”135 The only way to rid the Islamic world,
particularly Iran, was a rebellion against the American government and the Iranian
establishment that it was supporting.
For example, in his official statement about the attack on the American embassy, he
declared the violence justified because “In this Revolution the Great Satan is America,
which is gathering around it other satans by making loud noises—that included both the
satans inside and outside Iran...Iran was enslaved by Britain and then America” and “As
for the center [the U.S. embassy] occupied by our young men, I have been informed it
has been a lair for espionage and plotting.”136 Khomeini’s rhetoric and appeal to his
audience, we later find, is similar to how modern apocalyptic literatures were being
written—including the publications of ISIS’s Dabiq.
By describing America as the Great Satan, Khomeini was able to place his revolution
into a cosmological battle between Good vs. Evil, God vs. Satan, and Iran vs. America.
The label of American being the Great Satan has since been continuously recycled in
Iranian rhetoric discussing the United States. Such mistrust of what America represents
eventually spread to encompass other nations as well, even though most were deemed
allies with America. This included Saddam Hussein’s Iraq which had been given the title
of “Lesser Satan.”137 Iraq, in this line of thinking, was being used as space for the
widespread destabilization of the Middle East—a thought adopted by the most popular
apocalyptic writers of the 1990’s.
Amanat, Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi’ism, 211.
Ibid., 199.
137
Ibid., 201.
135
136

71

The Siege of Mecca in 1979
Iran, however, was not the only base for a revival of apocalyptic speculation in the
modern Middle East. The Sunni nation Saudi Arabia also faced a rise in millenarian
speculation amongst its civilians in the years leading up to 1400 of the Islamic calendar.
On November 19, 1979 just fourteen days after Khomeini’s declaration of America as the
“Great Satan,” roughly two hundred to three hundred armed revolutionaries snuck into
the Ka’ba, surrounded the structure through underground tunnels, and waited until the
final minutes of the year 1399 to make their appearance. As those final minutes elapsed,
the leader of the armed rebels, Juhayman al-Utaybi, stood next to the Ka’ba and
proclaimed to those surrounding the structure that his brother-in-law, Muhammad alQahtani, was the long-awaited Mahdi and was going to bring justice to the world.138
Citing the decaying morality of the Muslim world, negative influences coming from
Western society, and that the leaders of Saudi Arabia did not follow the Shari’a Law,
Juhayman alleged that the end of the world was at hand and that Mecca must first be
cleansed to await the Final Hour.
One account claims Juhayman stated, “The good man is here with us, and he will
bring justice to Earth after it had been filled with Injustice. If anyone doubts, come here
to check. We are all your brothers!” before finishing the speech with “In the name of
Allah, most gracious, most merciful, here is the awaited Mahdi. Pledge ba’ya (allegiance)
to Brother Muhammad Abdullah al-Qurayshi.”139 According to Juhayman, his brother-inlaw not only shared the name of the Mahdi, Muhammad Abdullah, but his lineage even
could be traced back to the Prophet Muhammad—both qualifications for who would
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become the Mahdi. Juhayman had spent a significant amount of time reading the classical
sources as direction for his mission. He remained under the impression that the Islamic
tradition had increasingly become corrupt and was falling away from the example of the
Prophet Muhammad to the degree that the next sign to come would be the appearance of
the Mahdi. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had represented the final breaking away from
the example of the Prophet and thus no longer possessed the allegiance of any Muslims
even though they controlled the two holiest cities of Islam—Mecca and Medina.
Juhayman’s history begins with a man possessing strong anti-Saudi beliefs, a father
that had rebelled against the Kingdom in the 1920’s, and that he would eventually be
exiled to the Arabian Desert in 1977 due to his increasingly public opposition of the
Saudi ruling family.140 It was while he was exiled in the desert that Juhayman would
begin to write a series of eleven letters discussing signs of the Hour. The most popular
letter was titled Tribulations [fitan], the Mahdi, the Descent of Jesus, and the Signs of the
Hour, and claimed that all signs of the Hour were “without exception associated with the
Arabian Peninsula.”141 Linking his belief mostly to the hadiths collection of Abu Dawud,
Juhayman became convinced that the Mahdi would appear in Mecca in response to the
“hypocrisy” of the Saudi rulers and the corruption of Islamic society from outside
influences. Juhayman notes at one point that prior to the appearance of the Mahdi a “great
discord will occur, and Muslims will be drifting away from the religion,” a detail
highlighting the purpose of fitna during the Final Hour.142
It was also during this year that his brother had been arrested and jailed because he
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was one among many of Juhayman’s supporters.143 The harsh crackdown on the
supporters of Juhayman led to further distrust of the established government and Muslim
rulers. There are reports that Juhayman condemned the Saudi kingdom by stating “How
is it possible to declare jihad against the states of the infidels when we have ambassadors
in their countries and they have in ours ambassadors, experts and professors? We should
not be deceived by the ornaments. How can we propagate Islam when our professors are
Christians? Is it possible to raise the flag of jihad when the banner of Christianity is
flapping next to the banner of the faith of One God?”144 For Juhayman, the Saudi leaders
had lost their legitimacy by becoming close allies with ‘infidel’ nations and “Christian”
nations while at the same time arresting Sunni Muslims at an alarming rate.
There are some indications that Juhayman may have possessed a strong level of
takfirsm (claiming that one is an apostate) during the years leading up to the siege of
Mecca. One account claims that Juhayman declared that the Saudi Kingdom had accepted
“Shiites as Muslims, and fights those who disagree with this, and opposes those who
combat the heretical worshippers of Ali and Hussain.”145 For Juhayman, the Saudi
Kingdom had fallen so far away from what he saw as the “true” version of Islam that they
were now accepting Shi’a Muslims as legitimate believers. This becomes quite
problematic for radical understandings of takfirsm, and may have been another leading
cause to Juhayman’s apocalyptic belief. The alliance, according to Juhayman, between
infidels, Christians, Shi’a Muslims, and the Saudi Kingdom represented a polluted
version of Islamic rule and a sign that the Final Hour had finally started.
Juhayman was deeply interested in the classical sources for guidance on what was
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about to occur in Mecca, and believed that the Mahdi was the first step in ushering in a
Day of Judgement that would result in attacks against his rebellion from all directions.
Possibly citing the A’maq Cycle (the focus of this thesis), Juhayman alleged that during
this conflict a third of Muslims would be martyred, a third who would abandon the cause,
and a third that would destroy the Byzantine (Christian) cities with the cries of “Allahu
Akbar.”146 This conflict at Mecca would then result with the return of Jesus, after which
according to Juhayman, “Not a single infidel will survive the breath of [his] air.”147
Much like the Sudanese Mahdi of the late 19th century, Juhayman may have attempted
to use apocalyptic conviction to energize Muslims universally to rise up against
immorality and Western influence on Islamic society. He, like the Sudanese Mahdi
decades prior, claimed that the appearance of the Mahdi was confirmed to him in a dream
by the Prophet Muhammad and there are accounts that his followers also began receiving
these dreams in the days leading up to the attack on Mecca.148 Yet even with as
calculated of a plan as the one that Juhayman developed, and the knowledge he gained
from Dawud’s hadiths, one major detail was overlooked by Juhayman— the demand to
take control of the Ka’ba armed with guns. One account claims that Juhayman told his
followers, concerning his call to fight at the Ka’ba, “If we do not bring weapons this
[enemy] army will not come to Mecca and so it will not be swallowed into the Earth. We
will not shoot until they shoot first.”149
Working from the classical sources, Juhayman believed that the battle must take place
at the Ka’ba and his rebellion should be armed. Consequently, however, the act of
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forcefully taking the holiest structure in Islam stifled any potential widespread support for
the millenarian rebellion. The seemingly sacrilegious move came across to many as
something that would not be done by the “true” Mahdi. Jean-Pierre Filiu notes, “Plainly
the insurgents desired the overthrow of the ruling dynasty, as well as the punishment of
all those ‘Ulama who, in their view, had corrupted Islam by serving the interests of the
Sa’uds….But to the rebels’ immense dismay and incomprehension, no movement of
solidarity emerged outside Mecca, for the simple reason that the sacrilege they had
committed seemed unpardonable.”150 While the rebels had looked to the classical sources
for indication that the beginning of the fifteenth century would mark the time where
Islamic law would once again rule the world, the armed aggression on the Ka’ba had
angered the Saudi population to a level that would not bring any support outside the walls
of the structure.
The failure to attain a high level of support across the Kingdom did not necessarily
imply no one supported the movement, but the lack of unified support certainly damaged
the believability of the message. In a time prior to the Internet, the only way of spreading
the message would have been word of mouth—resulting in even less support to the cause.
There may have been some people in Mecca speculating the “what if he is right” question
during this attack. This may have even led to a substantial part of the Saudi population
being hesitant to criticize Juhayman’s message on the off chance that his brother-in-law
was in fact the long awaited Mahdi, but such speculation did not result in any significant
number of additional people joining the rebellion. Yet in the wake of what had just
occurred in Iran, and decades of Western influence in the Middle East, the plausibility of
the message may have been amplified as hours turned to days with the Ka’ba remaining
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under Juhayman’s control.
The ability to control the Ka’ba for so long, however, was in a result of the Saudi
Kingdom’s shared fear of conducting violence near the Ka’ba that had been a topic of
debate amongst Juhayman’s supporters. It would take roughly three days for the head of
the High Council of ‘Ulama to issue a fatwa permitting the use of force in removing
hostiles from the Ka’ba.151 By referencing Surah 2:191—“Do not fight with them at the
Sacred Mosque until they fight with you in it, but if they do fight you, then slay them;
such is the recompense of the unbelievers”—a decision was eventually made to first
demand surrender from the rebels, otherwise “all measures could be taken to arrest them,
even if it led to a fight and the killing of those who were not arrested and had not
surrendered.”152
This justification for violence against the group in the Ka’ba, however, did not end the
insurgency as swiftly as Saudi officials had anticipated. The motivation of the rebels was
the belief that the proclaimed Mahdi, Muhammad Abdullah, could not die. This
messianic belief was only amplified as time progressed, especially after the firefights
began to commence between the government and the rebels. It is reported, whether true
or the narration of the rebels, that Muhammad Abdullah was continuously at the front of
the line of fighters while never ever taking a serious wound—legitimizing in the minds of
his followers that he was in fact the awaited Mahdi.153 This luck eventually ran out and
the proclaimed Mahdi was killed after trying to throw back a grenade—a skill that he had
supposedly accomplished throughout the skirmishes.154 Much like what had occurred in
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Sudan, the death of this Meccan Mahdi resulted in a loss of energy and fervor amongst
his followers.
The sudden death of the one supposed to be the Mahdi ultimately implied that the
mission was not actually under the ordinance of the eschatological narrative that
Juhayman had claimed was given to him from the Prophet Muhammad in a dream. Most
rebels, following the death of Muhammad Abdullah, withdrew from the structure by way
of surrender or were quickly killed. Juhayman, however, refused to leave the area and
with a small number of followers barricaded deep underneath the Ka’ba until December
3, 1979.155The rebellion, while drawn out longer than expected, was drawing to an end
even with the final group of armed rebels remaining hidden in the structure. A sudden
change in plan in defeating the rebels, however, would end up resulting in much longer
consequences for the Kingdom and sent ripple effects across the Middle East.
To reach Juhayman and his barricaded rebels, Saudi officials looked for outside help.
Through the help of the French, the task of placing “incapacitating gas” into the areas that
held the remaining rebels was undertaken “from the Groupe d’Intevention de la
Gendarmerie Nationale, sent at the request of Prince Turki and [who] formally converted
to Islam before going into action.”156 Now with the expertise of the French commanders
using Western weapons and bearing French gas masks, Saudi soldiers were able to gas
the rebels long enough to enter into the barricaded controlled areas where they found and
captured Juhayman amongst the dead and wounded.157 The use of Western allies and
weaponry looked bad on the part of Saudi officials in the minds of some Muslims from
the fact that Mecca was supposed to be off-limits for all non-Muslims—especially inside
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the Ka’ba. Such a choice of action would lead to a level of distrust towards the Saudi
Kingdom and its alliances with the West among jihadists across the world, including
Osama Bin Laden.
In the aftermath of the siege, Saudi officials reported that over one hundred Saudi
soldiers were killed with nearly five hundred wounded, while the rebels had suffered just
over one hundred deaths, among the dead rebels were a variety of nationalities including
Saudi, Pakistani, Indonesian, India, Egyptian, Burmese, Indonesian, Afghani, and even an
American man named Jamal Ameer Kahel Abdullah.158 It would seem that the appeal of
Juhayman’s messianic speculation was not specific to just Saudi Arabians, but was a
shared vision across the world. Those who survived the initial battle, including
Juhayman, were later executed and publically beheaded on January 8, 1980.159 It
appeared that after the death of the remaining rebels, apocalyptic speculation came to a
screeching halt, yet in reality it may have opened the doors for more levels of violence.
The use of Western forces and weaponry in the battle achieved two unintended
outcomes; first it may have supported the rebels’ belief that they were fighting the final
battles of Malhamah and led to great fervor among them until the death of the man
claiming to be the Mahdi. The introduction of Western “Christian” forces and weapons
would have played right into the narrative that Juhayman had constructed. Secondly, the
introduction of Western weapons, and whispers that French forces actually fought inside
of Mecca, sent ripple effects across the Middle East for years to come—most especially
in the case of Osama Bin Laden. Most of the weaponry used by the Saudi army and
National Guard during the attack was American made—including the TOWs used to kill
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the rebel snipers posted up in the balconies of the structure—with the French providing
the gas weapons and equipment to flush out the last of the rebels.160
Another interesting point is that the man behind the construction of the structure
surrounding the Ka’ba was Salim Bin Laden, the brother of Osama Bin Laden, and
provided the blueprints of the structure to the Saudi army in order to attack the rebels.161
During the siege on Mecca there is indication to show that while Osama Bin Laden did
not necessarily believe that the Mahdi had appeared at the Ka’ba in 1979, he also would
never publically condemn the actions of the rebels. The only known account of Bin
Laden speaking on the events comes from an audio recording in 2004 which has Bin
Laden declaring, “Prince Fahd defiled the Sanctity of the Grand Mosque. He showed
stubbornness, acted against the advice of everybody, and sent tracked and armored
vehicles into the mosque. I still recall the imprint of tracked vehicles on the tiles of the
mosque. People still recall the minarets were covered with black smoke due to their
shelling by tanks.”162 Bin Laden certainly would later share many of the same critiques
against the Saudi regime that Juhayman had possessed, although he would never avert to
messianic speculations in his own argument against the regime. It would seem that the
attack on Mecca, and the actions conducted by the Saudi Kingdom, would be a major
influence on Bin Laden in later years of his life.
Perhaps the most noteworthy result from the attack on Mecca, however, was from a
man known as Abu Mohammad al Maqdisi who had become increasingly interested with
the ideology that Juhayman had introduced into the world. His own brother-in-law had
even been a supporter of Juhayman during the time of the rebellion and siege on
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Mecca.163 In his writing, Maqdisi demanded that it was the Saudi government that had
acted wrongfully during the entire event, even though the declaration of Muhammad
Abdullah being the Mahdi was proven incorrect. He continues in The Clear Proofs That
the Saudi State Is Infidel that the actions of Juhayman were “nothing compared with the
enormous crimes of the Saudi government: blocking people from the path of God,
embracing disbelief, harming worshippers…and opening the doors of the country wide
open to infidels of various faiths.”164
For Maqdisi, the Saudi Kingdom had shown its “true” colors during the rebellion by
attacking the Ka’ba and allowing non-Islamic fighters to enter into the Kingdom to assist
in the matter. Maqdisi, however, is better known for who he would later share a cell with
in Jordan during the early 1990’s. It was in this jail cell that Maqdisi would spend
significant time with a man known as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who later in 2005 would
send a suicide bomber to attack a building in Baghdad under the alias of Abu
Juhayman.165

The Modern Transformation of Apocalyptic Literature
The events of 1979, including the peace treaty signed between Egypt and Israel, would
become leading causes of the civil unrest occurring across the Middle East. This unrest
may have been fueled even further by the increase in skepticism of the growing influence
of the Western world on Islamic nations during the late 20th century. The Iranian
revolution and Meccan Siege highlighted the civilian distrust of government officials and
Western society, which had begun to be embraced by Saudi Arabia and Iran prior to
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1979. For example, after the Siege of Mecca had been resolved, newer concerns on the
relaxing restrictions on Saudi women’s dress, the employment of women, and the use of
alcohol—all critiques made by Juhayman previously—became targets of reform by the
Saudi government in an appeal to avoid another rebellion.166 Iran similarly attempted to
combat the educational, societal, and religious changes that had developed under the
leadership of Reza Shah prior to the revolution.167 Other concerns that began to be
tackled following the Revolution in Iran were “Satanic temptations such as music,
painting, and motion pictures and the threat of unveiled women and their intrusion into
male spaces.”168
Directly following both the Siege of Mecca and the Iranian Revolution another major
event occurred, this time in the nation of Afghanistan. It was in December 1979 that a
revival of global jihad sprouted and was directly linked to the invading Soviet forces into
the eschatological region known as “Khorasan” where the black banners of the Mahdi
were thought to appear in many classical sources. While failing to usher in a revival of
apocalyptic speculation like the two uprisings in Mecca and Iran, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan brought with it a revitalization of jihad of the sword and provided the initial
space for groups like Al-Qaeda to develop. While the Soviet invasion, Iranian
Revolution, and Siege of Mecca may have had no direct influence on each other, they all
strangely enough took place at the beginning of the fifteenth century of the Islamic
calendar—a moment where eschatological narratives point to as an important date.
The sudden revival of revolution and global jihad, in wake of the beginning of the 15th
century, fueled more anxiety toward Western influence on Islamic cultures. Such anxiety
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would spiral more out of control over the course of the next three decades, where it began
developing an innovative and radical form of apocalyptic literature. Cook finds that it
was also during this period of time that a variety of resemblances began to become
apparent between the new assortment of apocalyptic writings and the revitalization of
global jihad. One such theme was that both were viewing Muslim society as being
corrupted by the West and in need of reverting back to the example of the Prophet
Muhammad through the implementation of Shari’ah Law.
According to Cook, this fresh wave of jihadists and apocalyptic writers wanted to
“reform society radically” in order to “achieve a just state” where they could practice
their faith without disturbance from outside forces.169 Whereas Cook finds there may be a
slight difference between how this just state should be brought about, both may have
been regarding Dawud’s classic hadith of “A group of my [Muhammad’s] community
will continue fighting for the truth, victorious over those who oppose them, until the last
of them fights the Dajjal” as sources of inspiration and guidance in wake of what was
occurring across the Islamic world.170
Cook continues that it may have been a shared “sense of persecution and the idea that
the entire world is conspiring to destroy Islam” that allowed for both jihadists and
modern authors to imagine that the Final Hour was rapidly approaching and that Muslims
must act in wake of such revelation. Similarly, it was only after 1979 that both jihadists
and apocalyptic authors began focusing their attention on the progressive influence Israel
and the United States of America had on the society and morality of Islamic nations.
With this skepticism of both nations came a sudden development and expansion of what
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many would call “conspiracy theories” on bookshelves across the Middle East—due in
large part to the popularity of Said Ayyub’s The Anti-Christ. His 1986 work would
initiate a new genre of apocalyptic literature focused on identifying the Dajjal’s plot to
control the world. With his book displaying on its cover a one eyed solider with both
Soviet and American symbols patched onto his military uniform while adorning a Star of
David necklace, Ayyub would thrive on the actions around him and the anxieties amongst
Muslims to become a leading authority on the Final Hour in modernity.171

Leading Authors of the 1990’s
According to Ayyub’s cover, the Dajjal (Antichrist) was not merely a representation of
America and Russia, but was also a reference to both being in company with the Jewish
tradition, all of which were attempting to terminate the Islamic tradition. More
importantly to Ayyub’s theory, this was already occurring in real time and could now be
discovered by Muslims across the world. He writes,
The Jews have placed themselves in the hands of the Antichrist. They have
considered him as one of their princes, they have forged a strategy for [carrying
out] his purposes, and they have held to it. They have used all the means at their
disposal to realize this supreme goal. They have infiltrated political and
diplomatic activity in many places in the world, and they have penetrated
societies through channels of communication that they control. And all for the
Antichrist! This Antichrist lives in our midst today, in our world! He knows the
frontiers reached and occupied by Israel, and it is from this place [Israel], where
he lives, that he will venture forth.172
To support this claim, Ayyub references Paul’s conversion to Christianity as part of
the agenda led by the Antichrist, “Paul founded in Jesus’s name a religion that Jesus
would not have understood when he was alive…and that he will not understand when he
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returns at the end times.”173 This, according to Ayyub, helps explain why classical
eschatological narratives claim that “The son of Mary will descend from heaven and will
be a just leader. He will destroy the cross and kill the swine. Peace will everywhere reign
and swords will be used as sickles.”174 While he uses classical sources, such as this
hadith, he also provides his own interpretation of historical events to fit alongside his
theory of a Jewish Dajjal.175
Ayyub continues in this line of thought to claim that Jews were secretly behind every
atrocity that had occurred throughout Islamic history—including the crusades in the
Middle Ages, the creation of “Freemasonry” used to control America, and Napoleon
Bonaparte’s conquest of Muslim lands.176 For Ayyub, Jews are not only followers of the
Dajjal but are also conspirators attacking the Islamic tradition throughout time in a
variety of different ways, including politics and economics. Jumping ahead to his own
time, Ayyub notes the events occurring around him were again the arrangements and
deeds of the Antichrist—now being supported by a Judeo-Christian Alliance rather than
just the Jews. Ayyub uses this line of thinking to assert that the Cold War was actually
synthetic and only being depicted as a power struggle between the two nations. As his
cover implies, all three forces were actually working for the Dajjal in order to destabilize
the Middle East, now through an “Israeli-American strategic cooperation.”177
Ayyub also emphasized to his readers that the Final Hour and appearance of the
Antichrist is going to be in tandem with high levels of unbelief and immorality within
Muslim societies. He claims that to destabilize the Middle East fully, there must be a high
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level of disunity among Muslims. At one point he writes, “The Antichrist is the goal of
all of the camps of unbelief that have allowed the realm of thought to cease, and did not
listen or pay attention to the set-path God has placed as a fortification for all who
believe…God foretold that they would cause corruption in the world and that they would
make haste in that corruption with any intelligence and any ability, and they would go
with that corruption into the future.”178
Ayyub claims that the only way to overcome such an increasing influence of the
Antichrist is for Muslims to revert back to living as closely to the example of Muhammad
and the early Muslim community as possible. It is only by doing this that they will be
able to position themselves as pious believers in a world of corruption and disbelief. He
writes, “What is the part of the believer in the victory that will be gained in the final end?
The part of the believer is that he takes his place in the camp of faith and that he places
himself in the path defined by well-trodden [the Shari’a], and that he lives his life in
accordance with that definition.”179
This separation of two camps, however, was not the end goal of Ayyub’s vision.
Instead he also claims that there must be a decisive battle between the camp of faith and
the camp of the Antichrist. This battle, foretold in some classic sources, has now
undertaken the form of a major war that will include every person, since “The Jews are
planning the Third World War in order to eliminate the Islamic world and all opposition
to Israel.”180 Such a vision of the final battle between the Jewish tradition and the Islamic
tradition highlights two major themes of Ayyub’s work that would later be adopted by
future apocalyptic authors—deliberate anti-Semitic rhetoric and a fear that Jews and
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Christians were conspiring against Muslims under the guidance of the Antichrist.
Yet Ayyub’s narrative, while periodically citing classic apocalyptic sources, does not
follow in the footsteps of previous authors or even the narrative of Juhayman who based
his belief solely on the classic sources. Rather Ayyub attempts to construct his narrative
with a slew of non-traditional sources in order to make loose connections between the
classic narratives and what was occurring around him. In fact, Ayyub is not sneaky with
this strategy or attempting to hide it but rather completely refuses to acknowledge his
faults. What separates Ayyub’s authorship from these previous movements and writings
goes beyond just a desire to blame the Jewish people for current political and social
problems in Muslim nations. According to Filiu, “Ayyub ruptured the organic link
between the Islamic tradition and the last days of the world. In doing this he invented a
new genre, apocalyptic fiction, whose purpose was both educational and propagandistic,
and whose influence was destined rapidly to spread throughout the lands of Islam.”181
Ayyub’s revolutionary work removed itself from the limitations and confinements of
the hadith literatures and Kitab al-Fitna. Instead, he uses the sources when they work
with his narrative and then looks elsewhere for support for any of his claims that do not
line up with the classic sources. For example, Ayyub openly quotes Western Holocaust
deniers in order to inflate his conspiracy that the Antichrist is manipulating every
historical event in order to set up the events of the Final Hour. Early critics of Ayyub note
that he almost entirely cites Western sources, Jewish texts, and the Christian apocryphal
books of the New Testament for his construction of the apocalypse. Rather than work
exclusively from the authoritative literatures from the Islamic tradition, as the classical
authors did, Ayyub openly uses non-traditional sources as evidence for his newly
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constructed narrative. Another example of such is where Ayyub mentions that “the
faithful one” mentioned in the Book of Revelation actually was a direct reference to the
Prophet Muhammad and thus Revelation can be used as an authority on the end times.182
While often working from outside the tradition, Ayyub does periodically interweave
classic Islamic sources into his arguments. Using the hadith collection of Abu Dawud, as
Juhayman had done, Ayyub decides to use the classic sources to connect geographical
locations with what was going on during the time of his writing. Activities occurring in
Iraq and Afghanistan (Khorasan), areas of importance in classic sources, thus can
suddenly be discussed as actually occurring in real time and as evidence that his narrative
is correct. Yet as Filiu points out, this tactic of picking and choosing which parts of the
classic sources ultimately created inconsistencies between Ayyub’s narrative and what
was found in the Dawud’s classic account—specifically on where the Dajjal is to arise
from.183
Ayyub’s popularity, however, only was amplified as his work became more
widespread and distributed across the Middle East despite his lack of citation and use of
non-traditional sources. The formal and scholarly critiques attacking his work held no
weight in the larger population reading his novel that most likely held no strong
understanding of the classic sources. The popularity and income brought about with
Ayyub’s novel laid the foundation for how future writers and book companies would go
about writing and selling apocalyptic literature. The rise in popularity was further
sustained with every military conflict, political action, and social disturbance occurring in
the Middle East—especially with what would occur in final years leading up to the 21st
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century.
A pupil of Ayyub’s work, Muhammad Izat Arif, would soon after The Antichrist begin
his own set of fictional narratives under guidance of the book publisher Dar al-I’tisam
(The House of Refuge). By avoiding concentrating specifically on anti-Jewish rhetoric
and a Jewish Dajjal, Arif was able to expanded his narrative to begin including actions
occurring in other Middle Eastern nations. Arif depicts Saddam Hussein as an
Israeli/American agent, while, like his predecessor, remarking that the Antichrist is surely
“the spiritual father of the Jews.”184 He, however, continues on to include Muslim leaders
in this conspiracy, “There can be no doubt that the Jews are behind the rejection of the
Shari’a of God and the preference of relativistic laws, because it [the Shari’a] is more
just, more compassionate, and more right. This is what proves the deviation of the ruling
politicians, who rule according to something that God has not revealed and disgrace their
identities through the fact that they are named by Muslim names.”185
Arif begins to not only place the Jewish tradition within the Dajjal’s grand scheme
against the Islamic tradition, but also includes illegitimate Muslim rulers who purposely
moved entire nations away from abiding by Shari’a Law. Structuring an argument for
why the world should be run by Shari’a Law and not the laws of man, Arif contends that
America and Israel were secretly trying to destabilize and remove believers from their
tradition by way of puppet regimes in the Middle East dating as far back as the beginning
of colonialization. He contends,
Secular groups go along with a plan built upon the slogans of freedom and
democracy. When they reach their goals, these slogans themselves will have
accomplished the desire of the sons of Zion by propagation of chaos and societal
aimlessness and destructive agitation for the people. This is what we are feeling
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during the present, which is based upon something other than fearing god. The
pillars of the Jewish rule are built upon the axis of propagation of
corruption…and the rule of the people through relativistic laws that increase the
tyranny and leads to conflict between people.186
For Arif, the concepts of “freedom,” “secularism,” and “democracy” were all formed
as a part of this wider agenda against Islamic societies led by the Dajjal. Both Ayyub and
Arif do, at times, make references to the classical narratives but easily diverge from their
contexts and rhetoric. By doing this both authors are no longer restricted to the confines
of a classical source’s narrative and are now able to create any narrative that they want.
With no limitations, these authors were able to publish their novels with either messy or
no citations, and were able to transform any hadith or Qur’anic verse to fit directly into
their newly constructed narrative. The ability to draw any number of connections
eventually reached the point of adopting evidence of UFOs and the Bermuda Triangle to
legitimize their narratives. This was brought to life and popularized through the writings
of Muhammad Isa Dawud.
Dawud’s first two public releases, Beware: The Antichrist Has Invaded the World
from the Bermuda Triangle and The Hidden Links between the Antichrist, the Secrets of
the Bermuda Triangle, and Flying Saucers plots became the leading texts for introducing
the realm of UFOs and the Bermuda Triangle into the narration of the Dajjal. Muhammad
Isa Dawud uses similar ideas to construct a historical timeline of the Dajjal’s life. Dawud
does this by referencing and re-constructing Sahih Muslim’s collection on the narration
of Tamin al-Dari. Within this account al-Dari is alleged to have sailed to the “West” due
to a major storm on the sea where he eventually came across the Dajjal on an unknown
island. Muhammad Isa Dawud asserts that the reason the Dajjal was on this island was
186
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because he had unsuccessfully attempted to take control of the world before sailing to
North America to wait for the proper time—explaining why al-Dari would have come
across him.187
Through this line of reinterpreting the classic hadith, Dawud claims that since “The
Bermuda Triangle is the point of departure and return for the flying saucers” that the
Dajjal must be waiting there to once again take control of the earth.188 This would explain
the narrative of al-Dari while also explaining the widespread mystery of UFOs and the
Bermuda Triangle. To explain what these UFOs must be, Dawud explains that their
sightings are either a trick of the mind or evidence that the Dajjal possesses technology
unknown to the rest of the world that will soon be used against Muslims. One excerpt
from his writing highlights this reasoning,
Yes the Antichrist has subordinated light and understood the secrets of vision and
arrived at the secrets of magnetic gravity…Yes, the Antichrist rides particles of
light, since this idea did not come first to Einstein, the Jewish thief, who stole
ideas, theories, and truths…Yes, the Antichrist is able to make a new type of
artificial light and is able to take advantage of the sea of particle rays falling on
the earth like a waterfall.189

Not only is he quick to argue that UFOs must be the work of the Dajjal, but also points
out that Einstein was part of the wider Jewish conspiracy against Muslims. This notion of
a world-wide conspiracy was not only specifically done to scare readers into believing
the Final Hour was at hand, but rather may have been a tactic to bring unity to the Islamic
world under a shared threat. According to Cook, “most of these authors subscribe[d] to
the idea of an international conspiracy against Islam and Muslims everywhere…to unite
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all Muslims into one state ruled by a caliph.”190 Whether the latter part was always the
case remains unknown, but the appeal of a worldwide conspiracy against all Muslims
may have been used to ignite belief that the end was nearing. According to these writings
it was not just Muslims living in a specific region that were going to be impacted by the
Dajjal, but rather Muslims living in every corner of the world were going to suffer at the
hands of Jews, infidels, Christians, and the Dajjal. By appealing to every Muslim, authors
were ultimately able to reach a wider audience of readers. Such a tool may have been the
goal of the book companies publishing these works in order to create more sales and
interest in the subject.
While distrust of the Jewish tradition became incorporated into these early modern
narrations of the Dajjal, it is important to highlight that there remains little classical
evidence to support such a claim. Besides the hadith known as the tradition of the rocks
and the trees—“The Hour will not arrive until the Muslims fight the Jews, and the
Muslims will slaughter them, until the Jew will hide behind the rocks and the tress. The
rocks and the trees will say: ‘O Muslim, O servant of God, there is a Jew behind me,
come and kill him!’”—there is no little conclusive evidence for the Jews and Muslims
being enemies during the Final Hour.191 Yet, the opinion that Jews would be followers of
the Dajjal is littered throughout the hundreds of books being produced in the 1990’s. The
Jewish tradition was simply where all guesses were going on who would be joining the
Dajjal, most likely a result of the formation of Israel and the fighting between it and
Muslim nations in the 20th century. It would not be until the morning of September 11,
2001, that a new enemy would arise. Following the attacks, the attention of jihadists and
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modern apocalyptic authors alike turned towards the United States of America as being
the newest pawn in the Dajjal’s wider scheme.

Post 9-11: Radical Transformations in Literature
The attacks on the morning of September 11th changed the landscape for how modern
Islamic literatures would be written. Muhammad Isa Dawud remained a popular author at
this time and was one of the first to latch onto the attacks on the World Trade Center as
new evidence that the end of the world was nearing. His release of The Surprise in 2001
came with a cover bearing the images of the two towers burning alongside a picture of
the Dome of the Rock directly below it. For Dawud, these attacks were set up by Jewish
leaders in hopes of further destabilizing the Middle East to destroy the Islamic tradition’s
image in the public consciousness of Americans. This attack on American soil, according
to Dawud, would lead to further and “justified” American transgression into the Middle
East. The Surprise would go on to find its greatest success in Egypt during the first two
weeks of publication before being republished two more times.192
While Dawud became the first apocalyptic author to venture into the realm of
conspiracy with the 9/11 attacks, it was the authors that followed him that fully
developed his works and transformed them into another genre of modern apocalyptic
literature. Amin Muhammad Gamaleddin, who had been previously hired in 1997 by the
publishing company Al-Tawfiqiyya (The Mediator), was able to find more widespread
success following the events of 9/11. This was largely due to his ability to draw
connections between the events of the 21st century and a previous book on the signs of
the Hour that he wrote. Gamaleddin’s 1997 The Revelation of the Minor Signs of the
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Hour proposed that all 79 signs prior to the Hour had already occurred and the Muslim
world should now wait until the final battles and appearance of the Dajjal occur. With the
attacks of 9/11 Gamaleddin saw an opportunity to provide fresh insight into his previous
narrative—this time on the actions of the United States.193
According to Gamaleddin’s 2001 release Armageddon, the attacks on the World
Trade Center were a part of a strategy to initiate World War III, which would commence
with American invasions throughout predominately Muslim nations. These coming
invasions would “haunt Syria [Sham], darken Egypt, assail Iraq, and engulf the Arabian
Peninsula” to a level that had not previously been seen in history.194 According to
Gamaleddin’s prediction this will be accomplished by a “new coalition, organized by
America in response to the destruction visited upon New York and Washington…in the
name of tracking down the terrorists and eliminating terrorism.”195 Since all of the signs
had previously been completed, these invasions would be the final plots of the Dajjal and
battles of the end times. The attacks of 9/11 simply allowed modern authors, such as
Gamaleddin, an ability to edit and reconstruct how the Final Hour would take place.
Whereas the 1990’s had previously been more of guessing games from apocalyptic
authors on who would initiate the final battles, the 21st century was able to direct its
agenda against the United States and on the real time actions it was conducting across the
Middle East.
Moving away from exclusively discussing anti-Semitic topics that had characterized
the writings of the 1990’s, apocalyptic writings during the start of the 21st century now
focused directly on the actions of America in the Middle East. Gamaleddin and
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Muhammad Isa Dawud suddenly became leading authorities for this new offshoot of
contemporary apocalyptic writings, and more book companies were quick to join in the
hysteria and speculation. One Jordanian company, for example, published The Antichrist
and the Battle of Armageddon by Hisham Muhammad Abu Hakima after seeing the
success that Dawud and Gamaleddin found in their writings.
Hakima, working from the narratives constructed by Ayyub a decade prior, claimed
the world was being divided into “the camp of faith and the camp of godlessness” and
that “the Islamic forces, believing in Allah and him alone, will be found in Syria [Sham]
and in the Arabian Peninsula.”196 Hakima argued that the actions of the West were
purposely attempting to place each person into one of these camps and that the most
pious believers would be found in Syria and the Arabian Peninsula—an allusion perhaps
to the notion that Jesus would descend upon Damascus to help defeat the Dajjal.
Most of the classical sources pointed to Iraq or Syria (two major places of interest in
the classical sources) as areas where the end of the world would occur. The ability for
modern authors to reference classical hadiths in the wake of what was happening in the
present time ultimately allowed them the capability to sporadically show some level of
legitimacy and authority amongst its readers. For example, Dawud’s second book,
released in 2002, titled The Treasure of the Euphrates stated “Such is the secret, O nation
of Islam: after having detected the Euphrates’ mountain of gold, America decided to
invade Iraq and to change its regime.”197 Such a claim could be supported when read
beside Muslims’ hadith “The Last Hour would not come before the Euphrates uncovers a
mountain of gold, for which people would fight. Ninety-nine out of each one hundred
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would die but every man amongst them would say that perhaps he would be the one who
would be saved (and thus possess this gold).”198
Such a tactic, while not particularly popular amongst these modern authors, did
provide readers with classical narratives that could be viewed as actually occurring
around them. It would be hard to deny how influential oil has become in the world, and
how it has been linked to American’s interests within the Middle East. By responding to
the widespread feelings of skepticism and anxieties toward the actions of America
through references to classic sources, modern authors were able to amplify their claims
tenfold. The beginning of the 21st century ushered in a new wave of writing on Islamic
eschatology throughout the Middle East and became increasingly popular as the Middle
East remained in states of war and conflict.
Consequently it would seem that the actions of America only provided more space for
the radical narratives to find room on bookshelves in the Middle East. Whereas the
1990’s enjoyed a vast amount of speculation on what was to come, the 21st century
answered those speculations and gave authors the opportunity to frequently draw links
between the Final Hour and what was happening in real time with regard to what the
United States was doing. It would not be until two years later with the start of Operation
Iraqi Freedom that these connections were blown right off with a range of new
speculations flooding the market. Filiu writes,
The extension to Iraq of what the American government called the global war
against terror proved to be an extraordinary source of encouragement to
apocalyptic speculation in the Islamic world in the years that followed…The new
apocalyptic literature, by harnessing the rhetoric and the images of both Muslim
and Christian tradition, was able to distort and redirect scared prophecy for its
own purposes, and, with the invasion of Iraq, to reach a new and larger audience
198
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while at the same time strengthening the plausibility of its forecasts.199
Filiu notes that “what had developed fifteen years earlier as an anti-Semitic species of
fiction now became an obsessive style of paranoid interpretation…for making sense of
the world.”200 The predictions of previous authors, whether legitimate or not, were
coming to fruition in the minds of those who had read their works. The invasion of Iraq
and toppling the Saddam Hussein’s government would bear the weight of skepticism
among these authors, who once again had new material to work around. One major
publishing company from Cairo, Dar al-Kitab al Arabi (The House of the Arab Book),
was quick to see the opportunity of this event and began releasing apocalyptic literatures
in 2003.201 Contemporary apocalyptic literatures were no longer the taboo writings of the
1990’s, but were increasingly becoming authorities on the events of the Final Hour.
With the sudden increase in popularity and authority came also a desire from authors
to address every single issue occurring in the world. This became quite problematic,
however, and led to the wide range of conspiracies that had existed in the 1990’s to
become popularized once more. An Egyptian lawyer named Mansu Abdelhalkim became
one of these leading voices in the wake of the American invasion of Iraq and felt as
though he had to explain every event with an apocalyptic framework. For Abdelhalkim,
the end of the world had not only been unfolding but now could “no longer be
stopped.”202 This, he claims, was due specifically to the presidencies of both George
Bushes, Freemasonry and the Rothschild family, drugs and immorality afflicting Muslim
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societies, and the use of UFO technologies to achieve world dominance.203 Here, we find
a resurgence of discussion on UFOs and wide-scale conspiracies. Abdelhalkim, drawing
from Christian sources and Western skeptics of 9/11, goes as far as even accepting the
prophecies of Nostradamus as a source of authority for interpreting current events.204
Abdelhalkim uses these non-traditional sources in order to even eradicate all
responsibility of the attacks on 9/11 from Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda.
He instead insists, possibly from Thierry Meyssan’s 9/11 The Big Lie, that Bin Laden,
Al-Qaeda, and Muslims in general were set up by “a group of the American state
apparatus charged with implementing the policy of President Bush.”205 According to
Abdelhalkim, this grand conspiracy was the doing of the Dajjal, and only conducted by
the American government to destabilize the Middle East for justification for invading
Iraq and Afghanistan. While he uses a vast amount of non-traditional sources, much as all
of the modern authors have done, Abdelhalkim attempted to place every political and
military action done by the United States into an apocalyptic narrative. This desire led
him to dive into the same speculations and conspiracies that previous authors had been
focused on. This, however, did not mean that the genre of apocalyptic literature lost any
of its traction.
The invasion of Iraq in 2003, alongside President Bush’s infamous public “great
Crusade” reference fueled more anxiety and skepticism toward what America was
attempting to accomplish. It would appear that the literatures were able to get away with
discussions of UFOs and Freemasons because the actions of the United States often fell
in line with what the novels were claiming. In much the same way that the Left Behind
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Christian apocalyptic series dominated the book shelves of American bookstores in the
early 21st century, Islamic apocalyptic literature was thriving from the worldwide interest
on identifying and discussing the apocalypse. Contemporary Islamic literature, still
basing their narratives on the classical sources, tended to view the end of the world being
filled with corruption, oppression, and in need of some sort of violent revolution and
battle against the Dajjal rather than a coming rapture that would remove the pious
believers from the Earth. The literature, focused on the violence that will take place
towards the Final Hour, referenced many of the same actions conducted by the United
States as jihadists were.
This new genre of literature and apocalyptic propaganda that was being released at a
rapid rate developed and popularized at nearly the same time that jihadism became a
global pursuit among a small minority of Muslims. The timing may have been completely
coincidental, or perhaps the literatures were building their narratives on the actions of
jihadists, but the combination of the two did instigate a new wave of anxiety and fear
across the Middle East—especially in Iraq during the first years of Operation Iraqi
Freedom. The lasting impacts that the literature had on jihadists and vice versa may never
be known, but knowing that both were occurring and circulating within the Middle East
at the same time helps support a theory that both may have been influencing
disenfranchised Muslims who were seeing firsthand the repercussions of war and
violence.
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Paving the Way for ISIS
Not every jihadist was influenced by apocalyptic narratives, and not all modern
authors were influenced by the actions of jihadists, although both certainly benefitted
from the actions of the others. In the mix of a global spotlight on Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda
and the transformation and popularized work of modern apocalyptic narratives arose one
man known as Abu Musab al-Suri who would begin to blur the lines between the two.
While he cannot be given all the credit for combining jihad with messianic belief in
contemporary times, he has certainly played a large role in the development of modern
apocalyptic jihad. It would appear that al-Suri was perhaps the only modern apocalyptic
author who attempted to violently fight back against an Islamic government through the
use of jihad. Born in Syria in 1958, al-Suri would go on to join the Muslim Brotherhood
in fighting the Syrian government under the leadership of Hafez al-Assad.206 Though the
fighting would be unsuccessful, by 1997 after living in exile in both Jordan and Iraq, alSuri found a new home in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.
He remained there until the American invasion in 2001. Moving across the Middle East,
al-Suri would complete The Call to Global Islamic Resistance in 2004—a work that has
since inspired a slew of jihadists inspire to fight against the foreign invaders.207
Within this text were over a hundred pages on “the most important prophetic
indications, reported in tradition [Sunna] on the end times.”208 Perhaps known as one of
the leading authors for justifying jihad of the sword, al-Suri may have been under the
impression that the Final Hour was at hand and that jihad should be used in the wake of
it. Within the writing, al-Suri makes mentions to his messianic belief writing,
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The earth is filled with oppression and injustice and the events lead on from one
another toward the appearance of the Mahdi…For jihad is an obligation until the
advent of the Hour. The community that fights for what is true and just will be
victorious…and it will persevere until the last of its members fights the
Antichrist, a constant command of our religion…The twentieth century is past,
and we have now entered the twenty-first to find that most people seem prepared
to follow the Antichrist.209

Here, we find, that al-Suri not only believes that there are countless pieces of evidence
to show that the Final Hour is drawing close, but also that jihad is justifiable and
demanded until the Day of Judgement. This use of jihad, according to al-Suri, becomes
ever more important when it is being conducted against the Dajjal—who had prepared
the world to follow him during the Final Hour. For al-Suri the current state of the world
had “entered into the age of battles and tribulations” and Muslims must prepare for the
coming Final Hour by reverting back to living as piously as possible.210 Hoping to avoid
dwelling on the ‘conspiracy’ theories that had plagued previous modern writers, such as
UFOs and the Bermuda Triangle, al-Suri cites Burkari, Muslim, and Dawud’s hadith
collection while also often referring to Nu’aym ibn Hammad’s work. Filiu points out that
it is through these sources that al-Suri concludes that the final battles must take place in
Syria [Sham] where “Al-Qaeda’s global jihad must be reoriented to take into account this
final clash.”211
While al-Suri criticizes Al-Qaeda for its failure to combat the American forces in
2001, he still finds it critical that the organization leading global jihad must prepare for
the final battles to take place in Syria. This claim may have been influenced by his
historical background and personal conflict with the Assad regime, but al-Suri is careful
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to make his narrative reflect what is found in the classic sources. He does not make the
same mistakes as previous modern apocalyptic authors by overreaching his range of
sources and citations. Additional points of emphasis for al-Suri’s narrative discusses the
Euphrates hadith, a gradual moral decay occurring in Muslim societies, corruption of
Islamic scholars, the rise of Black Banners in the East which every believer should
pledge their allegiance to, and the final confrontation between the Christian Byzantines
and the final Muslims in Syria during the greatest and final apocalyptic battle—almahama al-kubra.212
Yet just under a year after The Call for Global Islamic Resistance was written and
published, al-Suri’s name was taken off of America’s wanted terrorist list. There remains
no explanation for what happened to al-Suri, but there are reports that he was killed
shortly after releasing his work to the public. His death, however, occurred only after The
Call for Global Islamic Resistance was uploaded onto the then increasingly popular
media platform known as the Internet. It has since remained on-line where it has
continued to be read by jihadists across the world as a source of guidance and authority
on how to combat the West.
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Chapter 3: Apocalyptic Origins: From Al-Qaeda in Iraq to the Islamic State
The creators of the apocalypses, in addition to a personal need to express their own
feelings, probably intended to influence public opinion, for example, in promoting
political aims, social tendencies, or religious values. Apocalyptic traditions
might…reflect the atmosphere prevailing among the fighters against the infidels, and
serve as propaganda to attract warriors and inhabitants to areas of perpetual shedding of
Muslims’ blood. No wonder that some such traditions are aimed against the Byzantines,
the Rum, an actual threat and a traditional eschatological enemy.213
Ofer Livne-Kafri

By first providing the groundwork for why apocalyptic literature developed and how it
radically transformed during the late 20th century, it now becomes crucial to look
exclusively at the origins of the Islamic State for there being apocalyptic motivations in
its formation and ongoing development in 2016. Through analyzing its earliest
founders—such as Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and al-Masri—its theology, and particularly
its understanding of takfirsm, there is discovered an increase in violence toward Shi’a
Muslims. This, I find, emerges alongside the Islamic State’s development in the 21st
century from Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI ) to Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) and now in its present
manifestation known as the Islamic State (ISIS). 214 By constructing a timeline of the
Islamic State and its gradual development from AQI to ISIS, we find that the group has
undergone changes theologically and strategically—both largely influenced by messianic
speculation.
These changes, I argue, seem to have been caused by advancements or slight
alterations made to an apocalyptic narrative that the group was being influenced by.
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While these changes, at times, can be minute and easily overlooked, analyzing ISIS from
an apocalyptic context will help demonstrate that not only did the Islamic State possess
an apocalyptic theology in its earliest years of existence, but that this theology has
continuously been able to transform, adjust to current events, learn from past mistakes,
and appears to have increasingly pursued higher levels of violence against Muslims and
non-Muslims alike. By approaching the Islamic State’s formation and development from
an apocalyptic context, there will also be additional evidence found for why the group
had early discrepancies with Al-Qaeda, why it chose to establish a caliphate according to
the “prophetic method,” and how ISIS has been able to expand its influence and territory
despite a near collapse in 2010.
The Islamic State’s eventual split from Al-Qaeda, how it occurred, and what resulted
because of it will help clarify distinct differences between end goals, theology, and
recruitment strategies between the two organizations. These differences, I argue, have
largely been a result of its outlook of the Islamic world, the future of the Islamic tradition
in the 21st century, and how ISIS wanted to go about pursuing an Islamic caliphate.
Through this method of approach, I will also point out how the political and sociocultural
environment of Iraq and Syria in the 21st century may have been flooded with, as
previous examples discussed have shown, high levels of anxiety, violence and warfare,
distrust of an established government, and an increasingly perceived outbreak of a
sectarian war due in large part to the agendas of Zarqawi, al-Masri, and now Abu Bakr alBaghdadi.
Due in large part to the initial theology and approach to establishing an Islamic the
mind of Zarqawi, we discover that the appeal of igniting a sectarian war between Sunni
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and Shi’a Muslims across the Middle East, fueled alongside a war against the United
States, would both play a large part in the Islamic State developing a sudden appeal and
fascination with the A’maq Cycle beginning in 2010. The combination of the Iraq War,
Arab Spring, and the Syrian Civil War would provide the groundwork for connections to
be made between the classic apocalyptic literature and current events. With this, ISIS
would tap into the anxieties of the area and eventually the world to generate one of the
most violent Islamist militant organizations to date to—one that believed the Final Hour
was rapidly approaching and action was needed.
This chapter will stress the reasons why ISIS changed its apocalyptic narrative from
awaiting the return of the Mahdi between 2007-2010, to now being motivated by the
A’maq Cycle—which concludes with the return of Jesus prior to the Final Hour, a fitna
between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims, and the battle of al-malhamah al-kubra against the
Byzantine Christians. This theological change to the Islamic State’s apocalyptic narrative
brought with it a revival of attention on the Dajjal, who he would be, and how he would
attempt to destroy the Islamic tradition. With this revitalized speculation on the Dajjal,
ISIS seems to have been provided new justification for attacking the West, Middle
Eastern governments, and any Muslim (Sunni or Shi’a) who did not pledge allegiance to
the caliphate.
The latter justification has, through this new apocalyptic inspiration, been understood
as deeming all Muslims (that do not give allegiance) as apostates or nonbelievers. With
this, ISIS seems to have begun attempting to purify the region, religion, and world of all
non-belief and human law. By refocusing its narrative around the A’maq Cycle and
establishing a caliphate under the leadership Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State
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positioned itself above all jihadist organizations (including Al-Qaeda), demanded ba’yah
from every Muslim (if denied they were not justifiable to be killed), and now placed
enemies under the influence of the Dajjal who was attempting to destroy the Islamic
tradition.
This shift in apocalyptic narrative has adapted over the course of the 21st century and
even seems to have learned from previous mistakes of previous apocalyptic
movements—including the Islamic State in Iraq. With belief in the approaching
appearance of the Mahdi, ISI nearly watched itself be destroyed after the failure of the
Mahdi’s appearance. As shown in chapter 2, the appeal of the Mahdi can result in any
man claiming the title—especially if his name is Muhammad Abdullah (prophesized to
be the Mahdi’s name). Once this occurs, there comes the strong possibility of the
proclaimed Mahdi being killed in battle, resulting in a loss of energy and appeal amongst
the followers. With the A’maq Cycle, however, ISIS removed the notion of the Mahdi
and began to focus on the return of Jesus—who will be clearly recognized upon his
return. In this way, ISIS has been able to shift its messianic speculation accordingly and
has benefited greatly from it. The sudden death of a man claiming to be the Mahdi or, as
ISI learned, the failure of the Mahdi to appear both can ( and often do) result in
widespread loss of appeal, energy, and legitimacy from observers and potential recruits.
By pinpointing apocalyptic influences in the formation and development of the Islamic
State, I show that ISI has been influenced by end time speculations and its role in
bringing in the Final Hour—a time where the Islamic tradition would rule the world by
God’s decree.
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Abu Mus’ab al-Zaqarwi and the Formation of AQI
While the Islamic State caught the attention of most of the Western world and media
outlets in 2014 with the beheading of the American hostage James Foley, the roots of the
terrorist organization date much further back than this infamous video. The history of the
Islamic State is quite complicated and ISIS has only recently begun to be studied as an
entirely separate organization from Al-Qaeda. As recently as 2014, when ISIS first made
a global appearance, President Obama still referred to the group as Al-Qaeda’s “JV
[Junior Varsity] team” in effort to delegitimize the notion that the Islamic State may be a
separate or more powerful enemy than Al-Qaeda. Yet this analysis of the group may, in
fact, be providing the wrong approach for combatting the Islamic State, analyzing its
motives, and predicting its future actions. Graeme Wood, in What ISIS Really Wants,
cautions that such a “monolithic” view of ISIS (as Al-Qaeda 2.0 or its “JV team”) causes
“confusion about the group, and may have contributed to significant strategic errors” so
far.215
The prevailing interpretation from scholars and government officials claiming that
they know what the goals and agendas really are of terrorist organizations has possibly
created a static paradigm for how Westerners analyze the Islamic State. Wood describes
such a process as the attempt to “apply the logic of Al-Qaeda to an organization that has
decisively eclipsed it.”216 This has become an extremely problematic approach to the
Islamic State who “follows a distinctive variety of Islam whose beliefs about the path to
the Day of Judgment matter to its strategy” which when taken seriously “can help the
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West know its enemy and predict its behavior.”217 In this manner, taking the Islamic State
at its word—a group heavily influenced by the end of the world—there becomes new
avenues shaped for understanding its formation, history, development, theology,
strategies, and aspirations. By taking the Islamic State at its word, we are also provided
opportunities for analyzing its possible fears, anxieties, understanding of the world
around them, and may be able to discover possible long-term resolutions to prevent
further end time speculation from spreading across the region.
By looking back at the founders of the first manifestations of the Islamic State in the
21st century, there is evidence of early apocalyptic references existing and motivating the
trajectory of the group through gradual changes made to its narrative. The first point of
reference for understanding the current manifestation of the Islamic State today begins
the leader and founder of AQI—Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi—though he himself would
never observe the manifestation of what his early influences would become.
At the heart and root of the Islamic State’s conception is the theology that was passed
down by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi—especially his understanding of takfirsm and the
killing of Shi’a Muslims. Zarqawi remains relevant to the Islamic State today and is
referred to as Shaykh al-Zaqarwi within media outlets. This persistent influence on the
group’s trajectory after his death in 2006 sheds additional light on the underlining
thoughts, tactics, and theology of the Islamic State throughout the 21st century—
including the opinion that the world must be purified of all nonbelievers. Therefore,
understanding the origins of ISIS must begin with the life and early career of Zarqawi
and the theological views he possessed when forming AQI in 2004.
The life of Zaqarwi, originally named Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Kalaylah, starts with a
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Jordanian man covered in tattoos,218 known by locals in the town as a drunk, a street
fighter, and a man who spent the majority of his early life being arrested for crimes
including drug possession and sexual assault.219 Zarqawi, at this point in his life, would
be far from the jihadist who led attacks against American forces at the start of Operation
Iraqi Freedom, was given the title of “The Shaykh of Slaughters,” eventually become one
of the higher ranking members of Al-Qaeda, and would be the master mind behind
civilian attacks across Iraq against Shi’a populations.
The radical change that Zarqawi underwent came directly after his time locked in a jail
cell for drug possession. The shift in lifestyle initially began after deciding to join an
“Islamic revivalist organization” named Tablighi Jammat, that Zaqarwi hoped would
allow him to become more pious Muslim. Another account notes that his mother forced
him to begin taking religious courses in Amman after being arrested, and that it would be
there that Zarqawi was first introduced to the doctrine of Salafism.220After spending time
studying Salafism and its argument that Muslim society needs to revert back to living as
closely to the example of the Prophet Muhammad and the early Muslim community,
Zarqawi decided to leave Jordan for Afghanistan in 1989 out of desire for performing
jihad against the Soviet Union. 221
He, however, would arrive too late and only witnessed the Soviet Union’s army
leaving the region. Despite not seeing combat, Zaqarwi ended up spending his time in
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Afghanistan advancing another skill, namely “working on jihadist newsletters.”222 This
early work with media distributions may further explain the reasoning that while in
control of AQI, Zarqawi would use the Internet and other media platforms to spread his
message and appeal to recruits. It would be during the early 21st century that Zarqawi
began releasing a number of beheading videos onto the Internet, a tactic that we now
know has remained quite relevant the Islamic State’s own media.
It would be also while living in Afghanistan that Zarqawi would make two
important connections with other top level jihadists. Zarqawi would meet two men who
both played significant roles in the September 11th attacks. These men were Khalid
Mohammad (a main plotter of 9-11) and Mohammad Shobana “who published a jihadist
magazine called Al-Bunyan Al-Marsus (the impenetrable Edifice).”223 These early
connections would heavily influence the future actions of Zarqawi. One account of an
interview conducted between journalist Mar Anne Weaver and a jihadist member with
Zarqawi at this time recounted, “It’s not so much what Zarqawi did in the jihad [at this
time]—it’s what the jihad did for him.”224 These early connections made in Afghanistan
would provide Zarqawi with his first taste of what jihad was in the modern world, as well
as a deeper appreciation for the use of media outlets in recruitment efforts. It would,
however, be who Zarqawi met and shared a jail cell with in Jordan between 1993 and
1999 that extraordinarily influenced his future decisions, theology, and understanding of
the use of force.
As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, Zarqawi would share his Jordanian
cell with Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi—whose brother-in-law had been a supporter of
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Juhayman’s siege on Mecca in 1979.225 Maqdisi, while no affiliation with the siege on
Mecca, was a strong supporter of using media outlets and publications to reach out to
potential recruits. In his publication Democracy: A Religion would, Maqdisi claimed
western styles of government were in direct opposition to the laws mandated by God and
thus should be resisted by any means necessary.226 This, we find, has been a cause for
messianic uprisings and would continue to be the focus of the Islamic State’s media
today.
While the two men eventually would have a falling out due to the violent actions
conducted against Shi’a Muslims by Zaqarwi in Iraq, the two men appeared to have
become close friends at this time. Maqdisi was well known for his knowledge of classic
texts and became one of the leading scholars amongst jihadists on a number of issues.
This even included discussing apocalyptic speculation amongst members, including
telling these Al-Qaeda members that the “faithful” Muslims would arrive in Syria during
the end times.227 While there is no certainty that Zarqawi adopted any apocalyptic views
and expectations of the future in this jail cell directly from Maqdisi, his time spent
amongst a multitude of other jihadists was a transformative time for Zarqawi. Nir Rosen,
an interviewer of imprisoned jihadists at this jail, described the situation as such:
Their time in prison was as important for the moment as their experiences in
Afghanistan were, bonding the men who suffered together and giving them time
to formulate their ideas. For some, it was educational as well. One experienced
jihadi who knew Zarqawi in Afghanistan told me: When I heard Zarqawi speak, I
didn’t believe this is the same Zaqarwi. But six years in jail gave him a good
chance to educate himself.228
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Zarqawi’s time in jail allowed him to safely learn under the guidance of jihadists who
had fought in Afghanistan and leading Salafi scholars, such as Maqdisi. In this way
Zarqawi was surrounded by the leading minds on global jihadism. The ability for
prisoners to freely discuss difficulties in battle, theology, and future strategies for
combatting enemies in the safe confine of a jail cell proved quite effective in turning low
level jihadists into full fledge leaders in a short time frame.229 Jail cells would soon
become a “University” for jihadists and helped elevate Zarqawi to the forefront of the
revitalization of jihad against the West beginning at the end of the 20th century. By 1999,
only six years after being placed in jail, Zarqawi would strike luck and was freed from
the jail following the death of Jordan’s King Hussein who had arrested Zarqawi. The
newly appointed King Abdullah II offered amnesty for “around three thousand prisoners,
excepting the worst offenders such as murderers, rapists, and traitors. Many Islamists
who hadn’t actually committed terrorism against the crown were freed, al-Zarqawi
among them.”230
Soon after being released Zarqawi, however, made his way back to Afghanistan. This
time he would meet the leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden. Reports note that the two
initially did not meet eye to eye on a number of theological and strategical issues—
especially in regard to Zarqawi’s belief that Shi’a Muslims were apostates and should be
at the forefront of Al-Qaeda’s attacks. Osama Bin Laden, however, believed that the
focus of Al-Qaeda efforts should remain on combatting the “far enemy” (America). Bin
Laden saw the attacking of other Muslims, especially civilians, as problematic and a
quick way of losing global appeal from amongst the Muslim populations. Yet, Zarqawi
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remained insistent throughout his later life that the focus of attacks should be on the “near
enemy” (Shi’a Muslims in particular) and that the goal should be to purify the religion of
nonbelief and apostasy before combatting the West.231
This strategy of attacking other Muslims was one that Bin Laden strongly opposed
throughout the 21st century and remained an issue even with ISI and ISIS until his death.
Bin Laden, rather, remained focused on combatting what he saw as the increasing
influence of Western nations in the Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabia where the
holy cities of Mecca and Medina were positioned. Yet even with this disagreement
between Bin Laden and Zarqawi, the former recognized that the latter would still provide
needed help to Al-Qaeda’s goals—especially with the contacts Zarqawi had in regions
outside of Afghanistan. With Zarqawi providing Al-Qaeda the benefit of having contacts
in areas like Jordan, Bin Laden agreed to provide Zarqawi with “a training camp in Herat,
Afghanistan’s third largest city…built with Al-Qaeda startup money, and according to
former CIA analyst Nada Bakos, who estimates that Bin Laden granted al-Zarqawi
$200,000 in the form of a loan.”232 In this way the two formed an alliance and Zarqawi
was now in possession of recruits, cash, and a safe haven to prepare planning for the
future.
Zarqawi, in the confines of his new camp, would form Jund al– Sham (Soldiers of the
Levant) and would place a banner above the entrance of the camp reading Monotheism
and Jihad.233 Despite the newly formed alliance between Zarqawi and Bin Laden,
Zarqawi continued to refuse giving his oath of allegiance to Al-Qaeda’s leader.234 One
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member of Al-Qaeda later reported the alliance was simply a “marriage of convenience”
but not an alliance.235 It would, however, be after the American invasion of Afghanistan
following the attacks of 9-11 that Zarqawi would undertake new orders from Bin Laden.
In anticipation of America going to Iraq next, Zarqawi fled Afghanistan and was in Iraq
by 2002. In Iraq, Zarqawi would soon become a house hold name amongst jihadists and
Western government officials. The Bush administration at one point claimed (prior to the
Iraq War), that Zarqawi was the link between Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein and was
used as one of the many justifications for arguing that Saddam was housing terrorist
cells.236 Whether or not this was true remains unknown, but what is recognized is that
Zarqawi would soon establish Al-Qaeda’s branch in Iraq under the blessing of Bin Laden.
It would seem that Zarqawi became increasingly convinced of the important role that
the region of Iraq would play for future events. There have recently been found writings
from Al-Qaeda members, including Saf al-Adl, discussing Zarqawi’s appeal for Iraq and
how it came about. In one letter, Saf al-Adl mentions that Zarqawi’s plan for the future of
the Islamic world may have developed from his sudden interest in the medieval Caliph
Nur al-Din Zengi. Saf writes, “ [Zarqawi] was always asking for any book available
about Nur al-Din…I believe that what he read about Nur al-Din and his launch from
Mosul in Iraq played a big role in influencing…his [own] decision to go to Iraq after the
fall of the Islamic emirate in Afghanistan.”237
Nur al-Din is historically known for his decisive victories against crusader armies
during the Middle Ages and his establishment of a Caliphate spanning from Iraq into
Syria. More recently, Nur al-Din’s mosque in Mosel would become a major spot for the
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Islamic State. This mosque was thought to have been where al-Din launched his
campaign against the crusaders and was where the caliphate had been established
centuries prior. In 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi would come to this mosque and give his
only public recorded sermon. He declared:
The sun of jihad has risen, and the glad tidings of goodness have shone forth.
Triumph looms on the horizon, and the signs of victory have appeared. Here, the
flag of the Islamic State, the flag of monotheism, rises and flutters. Its shade
covers land from Aleppo to Diyala. Beneath it the walls of the tyrants have been
demolished, their flags have fallen, and their borders have been destroyed…It is a
dream that lives in the depths of every Muslim believer. It is a hope that flutters in
the heart of every mujahid [performing jihdad] monotheist. Now the caliphate has
returned. We ask God the exalted to make it in accordance with the prophetic
method.238
In tribute to Zarqawi, the Islamic State would use this mosque to declare the
[re]establishment of the caliphate. It would be at the very spot that many believe Nur alDin launched his own campaign against the crusader armies under the black banner of the
Abbasids. It would appear al-Baghdadi wanted to show that the initial motivations of
Zarqawi had come full circle and were being fulfilled. What appears certain is that
Zarqawi was influenced, during the early 21st century, by the belief that Iraq would be
where a new campaign would be launched against the present day crusaders—i.e.
America.
Anticipating the American invasion provided Zarqawi the advantage of establishing a
foothold in Iraq prior to 2003 where he would be under threat of American military
forces. When the appearance of American forces finally occurred in 2003, Zarqawi
wasted no in conducting his planned out attacks, bombings, and suicide attacks across
Iraq against Americans, Iraqi officials, and Shi’a civilians. Zarqawi and his newly
constructed off branch of Al-Qaeda (since he had yet given his oath of allegiance to Bin
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Laden) “Monotheism and Jihad,” claimed responsibility for a series of suicide bombing
attacks against Western embassies, a UN mission center, as well as the holy Shi’a
mosque of Imam Ali— where ninety people were killed including the high ranking Shi’a
cleric Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim.239
In this way, Zarqawi would remain focused on attacking both the “far enemy” and
“near enemy.” At one point, Zarqawi even referred to Shi’a Muslims as servants to the
Dajjal alongside the American forces.240 Yet these attacks would only further create
tension between Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda. In one letter Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda’s second in
command and current leader, told Zarqawi that their strategy should remain on
“removing the Americans and establishing an Islamic emirate or caliphate in Iraq…[and
keeping] popular support from the Muslim masses in Iraq and surrounded countries”
because “in the absence of this popular support the Islamic mujahidin movement would
be crushed in the shadows.” 241
Al-Qaeda leaders began to fear that the attacks on Shi’a mosques and the killing of
civilians would result in a loss of appeal from throughout the Islamic world and only
provide Western forces more justification for sending their armies into the Middle East.
Zarqawi, however, remained fixated on attacking the Shi’a populations and believed that
a sectarian war between the two sects of Muslims needed to occur before the American
forces could be fully combatted. By 2004 in result of the sudden wide scale violence
erupting across Iraq, the increase of Western forces, fallout from the toppling of Saddam
Hussein’s regime, and the subsequent Western establishment of a predominantly Shi’a
government, Zarqawi would finally give his oath of allegiance (bay’ah) to Bin Laden.
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In result, Zarqawi began pulling back on attacking predominately Shi’a regions of
Iraq. After giving his allegiance to Bin Laden, Zarqawi’s Monotheism and Jihad would
finally merge with Al-Qaeda to produce Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in late 2004. Following
this merger Zarqawi publically stated, “Our noble brothers in Al-Qaeda understand the
strategy of the Monotheism and Jihad group in the land of two rivers, the land of the
caliphs and their hearts are overjoyed by its method there…perhaps [it would establish]
the caliphate according to the prophetic method.”242 It would appear that Zarqawi’s eyes
were turning toward the establishment of a caliphate and with this belief soon came a
revival of attacks on Shi’a Muslims despite his allegiance to Bin Laden.

From Al-Qaeda in Iraq to the Islamic State in Iraq
While it is important to understand the vast amount of details on what occurred in Iraq
under the leadership of Zarqawi, the scope of this research is not broad enough to cover
every major battle, death, or disagreement between Bin Laden and Zarqawi. Rather, the
purpose here is to look exclusively how AQI formed under the guidance of Zarqawi,
whose strategy centered on igniting sectarian war—a strategy that became more
radicalized as AQI developed into ISI and later into ISIS. Despite lessening the attacks
on Shi’a civilians and giving his allegiance to Bin Laden, Zarqawi eventually fell back
into his old habits. After increasing the targeting Shi’a populations, now under the banner
of Al-Qaeda, Zarqawi would begin to be further cautioned by Al-Qaeda and Zawahiri in
particular. Zawahiri warned him, “Why kill ordinary Shi’a considering that they are
forgiven because of their ignorance? And what loss will befall us if we did not attack the
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Shi’a?”243 Another leader, Atiyya Abd al-Rahman, reportedly wrote to Zarqawi telling
him that “policy must be dominant over militarism” since “this is one of the pillars of war
that is agreed upon by all nations, whether they are Muslims or unbelievers.”244
Despite these warnings from Al-Qaeda leaders, Zarqawi only increased his attacks on
both American and Shi’a forces. A letter intercepted in Iraq by Kurdish forces notes
Zarqawi describing his hatred and distrust of Shi’a Muslims, “The insurmountable
obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy, and the
penetrating venom…The unhurried observer and inquiring onlooker will realize that
Shi’ism is the looming danger and the challenge.”245
For Zarqawi, the main objective of his violence remained starting a civil war between
Sunni and Shi’a Muslims and how forming an Islamic state would come in direct result
from the support of Sunni Muslims who were forced into the civil war. Another letter
from Zarqawi states, “Targeting and hitting Shia in their religious, political, and military
depth to provoke them to show the Sunnis their rabies and bare the teeth of the hidden
rancor working in their breast. If we succeed in dragging them into the arena of sectarian
war, it will become possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent
danger and annihilating death” at the hands of the Shi’a.246
In line with his attacking of Shi’a Muslims across Iraq, Zarqawi would also begin
using the Internet to begin appealing to recruits. As early as 2004 Zarqawi began
displaying beheading videos, a tactic that has become one of the staple points of the
Islamic State today. In one of his earliest videos Zarqawi broadcasted himself personally
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beheading a captured American contractor named Nicholas Berg. While the beheading
videos that have been released by ISIS today do not openly show the violent act,
Zarqawi’s video never framed away from the execution and depicted the entire beheading
for everyone to witness.247 Following the release of the video, AQI would proceed to
release at least eighty other execution videos, some often showing the killing of more
than one individual.248 These videos would not receive the support from Al-Qaeda
leaders, who again feared that the image being shown to the world would only damage
their appeal to Muslim masses. Zawahiri wrote to Zarqawi in 2005, “You shouldn’t be
deceived by the praise of some of the zealous young men and their description of you as
the Shaykh of the slaughterers…We are in battle, and more than half of this battle is
taking place in the battlefield of the media.”249
Al-Qaeda’s leaders became aware of the ripple effects these videos could have on their
future, yet the videos never would reach the global appeal that the beheading of James
Foley did. Zarqawi’s videos came during a time where it would prove more difficult to
broadcast videos to a global audience. There was no Twitter, no Facebook, and the
Internet had yet to popularize as it has today. These early videos, however, are important
to note by how we are able to see how their format and usage were later adopted and
tweaked by the Islamic State. While the videos seem to have served as an important
recruitment tool for the Islamic State today, the beheadings of Western and Shi’a captives
by AQI would become another source of tension between Zarqawi and Bin Laden.
These strategies and the negative feedback they brought with them soon appeared to
begin damaging widespread support for Zarqawi’s movement. The growing lack of
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support would even include his former teacher, spiritual guide, and cellmate al-Maqdisi
who told Zarqawi, “The clean hands of mujahidin should be protected from being
tarnished with the blood of the protected people.”250 Yet knowing how successful the
Islamic State’s videos have become today, it may have only been a result of lack of
access that prevented the videos from becoming a leading source of recruitment for AQI.
Zarqawi’s strategies seemed to have only been damaging support to his cause, but he
would soon be revitalized by a sudden increase of widespread anxiety towards Iran’s
involvement in Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government.
Rumors of an Iran-American alliance forming to destabilize Iraq began to become
more popular following the increase of Shi’a leaders being placed into government
positions of power. This alongside the sudden appearance of Shi’a militias in Iraq, such
as the Mahdi Army, only fueled the extensive anxiety on what was occurring across Iraq.
These actions would prove only further fuel Zarqawi’s speculation that a sectarian civil
war was on the verge of breaking out across the Middle East. With this, he only increased
his attacks. Yet Zarqawi was not the only one who was seeing a sudden transformation of
Iraq’s government into being predominately run by Shi’a Muslims. A former adviser to
US military stated, “It is common in the Arab world to hear talk of secret deals between
Iran and the United States, and mantes that the US ‘gave Iraq to Iran.”251 At nearly the
same time a leaked document from a White House National Security Council to President
Bush from 2006 was discovered and stated a similar mindset on what was occurring:
Reports of non-delivery of services to Sunni areas, intervention by the prime
minister’s office to stop military action against Shiite targets and to encourage
them against Sunni one, removal of Iraq’s most effective commanders on a
sectarian basis, and efforts to ensure Shiite majorities in all ministries—when
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combined with the escalation of [Mahdi Army] killings—all suggest a campaign
to consolidate Shiite power in Baghdad.252
The surge of Shi’a Iraqis into positions of power, the sudden increase of Shi’a militias
entering into Iraq, and a rise in violence occurring between Sunni, Shi’a, and American
forces ultimately lead to a nation rampant with anxiety, distress of the government, and
was filled with violence and warfare. All of these underlining issues would not only give
credence for Zarqawi’s mission and strategy but would also pave the way for the initial
support that ISI received from Sunni Muslims living in Iraq. The authors of ISIS: Inside
the Army of Terror note that this early skepticism towards the influence of Iran in Iraq’s
government would be one of the “primary reasons that Sunnis have been attracted to
ISIS” in Iraq.253
Iraq in the matter of a few short years would nearly ignite into the very outcome that
Zarqawi was aspiring for—an all-out war between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. This was
also occurring alongside the presence of American forces and may have provided space
for initial apocalyptic speculation to arise. In fact it would be during this time that
Zaqarwi, looking to the future, made the statement placed at the front of every Dabiq
magazine, “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify—by
Allah’s permission—until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq.” Perhaps Zarqawi
foresaw a civil war spreading outside of Iraq would soon engulf the entire Middle East.
What is certain is that he was keenly aware of the apocalyptic context and role of Dabiq
during the Final Hour. As Zarqawi had envisioned the invasion of Iraq before it occurred,
he would begin looking toward Syria as being the next area of conflict.
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Zarqawi, in April of 2006, would make his last impressions on the future development
of the Islamic State. At this time Zarqawi decided to call together a council made up from
a variety of different jihadist organizations existing in Iraq. He described the meeting as
the “nucleus for establishing an Islamic state” and that it this establishment would occur
in three months.254 This assertion and plan was directly opposite of Bin Laden and AlQaeda. By this point, Al-Qaeda was under the belief that the American forces and Iraqi
government should be removed prior to any attempt for establishing a state in Iraq. In line
with this thought, Al-Qaeda needed to gather as much support from Muslim populations
as possible before establishing an Islamic state. Zarqawi, however, believed that the
Islamic state should be established first and it would gain support from amongst Muslims
after its announcement.
On June 7, 2006, however, a US drone strike would end the aspirations and life of Abu
Mus’ab al-Zarqawi by dropping a “five-hundred pound laser-guided bomb on [his]
location, followed by a second, satellite-guided munition.”255 Following the sudden and
un-expected death of Zarqawi, AQI’s quickly placed Abu Ayyub al-Masri in command of
AQI. Just a few months after taking the helm, al-Masri would attempt to fulfill Zarqawi’s
prediction and in October publically declared the establishment of the Islamic State in
Iraq (ISI). With this announcement, al-Masri declared that all Iraqi Muslims should now
give their oath of allegiance to Abu Umar al-Baghdadi. With this declaration, al-Masri
would also begin a series of movements and strategies focused specifically on his own
messianic belief. For al-Masri, the Mahdi was going to return at any moment and an
Islamic state needed to be established before his return.
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Al-Masri and the Apocalyptic Appeal of the Islamic State in Iraq
A large component of ISI and later ISIS is the apocalyptic appeal that it fashioned
early on in the group’s formation, the sources it was inspired by during its development,
and how the group adamantly believed that it was going to establish a caliphate according
to a prophetic method prior to the return of the Mahdi. The majority of these beliefs,
while possibly being the motivations of Zarqawi, only came to fruition when AQI and ISI
were under the leadership of Abu Ayyub al-Masri. One of the largest contributions that
al-Masri gave to the present manifestation of the Islamic State has been arguably its
adoption of the black flag, and the reasoning behind the choice for its color and wording.
When ISI was formed in 2006 it possessed no separate flag of its own as most jihadist
organizations do. By as early as 2007, however, ISI decided to adopt a black flag with
white lettering reading “There is no god but God, Muhammad is his Prophet” (known as
the shahada or testimony of faith) as its flag of choice. Around the latter part of the
shahada was a white circle.256 The reasoning behind this specific choice in color came
from the notion that the Prophet Muhammad was believed to have used black flags
during his own life and battles against the Quraysh tribes. While the original Al-Qaeda
flag is also black and possesses the shahada on it, the flag created by ISI (still used by
ISIS today) purposely placed the white circle into its design to signify that ISI possessed
the seal of the Prophet Muhammad. McCants’s points out that this slight decision to
incorporate the white seal into its flag was to tell the world that “the Islamic State had
inherited the Prophets seal, just as the early caliphs had.”257
Rather than design a flag of nationalism, this flag was meant to encompass the idea
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that all Muslims would live under the flag of the Prophet and the Islamic tradition. The
addition of the white seal signified that ISI believed it had received the ability to rule as
an Islamic state. It was no longer the flag of Al-Qaeda but rather the flag of Islam.
McCants’s also states that ISI quoted Ahmad Cevdet Pash to support further reasoning
behind its flag, “The secret in creating a flag is that it gathers people under a single
banner to unify them, meaning that this flag is a sign of the coming together of their
words and a proof of unity in their hearts. They are like a body and what knits them
together is stronger than the bond of blood relatives.”258
In this way the Islamic State in Iraq was making a direct appeal at showing they were
conducting themselves as closely to the example of the Prophet Muhammad and that all
Muslims were united under the Islamic tradition, not nationalities or other jihadist
organizations. Yet beyond this understanding of its flag were also more apocalyptic
implications for its flag choice. Being specifically used by the Abbasids in the rebellion
against the Umayyad empire around 747-750 C.E., black flags adopted an apocalyptic
context within the Islamic tradition over the course of time. The most popular apocalyptic
narrative dealing with the flags was produced during the Abbasid revolt and reads, “The
black banners will come from the East, led by men like mighty camels, with long hair and
long beards; their surnames are taken from the names of their hometowns and their first
names are kunyas. [In the form of Abu so-and-so] If you see the black banners coming
from Khorasan go to them immediately even if you must crawl over ice because indeed
among them is the caliph, al-Mahdi.”259
McCants points out that while apocalyptic speculation was mostly non-existent
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amongst Al-Qaeda’s leaders prior to ISI, that this may be a reflection on Bin Laden and
Zawahiri’s “generation and class.”260 Both men had come from outside of Iraq and Syria,
where the classic traditions place the end time battles taking place, and both came from
wealthier families. Bin Laden had himself viewed the Meccan rebellion of 1979 and its
catastrophic failure following the death of the proclaimed Mahdi. This may have deterred
Bin Laden from making the same mistakes when in leadership.
He had also grown up a part of the wealthy class of Saudis and may have never felt
the urge to look to messianic speculations for changing the state of the world. Yet there
are known accounts of captured Al-Qaeda members, often lower ranking members,
making references to the classic prophecy of the black flags. Ali al-Bahlul supposedly
mentioned the battles of Armageddon while in Guantanamo Bay, while a body guard of
Bin Laden told the FBI “If you see the black banners coming from Khorasan, join the
army,” and Fadil Harun (Somalia’s leader of Al-Qaeda) wrote “The Islamic armies must
gather, rely on God, and support His religion…an ideological struggle, which will
continue until the Hour as long as an inch of Muslim land in the Holy Land is under
control of the enemies.”261
While apocalyptic speculation may have not been popular or flourishing under Bin
Laden’s watch, there are examples of members being quite aware of classic apocalyptic
sources and narrations on the Final Hour. One in particular is the account of the Black
Banners/Flags that are supposed to appear before the Final Hour. As noted in chapter
two, apocalyptic novels would have been flourishing at this point in history due largely to
the events occurring in Iraq and across the Middle East. Undoubtedly these novels would
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have been influencing the public consciousness of Iraq’s society and the surrounding
areas. The increase of American forces in Iraq, the worry that Iran was behind the
decimation of Sunni leadership in Iraq’s government, and the increase of violence
between the two groups would have certainly played right into the ideas that were being
discussed in the apocalyptic novels being released at the time.
It would, however, be al-Masri who would not only magnify the apocalyptic
speculation but also would capitalize on it when forming ISI in 2007. In the prayer led
after the completion of the black flag design, ISI publically declared, “We ask God,
praised be He, to make this flag the sole flag for all Muslims. We are certain that it will
be the flag of the people of Iraq when they go to aid…the Mahdi at the holy house of God
(Ka’ba).”262 In this way ISI was making a clear reference to the classic narration that the
Mahdi would appear in front of the Ka’ba, as was proclaimed by Juhayman in 1979, and
would usher in the apocalypse. McCants writes, “The Islamic State was signaling that its
flag was not only the symbol of its government in Iraq and the herald of a future
caliphate; it was the harbinger of the final battle at the End of Days.”263
The founder of ISI, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, would continue to make open references to
his belief in the approaching return of Mahdi and seems to have been deeply motivated
by this notion. At one point he state, “We are the army that shall hand over the flag to the
servant of God, the Mahdi.”264 McCants, in The ISIS Apocalypse, contends that it was this
strong belief in the Mahdi that al-Masri decided to rush to establish the caliphate
following the death of Zarqawi in 2006. He writes:
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He (Masri) believed the Mahdi, the Muslim Savior, would come within the year.
To his thinking, the caliphate needed to be in place to help the Mahdi fight the
final battle of the apocalypse. Anticipating the imminent conquest of major
Islamic cities as foretold in the prophecies, Masri ordered his men to build pulpits
for the Mahdi to ascent in the Prophet’s mosque in Medina, the Umayyad mosque
in Damascus, and the Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. He also ordered his
commanders in the field to conquer the whole of Iraq to prepare for the Mahdi’s
coming and was convinced they would succeed in three months.265

For al-Masri the return of the Mahdi was coming and the Islamic world needed to
begin preparing itself for it. It would seem that al-Masri was all too consumed with this
belief and allowed it to bleed into every action and decision he was making. When
challenged by other members within ISI for how devoted he had become to in the
Mahdi’s return, al-Masri would retort to them that the Mahdi would “come any day.”266
Very similar to the previous revolutions in Mecca and Sudan, al-Masri was tapping into
apocalyptic speculation to further support ISI and creates a mass appeal for what it was
trying to accomplish. His strategy of attempting to take control of Iraq in only three
months, however, would end up depleting his army across to vast of an area and was soon
recalled within “a week.”267
In another example al-Masri was reported as announcing to members of ISI that “This
war is in its early stages…and this is the beginning of the battles” prior to the Final
Hour.268 This helps highlight how influenced the founder of ISI was by the appeal of the
return of the Mahdi. It was not just the words that were coming out of his mouth but the
actions that he was conducting around the Mahdi’s return. The belief that the Mahdi was
going to return at any moment was a major factor behind the Islamic State in Iraq’s
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strategy, speeches, and design behind its flag choice. Under the leadership and messianic
guidance of al-Masri, ISI would also begin to establish strict hudud punishments within
the regions under its control in Iraq—a tactic that would later be adopted by ISIS
beginning in 2014.269
McCants notes that the sudden use of these hudud punishments, despite ISI not
controlling any real territory, was an attempt to “burnish one’s ultraconservative
credentials and bolster one’s claims to be a state…Unfortunately for the Islamic State, it
was too zealous in applying the hudud and therefore scared too many people.”270 Yet alMasri was under the apocalyptic belief that the region and Islamic tradition needed to live
under Islamic Law as strictly as possible—especially with the Mahdi about to appear at
any moment. The use of hudud punishments, however, created more strife between ISI
and Al-Qaeda than it did build support for ISI’s claim to being a functioning state in Iraq.
Other members of ISI soon became aware of the apocalyptic expectations of al-Masri and
the devastating consequences it was having on the group’s future development.
Alongside the sudden use of hudud punishments on Iraqi civilians, al-Masri and ISI in
2007 began to attack Sunni tribes and other jihadist cells in Iraq that refused to give their
allegiance to ISI. One spokesman of ISI claimed that every Sunni Muslim must “join us
in forming the Islamic State project…or hand over their weapons to us before we are
forced to act against them forcefully.”271 ISI soon after began killing Sunni tribal leaders
and leaders of smaller militias that had refused to give bay’ah to the newly formed
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Islamic State in Iraq. Whereas Zarqawi limited the majority of his attacks on Shi’a
Muslims and American forces, ISI now began to include Sunni Muslims that were not
offering their aid to them—another tactic that became magnified with ISIS more recently.
In 2008, after the failed appearance of the Mahdi, ISI would also begin to loose internal
support and legitimacy amongst other jihadists. McCants notes, “Chastened by his fail
predictions that first year, Masri’s messianic ardor cooled. At the same time…Abu Umar
al-Baghdadi became more substantial.”272
It would, however, be a mixture from all of these tactics and strategies that ISI would
begin to slowly fade out of sight and loose its legitimacy of being an Islamic state. One
former member of ISI, Abu Sulayman al-Utaybi, would eventually leave the group’s
confines in Iraq and travel to Afghanistan to speak directly with Bin Laden, Zawahiri,
and other Al-Qaeda leaders on the trajectory of ISI in the future. In his appeal to AlQaeda’s leaders, among a variety of issues raised against al-Masri’s leadership, was the
amount of influence apocalyptic speculation was having in Masri’s view of the future.
McCants notes that Sulayman previously wrote to Al-Qaeda’s leaders to warn them that
al-Masri had become too heavily focused “about the tribulations [preceding the Day of
Judgment], especially regarding the Mahdi” and that the Islamic State in Iraq was
“approaching an abyss” if it remained under his control.273
The warning of Sulayman would prove to be true and by 2008 the group had
witnessed itself becoming weaker than it had started as under the leadership of Zarqawi
when it was still known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Yet oddly enough throughout the disastrous
first attempt for establishing an Islamic state in the modern world, Bin Laden refused to
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denounce ISI as being separate entity from Al-Qaeda and instead only made mention that
“mistakes were made.”274 It would be in April 2010 that both al-Masri and the unknown
other leader of ISI Abu Umar al-Baghdadi would be killed by a raid against their
compound by both American and Iraqi forces. McCants notes that directly after the death
of the two leaders “in the following three months thirty-four more Islamic State leaders
would be killed or captured.”275
McCants later notes that Abu Umar al-Baghdadi even may have possessed messianic
speculations and was influenced by them during the first manifestation of the Islamic
State. He notes that in April 2007 Umar al-Baghdadi publically stated that Iraqi troops
would “aid the Mahdi clinging to the curtains of the Ka’ba.”276This is thought to be a
direct reference to a classic narration on how “tribes around the Ka’ba war with one
another, each believing they have the mandate of heaven. Some flee the battle and find a
man who has buried his face in the Ka’ba coverings, weeping. Because of the man’s
purity, they pledge allegiance to him….the man turns out to be the Mahdi.”277 More
interesting than this allusion to the Mahdi appearing is where the narration originated
from, a classic book titled Kitab al-Fitan and was written by none other than Nu’aym Ibn
Hammad and that “the Islamic State’s first emir succumbed to its gravitational pull is a
testament to the apocalyptic fervor of the State’s founders.”278

The Islamic State Reborn
In wake of the death of the leaders and founders of ISI, the organization nearly
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completely collapsed into history as just another group of jihadists. Yet it would be the
result of the next leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who prevented the group from utter
destruction following 2010. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, much like Zarqawi in the 1990’s,
began his path of jihadism in the confines of a jail cell—Camp Bucca to be specific. Born
in 1971 to a farming family, al-Baghdadi spent the first part of his adult life strictly
studying the Islamic tradition, with a specific focus on “Qur’anic studies.”279 His master’s
thesis would be focused on medieval recitation of the Qur’an, though it would take him
nearly three years to finish the project.280 Yet it would be in 2004, after the invasion of
American forces into Iraq, that al-Baghdadi would be arrested and detained by American
soldiers.
Accounts claim that Baghdadi had been visiting a friend named Nessayif Numan
Nessayif (the man targeted by American forces) during the time of his arrest. In a way
Baghdadi became guilty by association and was also taken to Camp Bucca.281 One
pentagon official is noted as claiming that Baghdadi was simply “a street thug” when he
was picked up amongst other jihadists.282 This accidental arrest, however, would pave the
way for how the Islamic State was able to rebound from its previous misfortunes under
the leadership of al-Masri.
It would be while in Camp Bucca a jail—housing takfirist jihadists, moderate
jihadists, accidental arrests like Baghdadi, and criminals picked off of the street—that alBaghdadi would undergo a sudden transformation. Some accounts note that there were
nearly 24,000 inmates within Camp Bucca during Baghdadi’s time with one inmate
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stating “We could have never all gotten together like this in Baghdad…it would have
been impossibly dangerous. Here, we were not only safe, but we were only a few hundred
meters away from the entire al-Qaeda leadership.” 283
In this way Baghdadi was surrounded by Al-Qaeda members, Saddam Hussein’s
military officials, and hundreds of petty criminals who could be converted to radical
interpretations of jihad and the use of force. In a similar manner that Zarqawi did in the
1990’s, Baghdadi used his time in the safe confines of a jail cell to further his
understanding of the Islamic world and the increase of Western forces and governments
in Islamic territory. This would only be further exasperated by how Baghdadi would
quickly become a leader in the jail, a spiritual guide due to his educational background,
and a middle man to settle disputes amongst members in the jail.284 One American
general notes that it would be during this time that Baghdadi began plotting for the future
and was “probably systematically organizing while he was in dentation. Building upon
IOUs, getting to know whom to trust. He must have been plotting while he was
incarcerated—he must have planned the whole rollout of the Islamic State.”285
Baghdadi would use his short time in Camp Bucca to begin plotting and planning for
what would eventually become the Islamic State. Accounts state that Baghdadi was
especially interested in Shi’a Muslims and Sunni tribes that were helping the American
forces with one narration finding he would openly declare, “Fighting them [other Muslim
groups] is more of a priority than fighting the Americans.”286 The authors of ISIS: Insider
the Army of Terror claim “His [Baghdadi] insistence on the need for fratricidal warfare—
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or fitna between and among Sunnis—would remain a hallmark of al-Baghdadi’s
leadership well into the expansion of ISIS into Syria and Iraq.”287
Baghdadi would be freed from Camp Bucca by December 6, 2004 but not before he
was able to establish himself as a leading voice on matters impacting Iraq and the Middle
East within the jail cell and amongst its members.288 By as early as 2006 Baghdadi joined
Al-Qaeda, become a member of Zarqawi’s constructed Mujahideen Shura Council, and
then following the establishment of ISI in 2007 would become the head of “all Shari’a
committees” in Iraq.289 Baghdadi, however, would remain at the lower levels of ISI
leadership until the right opportunity presented itself—which occurred in 2010 following
the death of al-Masri and Abu Umar al-Baghdadi. Following the vacancy left by the
death of both founders of ISI, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was elected by nine of the eleven
members of the Shura council as the next leader of the insurgency—due in large part to
Baghdadi’s claimed ancestral ties to the Prophet Muhammad.290
It, however, would not be until the Arab Spring in late 2010 that Baghdadi would be
able to spread his influence from Iraq into Syria. The Arab Spring, at its core, was based
on protests dealing with “inequality, corruption, and frustrations with injustices suffered
under long-standing dictatorships.”291 These notions, anxieties, and skepticisms rampant
across the Middle East would, by the end of 2013, result in the replacement of leaders in
the nation-states of Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and led to protests and uprisings to occur in
Syria.292 In wake of the widespread upheaval against the ruling regimes, and the influx of

287

Ibid., 120.
Ibid., 119.
289
McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, 76.
290
Ibid., 78.
291
Stern and Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, 39.
292
Ibid., 39.
288

133

foreign recruits traveling though Syria during the Iraq War, Al-Qaeda told ISI to “form a
group and send it to Syria”—in which Baghdadi agreed to and gave Abu Muhammad alJawlani the job of overseeing the operation. 293 The newly established Syrian branch of
Al-Qaeda adopted the name Nusra Front (Jabha al-Nusra). With the increase of
destabilization across the region, most especially in Syria, militant movements began to
flood into the areas of unrest in order to gain a foothold in the region.
This, however, did not occur all of a sudden but was rather slow and gradual process.
William McCants notes that by 2012 “Nusra had only about two hundred operatives in
Syria…But then things began to change. Nusra expanded in the north, becoming an
insurgent group rather than a clandestine terrorist organization. The development made
the group more sensitive to the need for popular support. It began avoiding suicide
attacks on civilians and collaborated with the other Sunni insurgent groups.”294In this
way, Nusra began adapting and working with a variety of other small organizations in
Syria—including the Free Syrian Army.295
This began to separate the interests of Baghdadi and the Nusra leader of the time alJawlani. During this point, despite the differences and disputes between leaders, ISI was
still understood as being Al-Qaeda’s branch in Iraq and that it should remain under the
leadership of Zawahiri. The two groups, ISI and Nusra, also possessed drastically
different approaches in how who was to be the combatted enemy. Baghdadi remained
heavily influenced by takfirsm and approached resolving the crises in the Middle East
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through the purification of the religion from all nonbeliever and apostates.
For example, in contrast to Baghdadi, al-Nusra tended to avoid attacking religious
minorities (including the Yazidis), Shi’a Muslims, Sunni tribes, and even in some cases
protected churches from Syria’s government and other rebel armies in the region.296 In
this way, Nusra reflected the ideals of Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda on gathering support
from the Muslim community against Western powers first and foremost. Yet, as we will
see in Chapter 4, this approach would be the direct opposite of a strategy of ISIS. For the
Islamic State would instead be focused on the “near enemy” and attempted to purify the
Islamic religion before focusing its attention of Western forces. It would, however, not be
until April 9, 2013 that the first official split between ISI and Al-Qaeda became
increasingly apparent. Baghdadi publically proclaimed that a merger between Nusra and
ISI had occurred and that he would now be the leader of both organizations.297 Yet this
notion was never agreed upon between Baghdadi and Zawahiri (who had taken complete
command of Al-Qaeda following the death of Bin Laden). Dispute over the matter
continued over the year with Baghdadi rejecting Zawahiri’s demand that ISI and Nusra
remain separate entities.
On February 2, 2014 Al-Qaeda would publically disavow ISIS and Abu Bakr alBaghdadi by stating, “ISIS is not a branch of Al-Qaeda group, we have no organizational
relationship with it, and Al-Qaeda is not responsible for its actions.”298 Over the next few
months Baghdadi’s ISIS would begin taking control of territory across Iraq and Syria,
including the city of Raqqa. Later in June of 2014, Baghdadi’s forces would capture the
city Mosul in Iraq and publically announce from the confines of the mosque of Nur al296
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Din Zengi that boarders created by Western forces following the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire between Iraq and Syria were now “destroyed,” that the national flags of the
Middle East had “fallen,” and that the “Caliphate had returned…in accordance with the
prophetic method.”299
This declaration of the “prophetic method” was an attempt to claim that the caliphate
was the fulfillment of prophecy. McCants notes that after this declaration “Across Syria
and Iraq, billboards popped up at Islamic State checkpoints On the right side, the black
flag…On the left side: The Islamic State: A Caliphate in Accordance with the Prophetic
Method” with soldiers now bearing a patch with the slogan embroidered upon it.300
Rather than focus on the return of the Mahdi, as ISI had done under the leadership of alMasri, ISIS placed importance on the caliphate, which was established according to the
“prophetic method.”
The Islamic State in this way never remained static in its apocalyptic speculation but
rather adapted after viewing the devastation that the failed appearance of the Mahdi
resorted in. McCants argues that a shift in how the group discussed the end times was a
thought out and strategic move under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—one that
provided new avenues of recruitment for the Islamic State. McCants further argues this
shift removed its focused from the Mahdi returning to suddenly emphasizing that there
needed to be an established caliphate to begin establishing Islamic Law. Abu Bakr alBaghdadi, in this way, seems to have learned from the mistakes made by al-Masri. For alMasri had placed all of his eggs in one basket—one that adamantly believed in the return
of the Mahdi. Fearful of the same result occurring to ISIS, Baghdadi removed all
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attention from the Mahdi and into a prophetic caliphate. McCants writes:
Caliph Baghdadi watched the first incarnation of the Islamic State nearly destroy
itself because its leaders made hasty strategic decisions in the belief that the
Mahdi would appear any day. Perhaps chastened by the experience, he has made
the caliphate the locus of the group’s apocalyptic imagination rather than the
Mahdi….The shift of eschatological emphasis from the person of the Mahdi to the
institution of the caliphate buys the group more time to govern while sustaining
the apocalyptic moment that has so captivated its supporters.301
In his concluding remarks McCants further elaborates upon the reasoning behind such
a shift stating, “Messiah gave way for management. It was a clever way to prolong the
apocalyptic expectations of the Islamic State’s followers while focusing them on the
immediate task of state building…Although the messianic fervor has cooled in the
Islamic State’s leadership, the group’s apocalyptic rhetoric has intensified”302 In this way,
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi would use the lessons learned from predecessors, the Arab Spring,
turmoil across Iraq, and the Syrian Civil War to usher in a more deadly, radicalized, and
apocalyptically re-focused organization. By shifting focus now on the return of Jesus and
the A’maq Cycle, Baghdadi’s ISIS could begin to state build and expand the caliphate
without any time restrictions. Also, this shift avoided the possibility of ever having a
proclaimed Mahdi appear and attempt to take power. It is in 2014 that we find ISIS
referencing the A’maq Cycle, the region of Dabiq, the return of Jesus, and the appearance
of the Dajjal. Benefiting from the increase of disorder and mayhem across the region, the
removal of American forces, and the ongoing Syrian Civil War, al-Baghdadi would
resuscitate ISI from the grave and establish the Islamic State—who now claimed to be in
control of the caliphate—and would forever change the landscape of jihadist
organizations.
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Chapter 4: Analysis of Dabiq as Apocalyptic Literature
Although the overwhelming majority of Muslims today pay no heed to delusional
prophecy, its gruesome fantasies furnish the basis for a paradoxically modern and
increasingly influential ideology that relentless demonizes America as the absolute
enemy of Islam. In the minds of the most impassion believers, each bloody defeat draws
the moment of ultimate and total triumph that much nearer. The end of the world is a
serious matter—especially for those who are busy preparing for it.303
Jean-Pierre Filiu
The previous chapters attempted to provide the essential foundation for the
development of Islamic eschatology, its transformation in the late 20th century, and
examples of revolutionaries tapping into it for inspiration and guidance in modernity.
Chapter Three then exclusively looked at the messianic ambitions the Islamic State
possessed in the 20th century during its formation and development from AQI to ISI and
now ISIS. We discovered that ISI was initially established on a belief that the Mahdi was
going to return at any moment, but that this belief would later be replaced with the return
of Jesus due to the near collapse the group experience following the failure of the Mahdi
to appear when al-Masri predicted. With this shift in narrative, the Islamic State began to
be increasingly influenced by the details found in the A’maq Cycle.
This shift brought with it resurgence and renewed justification for attacking Shi’a and
Sunni populations, while also exemplifying a final confrontation between Muslims and
Christians prior to the appearance of Jesus. The shift that occurred in this apocalyptic
narrative provided the Islamic State with more time to state-build, avoid falling prey to
inaccurate predictions on when the world would end, and provided theological
justification for actions conducted that attempted to purify the Islamic religion. By
understanding this shift in its apocalyptic narrative, it is now important to look
exclusively at the Islamic State’s primary source Dabiq for evidence of apocalyptic
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nature not only existing but also influencing the group’s current actions, recruitment
strategies, and its future aspirations.
Therefore, it becomes vital to attempt to avoid previous misinterpretations of the
Islamic State that have arisen by dismissing its apocalyptic theology. This will be done
by taking seriously that the Islamic State is using Dabiq to convey its apocalyptic
message. By analyzing Dabiq as an apocalyptic text—one that is laying out its theology,
future goals, and how they plan to go about fulfilling them—I find new analyses on a
variety of actions conducted by the Islamic State to this point. In this way a deeper
analysis is developed for what the Islamic State is saying, claiming, and fighting to
achieve. This includes the desire to start a religious war across the world, attempts to
purify the world from apostasy and disbelief, a strong distrust of Shi’a Muslims, and an
adamant attempt to separate the Islamic State from everyone else by way of use of
Shari’a Law. These ideas all center on, I argue, the A’maq Cycle and its details regarding
the battles against Christians, a global fitna, and the eventual return of Jesus who will kill
the Dajjal and [re]establish God’s Law across the world.
What is known of ISIS’s apocalyptic narrative, so far, is to be found exclusively from
Al-Hayat Media Center, A’maq Media, and its online magazine Dabiq (now in its 14th
issue)—which will be the crux of this chapter’s analysis.304 While Twitter has been one
of the leading contributors for ISIS recruitment online so far, it has recently become more
difficult to trace any associated account to actual members of ISIS. After the original
ISIS account was suspended in 2014 there has been a continued attempt to deter
recruitment by blocking associated accounts.305 Therefore investigating official Twitter
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accounts of ISIS between 2015 and 2016 has become nearly impossible.
For example, after the release of James Foley’s video Twitter began to double its
efforts of suspending associated accounts.306 In the months that ensued, additional efforts
were spent resulting in thousands more being shut down. The effort of taking down ISIS
supporters on Twitter has to this point only been semi-effective, due largely to how ISIS
continuously evolves through a “whack-a-mole” strategy. In this way, every account
“whacked” two or more sprout up in its place.307 The benefit of this strategy has proved
effective for ISIS keeping on-line support, but consequently also resulted in its most
authentic and authoritative accounts losing thousands of followers each time it is shut
down.
This has led to ISIS supporters to enter into a virtual diaspora where there no longer
existed an official ISIS Twitter account to speak on behalf of the Islamic State. Lacking
this overarching authority, a mass amount of accounts has begun claiming to be the
official spokesperson of the Islamic State. This has left scholars with no real ability to
decipher between those were legitimately associated with ISIS and those that are not. For
this reason, this chapter’s attention will focus entirely on publications officially released
from Islamic State media, specifically the thirteen issues of Dabiq.
An early clue that points to the existence of an apocalyptic narrative is the very name
the Islamic State chose for its on-line magazine—Dabiq. The reason behind the name is
directly linked to an apocalyptic hadith that was birthed from the A’maq Cycle.308 In
issue 3 The Call to Hijrah the Islamic State elaborates upon the reasoning behind this
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choice of name, “As mentioned in the introduction of our first issue, the name of our
magazine was taken from the area named Dabiq in the northern countryside of Halab, due
to the significant role it will play during the events of al-Malhamah al-Kubra (The Grand
Battle) against the crusaders…We ask Allah to place us in the camp of believers on the
day of al-Malhamah and keep us firm until he grants us victory or martyrdom.”309
Here the Islamic State remarks that the name Dabiq was specifically taken because of
the role the region is to have during the “events of al-Malhamah al-Kubra.” This notion
was further elaborated upon during the execution video of Peter Kassig where, while
Kassig’s head laid at the feet of “Jihadi John,” reference was made to Dabiq. In another
direct message to President Obama, Emwazi quotes Zaqarwi’s apocalyptic statement
(found at the front of every Dabiq issue), “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat
will continue to intensify-by Allah’s permission-until it burns the crusader armies in
Dabiq” before concluding with his own threat “And here we are burying the first
American crusader in Dabiq, eagerly awaiting the remainder of your armies to arrive.”
The perceived fascination with Dabiq’s apocalyptic role and the adoption of the name
for its magazine shows that the Islamic State is constructing its end time narrative around
Cook’s A’maq Cycle. Being influenced by this particular cycle has provided the Islamic
State with a narrative full of clashes against Christians, other Muslims, Jews, and
eventually against the Dajjal prior to the appearance of Jesus.
In Issue 1 The Return of the Khalifah, a slightly altered version to the classical
narrative is placed at the end of the magazine to provide readers with purpose for
combatting the West (Christians):
Abu Hurayrah reported that Allah’s messenger said, ‘The Hour will not be
309
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established until the Romans land at al-A’maq or Dabiq. Then an army from alMadinah [the city of Medina] of the best people on the earth at that time will
leave for them. When they line up in ranks, the Romans will say, ‘Leave us and
those who were taken as prisoners from amongst us so we can fight them.’ The
Muslims will say, ‘Nay, by Allah, we will not abandon our brothers to you.’ So
they will fight them. The one third of them will flee; Allah will never forgive
them. One third will be killed; they will be the best martyrs with Allah. And one
third will conquer them; they will never be afflicted with fitnah. Then they will
conquer Constantinople. Whole they are dividing the war booty, having hung
their swords on olive trees, Shaytan [Satan] will shout, ‘The false Messiah [the
Dajjal] has followed after your families who were left behind.’ So they will leave
for their families, but Shaytan’s claim is false. When they arrive to Sham he
comes out. Then while they are preparing for battle and filing their ranks, the
prayer is called. So ‘Isa Ibn Maryam [Jesus] will descend and lead them. When
the enemy of Allah sees him, he will melt until he perished, but he kills him with
his own hand, and then shows them his blood upon his spear. [Sahih Muslim.]310
The area of Dabiq plays a vital role in the Islamic State’s apocalyptic narrative, and its
adopted name to the magazine helps position the Islamic State as being aware of the
classic sources and possibly being inspired by them. This is not limited to Dabiq, and was
on the minds of the soldiers who fought for control of the region in 2014. McCants notes
that when the town of Dabiq was taken by ISIS soldiers on a hill overlooking the area
recorded themselves stating, “We are waiting for you in Dabiq. Try and come and we
will kill every single solider” while another is heard claiming, “Thirty states remain to
complete the number of eighty flags that will gather in Dabiq and begin the Battle.”311 It
would seem that the soldiers who fought for control of Dabiq were quite aware of the
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implications of the victory in the wider apocalyptic narrative.
The Islamic State does, as some argue, record these types of videos in order to solidify
its claim of being a functioning state rather than as evidence for its belief in the
apocalypse. Yet even when doing this, the Islamic State continues to emphasize Dabiq’s
apocalyptic role in the battles to come against the Romans (Americans). Strategies of
showing its location would seem to be catastrophic for a group of Islamist militants trying
to expand its controlled boundaries and influence throughout the region, but ISIS
continues to openly provide such information. The region of Dabiq plays a significant
role in the A’maq Cycle and is where the Romans are prophesized to appear prior to the
Final Hour. This strategy may very well be the result of believing if American soldiers
were to show up, the prophesized battles would commence. By taking a closer look at the
narrative being constructed in Dabiq, I argue that there are fresh insights and
interpretations, like this, for understanding future aspirations and agendas of the Islamic
State.
In order to fully understand the Islamic State’s apocalyptic narrative, I conducted my
research on the 13 issues of Dabiq and viewed them as being the apocalyptic text of the
Islamic State.312 I approached all thirteen issues as though they reflect the beliefs of the
Islamic State, by doing so found apocalyptic rhetoric is in each and every issue.
Throughout the thirteen issues I found references to the Dajjal 35 times, fitna 20 times,
Mahdi 13 times (9 being referred to the Jewish Mahdi who is also depicted as the Dajjal),
the “Hour” 29 times, the battles of al-Malhamah 18 times, and the return of Isa (Jesus) 11
times.
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This rhetoric points toward Dabiq being an apocalyptic text— one that lays out how
the Islamic State views itself, society, the Islamic tradition as a whole, and its actions in
accordance to fulfilling prophecy. The way that ISIS frames its narrative in Dabiq sheds
additional light onto ISIS’s view of the world being “a failure” and in need of change and
purification. In this way it is not always what is being said but often how ISIS is
portraying the message that points in the direction of Dabiq being an apocalyptic text.
Much like how scholars today have been able to analyze historic apocalyptic texts and
discover new insight, the same can be done now with Dabiq.
By analyzing Dabiq in such a way, I find evidence that the Islamic State has not only
constructing an apocalyptic narrative but is also using it in order to justify its actions,
style of governing, and possibly boost recruitment appeal across the world. With
influence stemming from the A’maq Cycle, ISIS understands its role in history according
to what is foretold in the classic narrative. A narrative that, again, is flooded with
mentions of fitna, war against Christians, immorality, the appearance of the Dajjal, and
the return of Jesus. Without taking the Islamic State’s apocalyptic nature seriously,
however, this analysis of the group’s possible motivations and future aspirations are
inherently ignored. By understanding Dabiq as apocalyptic literature, I demonstrate that
ISIS has strategically used the A’maq Cycle to claim lay out the vision of the future,
justify its claim to be the Final Muslims that will fight the Christian armies, and as well
as validation for any violent action conducted as being needed to fulfill prophecy.
Viewing the Islamic State in this way may also provide an addition perspective for
why the group has sustained global appeal despite its violent nature. Again recall that
Cook claims for apocalyptic authors, “The very adoption of a worldview that leads to a
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messianic future implies that the present system is at least partially a failure.”313 The
Islamic State’s apocalyptic narrative, in this way, is not just certainty that end of the
world is coming. Rather it may also be a direct window for how such violent movement
was able to form and attract such a significant number of foreign recruits so quickly. In
this way, viewing Dabiq as apocalyptic literature provides two angles of analysis. The
first is that Dabiq can provide insight into the reasons for why ISIS is conducting certain
actions, and possibly may provide awareness for future activities. The second benefit
from understanding Dabiq as apocalyptic literature, as the previous chapters have shown,
is that it may provide new understandings to the social, political, and theological issues
facing the Islamic tradition and/or the Middle East.
As previously shown, apocalyptic literature tends to arise within the Islamic tradition
during periods of high levels of anxiety and perceived religious persecution amongst a
Muslim community. The propaganda released by ISIS today may also illustrate a similar
undertone, but now with thousands of supporters around the world possessing similar
feelings of political oppression, religious persecution, and/or a fear that the Muslim
identity was under attack in a modernizing world. This development may have forced
individuals to believe that the only way to have their voices heard in what seems to be a
secularizing world is through violent insurgency—one that believes it is fulfilling
prophecy prior to the Final Hour.

Problems with Dismissing Religious Motivations
When ISIS caught the attention of the world in late 2014 with the publicized execution
of James Foley, there began to be deliberate efforts to combat the Islamic State in a
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number of ways. This included attempts to halt migrations to Islamic State territory,
censor ISIS propaganda online, and attempts to de-legitimize the group theologically by
claiming that the group is not really “Islamic.”314 The latter approach has become one of
the leading strategies so far. As discussed in the introduction, Jack Jenkins claims
Graeme Wood’s assessment of ISIS’s apocalyptic nature had “fallen prey to an inaccurate
trope all too common in many Western circles: that ISIS is an inevitable product of
Islam.” Yet I demonstrate, as Wood did previously, the Islamic State is framing its end
time narrative through an interpretation of classic Islamic sources—specifically in line
with the details of the A’maq Cycle. The attempt to disassociate ISIS from any facet of
the Islamic tradition, however, may only be playing right into its apocalyptic narrative
and understanding of themselves.
Theological attacks against the group are being re-directed in Dabiq as support to its
narrative. Dabiq constantly reinforces itself in a particular manner, one that attempts to
frame the Islamic State as the last pious believers who are being persecuted for its
religious beliefs. For example In Issue 7 From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: Extinction of the
Grayzone, the Islamic State directly addresses justifies its choice of burning Jordanian
pilot Moath al-Kasasbeh to death. The Islamic State came under fire from a barrage of
theological attacks against the action from Muslim citizens, Islamic scholars, and
government officials alike. ISIS, however, points to a classic source and then defends its
action of killing a Muslim man as “retribution for his crimes against Islam and the
Muslims, including his active involvement in crusader airstrikes against Muslim

314

Refer back to the recent debate on the publication of What ISIS Really Wants and the pushback it
received by wanting to make claim that ISIS was “very Islamic.”

147

lands.”315 In this way, the Islamic State is claiming that the man’s execution was justified
by scripture and justified because he was attacking the Islamic State.
Further debating the matter, Dabiq clarifies the reasoning behind its choice of
execution and why it only appears to the majority of the world as being “un-Islamic:”
This type of rhetoric is typical of hizbiyyah (those contradicting the example of
Muhammad)—even those masquerading as supporters of the mujahidin (those
engaged in jihad)—who continue to live under the authority of the murtaddin
(apostate) puppets, and defeatist Muslims who reside in the lands of kufr
(nonbelief) under the authority of the crusaders themselves…Such people have
had their religion diluted and, not surprisingly, are always amongst the first to
speak out in any case where the mujahidin display their harshness towards the
crusaders, attempting to disguise their criticism towards the mujahidin as concern
for the image of Islam.316
According to ISIS, the outcry which arose against it did not occur because the action
went against classic Islamic sources. Rather the outcry was a result of the rest of the
Muslim world being removed from the “true” interpretation of Shari’a Law. The Islamic
State is also quick to attack politicians and Western leaders as being the reason for why
the Muslim world no longer recognizes such actions as being in accordance with the
tradition:

And yet, as politicians and leaders, they have the platform to spread their opinions
and influence millions of others. It’s the same rubbish we hear from Obama,
Hollande, Netanyahu, and the others time and again, the old “the Islamic State is
not Islamic” diatribe. How Islam is great, we really like Muslims, but only
“Muslims” who conform to our definition of what a “Muslim” should be, who fits
neatly into the definition of a working democracy. And whoever does no conform
to this new definition of “Muslim” will be persecuted.317

The Islamic State projects attacks against it as further evidence that they are being
attacked because of faith not because of politics or nationalism. This uses this strategy to
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stir and manifest a religious war across the globe between believer and non-believer. ISIS
contends, in this argument, that the Western world has created an archetype for what a
“Muslim” should be defined as, how they should believe, and how they should not take
Islamic sources in their literal context. The Islamic State’s narrative, however, is
assembled around a claim of being against such a Western architype of what Islam
entails. Another example found in Issue 13 The Rafidah From Ibn Saba’ To The Dajjal,
frames the caliphate as being where the “true” Muslim can safely reside:
Come forth to strengthen and unify the ranks of the Muslims. Come forth to
support Allah’s religion revealed from above the seven heavens. Come forth to
aid the Khilafah [Caliphate] upon the prophetic methodology…The misleading
deviant “scholars” even left their corrupt fatawa [decree] that had been directed
against the fight kuffar [nonbeliever] who wage war against the religion and its
noble methodology and instead directed the attention of their disgraceful fatawa
towards those who are establishing Islam and elevating the tower of Khilafah.318
In this way, as we will continue to see, the Islamic State’s apocalyptic narrative is
fueled around the belief that it is made up of the final “true” and “pious” Muslims
foretold to appear prior to the Hour. Theological attacks against ISIS are reflected, in
Dabiq, as evidence that they are being attacked because of its religion—not its actions.

Dabiq and Apocalyptic Hadiths
Arguing the Islamic State is not “Islamic” brings no absolute understanding of the
group’s motives or theological aspirations. Rather, such an approach avoids a major
dynamic of the group’s identity and agenda—namely an apocalyptic nature and how it is
influencing current and possibly future actions. The Islamic State’s apocalyptic narrative
is constructed to reflect nearly every attack against them, both in warfare and the media,
as a way to legitimize its apocalyptic identity. As previously shown with the Siege of
318

Dabiq 13:54

149

Mecca and the Sudanese Mahdi, a constant reinforcement of messianic belief strengthens
the feeling of being “right” amongst members and allows for the Islamic State group to
continuously tap into this belief as a source of inspiration—despite victory or defeat.
The first major reference to the Islamic State’s apocalyptic nature is found at the end
of every issue of Dabiq where an apocalyptic hadith is strategically placed. Typically, I
discovered, this apocalyptic hadith would be the thesis of the particular issue—a way to
help support what the previous fifty to eighty pages had been discussing. Through this
method, unlike the authors of the late 20th century and early 21st century, Dabiq
attempted to provide its baseline understanding of the apocalypse entirely from classic
literatures. As we saw in Chapter Two, modern authors began incorporating a slew of
non-traditional sources to make sense between current events and the end of the world.
Though Dabiq does speculate about the past and what many would call conspiracies,
such as in Issue 2 The Flood, the magazine remains relatively dependent on the classic
hadiths to provide initial support for its claims.
For example when discussing the attacks of 9/11, Dabiq argues that the attacks were
not the work of President Bush and the American government like the modern novels did.
Rather Dabiq claims that such a plot would have been impossible to maneuver and that it
was done because of God’s decree and the “blessed” work of Osama Bin Laden. Issue 9
They Plot and Allah Plots states, “If jihad operations—like those of September 11th—
were carried out against the kuffar (nonbelievers), they would claim these operations
were conspiracies by the kuffar to justify their aggression against Muslims. And so,
according to these theorists, almost all the events of the world were somehow linked back
to the kuffar, their intelligence agencies, research, technology, and coconspirators!

150

Conspiracy theories have thereby become an excuse to abandon jihad, to have great awe
for the kuffar (nonbelievers).”319 In this way, in complete opposite fashion of the modern
novels, Dabiq argues that they rise of conspiracies around 9/11 were invented by the
West in order to take away influence and legitimacy from Bin Laden.
Later on in the issue Dabiq further discusses the 9/11 attacks and now frames it in an
apocalyptic context. Dabiq states, “There is a summary of this final plot of the crusaders
and their apostate allies before the major malhamah. First, the crusaders have become too
weak to wage their own wars. This is due to the blessed operations of September 11th and
the subsequent jihad in both Afghanistan and Iraq. They are too weak financially,
militarily, and psychologically to fight another war, although there is no doubt that they
will eventually fight the Muslims at Dabiq after the crusaders’ betrayal of an impending
truce.”320
In this manner Dabiq avoids plunging into the same conspiracies that plagued the
modern authors decades prior. Yet this does not mean that the end of the world is not at
the forefront of ISIS’s thought, or that there are ideas within Dabiq do not expand beyond
the realm of reality. The theme of Issue 2 deals, for example, specifically deals with the
argument that humanity no longer has a “free” choice in refusing to obey God’s laws.
This becomes ever more important to Dabiq’s argument of the Final Hour approaching.
In this issue the caliphate, rather than Noah’s Ark, is depicted as both prophetic in nature
and a safe zone for believers prior to the Flood (now understood as the Final Hour). In
this narrative, according to Dabiq, humanity has been led to believe that they should have
the choice to remove themselves away from God’s laws and not suffer the divine
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consequences. In this way, the Islamic State is “justified” for establishing the caliphate,
instituting Shari’a Law, and conducting violence against any that oppose its rule. Dabiq
claims:
From amongst the polluted ideologies that have afflicted people the entire world
over throughout the course of the tyranny, carried out by the forces of kufr
[nonbelief], is the notion that the people can choose whether to follow the truth or
to embark upon falsehood. This ideology teaches that no one has the right,
regardless of whom he may be, to impose any creed or set of morals on anyone
else even if that creed or set of morals is the truth revealed by Allah…The
proponents of this ideology have portrayed the prophets of Allah incorrectly,
making them out to be more akin to preachers and guides who have no authority
over the masses at all…The da’wah [preaching] of Prophet Nuh [Noah] followed
a policy from the very beginning that was completely opposed to the methodology
of choice. In fact, it was characterized in contrast to this by a frank, early warning
of the consequence of deviation and opposition to the truth.321
In this frame the caliphate, much like the Flood in Noah’s time, cannot be stopped
since it is a piece of God’s divine plan to bring people back to the submission of the
Islamic tradition. The “free” choice that exists in the world today is understood to be a
result from refusing to adhere to the laws of God. In much the same way that the Flood
could not be stopped during the life of Noah, Issue 2 constantly is retelling the argument
that humanity can no longer stop this caliphate from thriving and spreading across the
world nor the approaching Final Hour. In this line of thought, the final page of the
magazine concludes with an apocalyptic hadith reading, “Allah’s Messenger said, ‘You
will invade the Arabian Peninsula and Allah will enable you to conquer it. You will
invade Persia, and Allah will enable you to conquer it. You will then invade Rome, and
Allah will enable you to conquer it. Then you will fight the Dajjal, and Allah will enable
you to conquer him.’ [Sahih Muslim].”
Dabiq makes clear citation to the classic text of Sahih Muslim’s hadith collection and
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uses it as a source of authority for the magazine. At the same time they portray the
caliphate as an unstoppable movement, like the Flood, and it will achieve victory against
Persia (Iran/Shi’a Muslims), Rome (Christians), and the Dajjal
(Satan/immorality/injustice). Similar to how modern apocalyptic authors attempted to
interlace classic sources with current events, the Islamic State also attempts to do the
same but does so in a slightly different manner. By avoiding tapping into to nontraditional sources, the Islamic State is sure to base its narrative solely around what can
be found in classic Islamic texts—mainly the Qur’an and Hadith collections. Rather than
attempt to link every part of a hadith to current events, Dabiq instead places the classic
sources at the end of each issue in order to encompass the entire magazine’s discussion of
topics—a tactic that is used to lead readers to make the connections between the two.
Another example of this can be found in Issue 6 titled Al-Qa’idah of Waziristan. In
this issue there is an emphasis on the theological differences between ISIS and other
contemporary jihadist movements. These differences, according to ISIS, demonstrate its
legitimacy as being the most pious and observant Muslims. This argument is expanded
upon throughout Issue 6 where Dabiq claims that the Islamic State is the true caliphate
because of its “sincere” dedication to Shari’a Law rather than secular law.322 Alongside
this assertion, is also an overt hostility against current Muslim leaders, Islamist rebel
armies, and clerics across the world—all of which ISIS deems responsible for the current
failing state of the Islamic tradition. This further supports how ISIS attempts to separate
itself from other Islamist movements by reason that they are the final and only Muslims
who will combat the Dajjal and Christian forces prior to the Hour. Dabiq states, “Anas
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Ibn Malik narrated that Rasulullah said, ‘Prior to the Dajjal there will be deceptive years
in which the truthful person is belied, the liar is believed, the trustworthy is accused of
treachery, the treacherous person is trusted, and the ruwaybidah (corrupter) speaks.’
[Hasan: Reported by Imam Ahmad and others].”323
Another example of using a classic hadith comes from Issue 8 titled Shariah Alone
will Rule Africa. Here the overall synopsis of the magazine is to argue against the
implementation of nationalism and Western styles of government, especially in North
Africa. A major point of emphasis is that the caliphate, again, is the only place ruling by
God’s Law. For ISIS this should be the only way of governing. A major part of the
Islamic State’s apocalyptic narrative is the notion that it is separating itself from the rest
of the world, prior to the Hour, by sticking as closely as possible to the classic
understandings of the tradition. For ISIS, there can be no other way of living or
governing. As a result of this belief properly using Shari’a Law is a priority—despite the
backlash and persecution received because of implementing it. ISIS references a hadith
stating:
Abdullah Ibn Hawalah said, “Allah’s Messenger said, ‘You will be granted
conquest over Sham, Rome, and Persia, until one of you will possess such and
such number of camels, such and such number of cows, and such and such
number of sheep, to the extent if one were to be given a hundred dinars, he would
be discontent with it.’ He then placed his hand on my head and said, ‘O Ibn
Hawalah, if you see that the Khilafah has come to the Holy Land [Sham], then the
earthquakes, tribulations, and great matters have approached. The Hour will be
closer that day to the people than this hand of mine from your head” [Sahih:
Reported by Imam Ahmad, Abu Dawudd, and al- Hakim].

Here the Islamic State attempts to lead the reader to the conclusion that since the
implement Shari’a Law in Syria and Iraq is a sign that the caliphate has appeared prior
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the Hour. In this anner, ISIS is attempting to fulfill prophecy and is pointing to the
apocalyptic hadiths as evidence that such is occurring. Another example of such can be
found in Issue 3 A Call to Hijrah. Here Dabiq argues (much the same way as Noah’s
Flood in Issue 2) that every “true” believer must migrate to Islamic State territory prior to
the Final Hour. An action framed as being similar to what the early Muslim community
did when migrating to Medina to flee the persecution received in Mecca. The issue
concludes:
Abdullah Ibn Amr said that Allah’s Messenger said, ‘There will be Hijrah
(migration) after Hijrah. The best people on earth will be those who keep to the
land of Ibrahim’s Hijrah. Then there will remain on the earth the worst of its
people. Their lands will cast them out, Allah will hate them, and the fire with
gather them together with the apes and swine. [Hasan—Reported by Imam
Ahmad, Abu Dawud, and al-Hakim]” while also providing an additional
commentary “And what a tremendous favor it is from Allah to guide one to the
Islamic State and grant him companionship with…those who plunge into the
malahim (the great battles prior to the Hour)!324

In this way the Islamic State is attempting to claim that migration is the most
important act for a believer living in an area where they are persecuted. ISIS also adds its
own interpretation to the hadith by stating that today the migration to its territory results
in “companionship with…those who plunge into the malahim” prior to the Final Hour.
Now knowing that the Islamic State is influenced by the A’maq Cycle, this is a clear
reference to the final confrontation between Muslims and Christians prior to the
appearance of Jesus and his killing of the Dajjal
Another example of an apocalyptic hadith used to support Dabiq’s narrative
(influenced by the A’maq Cycle) is found in Issue 10 The Law of Allah or the Laws of
Man. In this particular issue the argument is that the laws implemented across the world

324

Dabiq 3

155

are a result of Western influence in Islamic societies. ISIS wants to, in this way, reiterate
that it is conducting a religious war, not a political or nationalistic one. This is important
to understand, in particular to how it is at the forefront of both the A’maq Cycle and
Dabiq. At one point, within this issue, ISIS identifies the fighting against the Kurds is
only occurring because of religious reasons, “Our war with the Kurds is a religious war.
It is not a nationalistic war—we seek the refuge of Allah. We do not fight Kurds because
they are Kurds. Rather we fight the kuffar (nonbelievers) amongst them, the allies of the
crusaders and Jews in their war against the Muslims.”325
Issue 10 attempts to further argue for the Islamic State’s “piety” and “legitimacy” by
again arguing how it is “the only state ruling by Allah’s Shari’a today.”326 This will
continue to be one of the leading claims throughout Dabiq and plays right into how the
Islamic State understands the final battles being between believers and nonbelievers. By
claiming this mantle and reasoning for why the caliphate was established the issue ends
with yet another apocalyptic hadith:
Allah’s Messenger said, ‘Indeed, what I fear most for my Ummah (Muslim
community) are the misguiding imams. And the Hour will not be established until
tribes from my Ummah join the mushrikin (polytheist) and until tribes from my
Ummah worship idols. And there will be in my Ummah thirty liars of who claim
to be prophets. And I am the last of the prophets. There is no prophet after me.
And there will always be a party of my Ummah manifest upon the truth not
harmed by those who oppose them until there comes the command of Allah’
[Sahih: Reported by Abu Dawud, at-Tirmidhi, and Ibn Majah from Thawban].

In this way the Islamic State again attempts to appeal to its readers as being the
Muslims who will stand up and fight for establishing belief amongst a world that has
fallen away from what the Islamic tradition entails. I use these examples to highlight how
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every issue of Dabiq ends with an apocalyptic hadith, and how Dabiq uses these classic
apocalyptic texts to justify what they are doing in present time as a fulfillment of
prophecy or in order to separate believers from nonbelievers. Rather than include the
hadith early on in the writing or repeatedly reference it throughout, Dabiq places such
references at the end of the magazine. I find this is a strategy which attempts to avoid any
discrepancies arising between the context of a hadith and a current event. As we saw in
chapter two, the attempt to connect every current event to a classic hadith eventually
resulted in the desire to look at non-traditional sources. By refraining from this tactic,
Dabiq instead places the hadith at the end and allows for the rest of the issue to be
constructed solely around particular events.
At times, the apocalyptic rhetoric within Dabiq does become less obvious and more
difficult to uncover—but this only happens without a solid foundation on the apocalyptic
texts that are cited. On occasion there are only subtle references made between current
events and the Final Hour. For example, in Issue 12 Just Terror the Islamic State
references the classic Euphrates River hadith without providing any real indication of the
issue in the pages prior. This particular issue concludes with,
Allah’s Messenger said, ‘The Euphrates is on the verge of uncovering a mountain
of gold. He who is present there should not take anything from it’ [Reported by
al-Bukhari and Muslim from Abu Hurayrah]. In another narration he said, ‘The
Hour will not be established until the Euphrates uncovers a mountain of gold over
which the people will fight. Ninety-nine out of each one hundred will be killed,
but every man amongst them will say, “Perhaps I myself will survive’ [Reported
by Muslim from Abu Hurayrah].
While the hadith mentioned above discusses the Hour’s establishment after a mountain
of gold is discovered, there oddly remains no other mention of oil, gold, or the Euphrates
elsewhere in the Issue. As discussed in the chapter Two, this classic narrative only gained
157

popularity during the late 20th century due to the wealth oil brought to the Middle East.
Prior to this point in history, the Euphrates narrative enjoyed little attractiveness. The
inclusion of it in Dabiq, however, may point to the influence modern literatures had on
the region during the last two decades. Recall Muhammad Isa Dawud’s 2002 The
Treasure of the Euphrates in which he used the same hadith to conclude “Such is the
secret, O nation of Islam: after having detected the Euphrates’ mountain of gold, America
decided to invade Iraq and to change its regime.”327 It would be after the American
invasion in 2003 that this hadith would become widespread in the countless other modern
apocalyptic fictional novels being written.
Yet rather than construct the entire issue on this specific hadith, as Dawud had done in
2002, Dabiq carefully and consciously places the narrative in the back of the Issue. This
is done in hope of allowing readers to draw their own connections between what they had
just read and the details of the apocalyptic hadith. While these endings in every issue are
a beginning point for finding that ISIS may be apocalyptically inspired, I found that it
was beyond these hadith excerpts that the bulk of its apocalyptic speculation thrived. In
light of this, this chapter will conclude by focusing on a number of topics discussed in
Dabiq that have association to the A’maq Cycle. By locating and analyzing topics such
as—the use of Shari’a Law, the role “strangers”, the purpose of fitna, the extinction of the
grayzone, the return of Jesus, and the Dajjal’s identity—we are able to achieve a deeper
analysis for how ISIS is using apocalyptic belief construct a narrative that advocates
violence against any group that opposes them.

Recruitment and Apocalyptic Appeal
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One of the more peculiar aspects of ISIS has been its ability to draw in recruits from
across the Middle East, North Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America—despite
portraying high levels of violence and destruction to the public. A 2014 C.I.A report
found that there were a minimum of 15,000 foreign fighters who had migrated to ISIS
territory, including roughly 2,000 coming from western nations.328 These foreign recruits
have traveled from all over the world to join the Islamic State and the fighting taking
place across Iraq and Syria despite having no actual ties to the region. While these
recruits may have come for any number of reasons, Dabiq’s apocalyptic rhetoric may
help further explain why the Islamic State has been so successful in its recruitment of
foreigners—who ISIS refers to as the “Strangers.”
The Islamic State’s narrative encompasses a wide range of topics—from the Dajjal
and Jesus to slavery and Shari’a Law—but stresses that these topics all have apocalyptic
implications and roles to play in fulfilling prophecy. The Islamic State, in this way, has
been able to reap two major benefits in its narrative; time because it becomes
“unbelievably short” and meaning because it suddenly is “to be found in everything”
conducted.329 By formulating Dabiq around these themes, the Islamic State positioned
itself at a unique moment in Islamic history—a time filled with war, fitnah, and an
increase of worldwide apostasy that needs being purified prior to the Day of Judgment.
By arguing that a variety of actions are to take place at this moment in Islamic history to
separate believers from unbelievers, which it claims is being accomplished, the Islamic
State has been quite successful in reaching a global audience through its apocalyptic
narrative.
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Dabiq helps contextualize a variety of topics that have become major selling points
for ISIS’s apocalyptic appeal. I will highlight how these topics, to this point, been
possibly misinterpreted due to the denial of its apocalyptic origins. By pointing out how
these topics are rooted in apocalyptic speculation or are strategies of fulfilling prophecy, I
argue Dabiq is an apocalyptic literature now being used to justify every action of the
Islamic State. One of the first major points to support this claim is the appeal for recruits
to be a part of what is framed as being the “Strangers” and how the role plays into
apocalyptic expectations of what will occur prior to the Day of Judgement.

Who are the Strangers?
Those who break off from their tribes: “Ibn Mas’ud said that the Prophet said,
‘Verily Islam began as something strange, and it will return to something strange
as it first began, so glad tidings to the strangers.’ Someone asked, ‘Who are the
strangers?’ He said, ‘Those who break off from their tribes’ [Reported by Imam
QAhmad, ad-Darimi, and Ibn Majah, with a Sahih isnad].330

Issue 3 of Dabiq, where the hadith above is referenced, the issue begins with a section
titled “The Islamic State before al-Malhamah (the immigrants to the land of Malahim).”
This heading helps position the role of “strangers” into the Islamic State’s apocalyptic
narrative as being a part of the al-Malhamah or grand battle. In the opening pages
additional clarification is made for the importance strangers will play in the things to
come, “I have no doubt that this state, which has gathered the bulk of the muhajirun
[those performing jihad] in Sham and has become the largest collection of muhajirun in
the world, is a marvel of history that has only come about to pave the way for al-
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Malhamah al-Kubra (the grand battle prior to the Hour).”331
Dabiq places the role of the Strangers under the umbrella of the al-Malhamah—a clear
reference to its apocalyptic nature and view of the world. In this argument is the notion
that since the Islamic tradition formed as something “strange” or “foreign” amongst the
pagan tribes of Mecca during the life of the Prophet Muhammad, so it would return to
something strange and unknown to the world prior to the Final Hour. Such an indication
is that only a few people would are truly aware of what the Islamic tradition entails and
how it should be conducted. In tune with the previous argument of being the only place
where Shari’a Law is being conducted properly, Dabiq’s understanding of the Strangers
is that this is only because of how far away the world has fallen away from the basis of
what the Islamic tradition once was. That it had become gradually diluted since the death
of the Prophet Muhammad until now being at the state currently existing. Dabiq
continues to cite yet another hadith in hope of further arguing that the version of Islam
being practice today is far removed from how it was practiced during the life of the
Prophet Muhammad and early Muslim community:
Thus, those who responded to the da’wah (preaching) of Islam left their
tribes…therefore, they were strangers, in reality, until Islam had emerged, its
da’wah had spread, and the people entered into it in multitudes, such that they
were no longer strangers. Then it began to part and fade, until it returned as
something strange as it first began…For the real Islam is extremely strange, and
its adherents are the strangest of strangers amongst the people” [MadarijusSalikin].332

The Islamic State uses this line of thinking as generating wider appeal for its message
and caliphate’s legitimacy—especially towards Muslims living in Western nations. In
Issue 12 Just Terror, Dabiq appeals to Western Muslims who may feel as though they
331
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have become a “Stranger” in the land that are living and practicing their religion:
Strangeness is a condition that the Muslim living in the West cannot escape as
long as he remains amongst the crusaders. He is a stranger amongst Christians and
liberals. He is a stranger amongst fornicators and sodomites. He is a stranger
amongst drunkards and druggies. He is a stranger in his faith and deeds, as his
sincerity and submission is towards Allah alone, whereas the kuffar (nonbeliever)
of the West worship and obey clergy, legislatures, media, and both their
animalistic and deviant desires…Thus, the Muslim in the West is in a constant
struggle. His fitrah is at war with the deviant drifts of the kuffar surrounding him.
The battle to preserve his fitrah and faith knows no ceasefire. If he wants to
preserve what mustard seed of faith he has been blessed with, he must exhaust
himself to the utmost so as to remain just a Muslim, never mind a Muslim striving
for jihad.333
For the Islamic State, “Strangers” in the West have become strange because they are
unable to practice their faith in how they want to or are persecute for attempting to do.334
They may be under the impression they are being oppressed for their religious identity.
This bleeds into how Islamic State’s apocalyptic narrative continuously claims that its
territory remains the only “safe” province for Muslims to practice Shari’a Law. Dabiq
continues this line of appealing to foreign recruits by stating, “The Khilafah [Caliphate]
was revived, and muhajirun [those who participate in jihad] were now pouring into Sham
from all corners of the Earth at a rate much greater than ever before. One no longer felt
the strangeness he would experience in the lands of crusaders nor that in the lands of
disbelief or in that in the territories of the nationalist factions. He now had his own land,
where his creed and methodology of Islam.”335
The Islamic State, through Dabiq, appeals to foreign recruits from across the world
(especially in the West) by claiming that the inherent strangeness toward the Islamic
333

Dabiq 12:29-30
This particularly is emphasized in Dabiq as being those who wish to conduct jihad or live under strict
interpretations of Shari’a Law. The attempt of Dabiq is to show that such aspirations from Muslims are
now only possible under the leadership of the caliphate.
335
Dabiq 12:29-30
334

162

tradition is actually a sign that the Final Hour is at hand. The Islamic State understands
itself as fulfilling prophecy by bringing awareness to how the strangeness is once again
appearing. They prop up the caliphate as being the place where persecuted Muslims from
across the world will no longer feel troubled for their religious desires.
It is, however, important to note that use of the term “Stranger” amongst jihadists
groups has been historically used, including al- Zarqawi who gave himself the title of
“the Stranger” when arriving in Afghanistan in 1989.336 While the use of the term is
nothing new for the Islamic State, the way that they are framing it around apocalyptic
connotations is. William McCants notes that one solider publically claimed when arriving
in Syria, “If you think all these mujahedeen came from across the world to fight Assad,
you’re mistaken. They are all here as promised by the Prophet. This is the war he
promised—it is the Grand Battle” while another member declared “They are here because
this is what the Prophet said and promised, the Grand battle is happening.”337
Both of these members view the arrival of mass amounts of foreign recruits as being a
Sign that the final battles were about to occur. This is only further enriched with the
region of Syria [Sham] being the place that these battles were prophesized to take place
according to classical sources—including the A’maq Cycle. It is not just the soldiers,
however, making the connection between the classic hadiths, ISIS, and the appearance of
strangers in Iraq and Syria. Dabiq claims in Issue 12:
The severe strangeness has been lifted. The only strangeness to confront was that
of the crusader alliance, the Shi’a alliance, and the Arab alliance. But this
strangeness was welcome…O Allah, what comes to us of good is from You alone;
You have no partner; To You is due all praise and thanks. O Allah, preserve the
great blessing of the Khilafah for us until Prophet Isa [Jesus] descends to lead us.
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O Allah, make us Your thankful slaves.338

Here there is a direct connection made between three major factors; the removal of
strangeness in the world, the establishment of the caliphate that Muslims can migrate to,
and the return of Jesus. With discussion of strangers and strangeness is constant
reference of the caliphate being the only area where the strangeness will be lifted and that
it will remain that way until the return of Jesus (Isa). The additional implication of
strangeness existing everywhere outside of the caliphate controlled areas is the belief that
Muslims have no longer been able to properly conduct jihad and live by Shari’a Law due
to the laws and regulations of nation-states across the world.
This appeal to Western recruits is further elaborated upon by how Dabiq claims that
mosques existing in the West have been corrupted by secularism and Western
governments. In this way, Dabiq attempts to highlight exactly why the “true” version of
the Islamic tradition has become strange in the eyes of Western observers—including
most Muslims. Dabiq appeals by arguing “There are almost no masajid [mosque] in
which one can seek shelter from heresy and belong to a community of strangers…He
feels himself a stranger and is in constant search for a land in which he can practice his
Islam more fully, especially if he hopes for jihad and is under the threat of crusader
intelligence agencies persecuting him.”339
Issue 3’s The Islamic State Before al-Malhamah is then followed by another
discussion of the statements provided above titled “Sham is the Land of Malahim.”
Beginning with a number of hadiths and narrations arguing why Sham is the “blessed
land with many of the events related to al-Mashi (Jesus)…and the Dajjal” Dabiq
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concludes its argument by stating, “So those who left their tribes—the best of Allah’s
slaves—rallied together…upon the path of Ibrahim [Abraham]. They fathered together in
the land of malahim shortly before the occurrence of al-Malhamah al-Kubra, announce
their enmity and hatred for the cross worshippers, the apostates, their crosses, their
borders, and their ballot boxes, and pledged allegiance to the Khilafah, promising to die
defending it.” 340
Dabiq continuously attempts to appeal to these recruits by arguing that the Islamic
State is the only place in the world where Muslims can practice their faith without
persecution and oppression. Also Dabiq attempts to position its narrative as being
between the “cross worshippers” and Muslims—a direct reference to the A’maq Cycle
which concludes with a final battle between the two. More importantly, the caliphate is
depicted as the only legitimate place where jihad can be properly conducted. This is
summarized in Issue 3 where they appeal to the consequences of not joining the Islamic
State, “There is no life without Jihad, And there is no Jihad without Hijrah…Jihad not
only grants life on the larger scale of the Ummah, it also grants a fuller life on the scale of
the individual…The life of jihad is not possible until you pack and move to the
Khilafah.”341

Shari’a Law and the Hour
A major proponent of the Islamic States apocalyptic nature still remains its adamant
use of Shari’a Law and how it is required to purify the religion prior to the Final Hour.
Yet another strategy of both fulfilling prophecy and separating believer from
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nonbeliever—ally from enemy. The Islamic State’s Shari’a Law enforced brings with it a
strict use of Hudud punishments (fixed penalties dictated by Islamic Law). These
punishments include “beheading or crucifying bandits who kill people while robbing
them; death by stoning for adultery; cutting off a hand or foot for theft; and flogging for
fornication and adultery, drinking alcohol…[where] imposing the hudud, therefore, could
burnish one’s ultraconservative credentials and bolster one’s claims to be a state.”342
The Islamic State has, since 2007, attempted to apply these severe punishments in
aspiration of becoming the most conservative “state” in the world, but such use nearly
forced ISI to lose all support by doing so. This was largely due to lacking any control
over a significant amount of territory between the years of 2007-2010. Recently,
however, ISIS has once again have begun enforcing the Hudud as a way of showing piety
and legitimacy to the claim of being the final group of Muslims prophesized to appear.
With the establishment of the caliphate in 2014 the Islamic State has been able to use
these punishments across its territory and have been no stranger in publically releasing its
use of crucifixion, beheading, and other sorts of punishments. McCants does point out
that the closest example to the Islamic State’s version of hudud is found in Saudi Arabia
but that they still drastically differ. For one, ISIS views the Saudi Kingdom as
illegitimate, run by apostates, and not completely abiding by the tenants of Shari’a Law.
For example while the Islamic State publically displays its punishments, executions, and
beheadings, the Saudi Kingdom tends to keep its punishments out of sight of foreign
powers and does not publically broadcast punishments. This fear of foreign repercussions
or media backlash comes as proof, to ISIS, which the Saudi Kingdom holds human
values and laws over the mandates given to humanity from God. The Islamic State does
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not care about how the Western nations view them or condemn its actions—rather ISIS
cares only about abiding by what Shari’a Law entails, and may explains why the Islamic
State flaunts its execution of people by gunfire, crucifixion, or the tossing of
homosexuals from rooftops.343
The Islamic State openly depicts such punishments to the entire world through its
media outlets as another way of showing its attempt to follow as closely to Islamic Law
as possible. Dabiq claims, “the Islamic State actively works to educate its citizens, preach
and admonish them, enforce their strict adherence to Islamic obligations, judge their
disputes, implement the Shari’a hudud, eradicate all traces of shirk and heresy, incite the
people to jihad and call them to unite behind the Khalifah, Ibrahim Ibn Awwad AlHusayani Al-Qurashi [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi].”344 The tenth issue titled The Laws of
Man or the Laws of Allah further argues this point. Dabiq states:
The call to defend the Islamic State—the only state ruling by Allah’s Shari’ah
today—continues to be answered by sincere Muslims and mujahidin [those
performing jihad] around the world prepared to sacrifice their lives and
everything dear to them to raise high the world of Allah and trample democracy
and nationalism” and finishes their claim by requesting “Thus we renew our call
to the sincere Muslims around the world to march forth and wage war against the
crusaders and apostates who seek to wipe out the Shari’a.345

The Islamic State portrays its punishments and executions for its reader so that they
are shown the “sincerity” ISIS has in conducting Shari’a Law. In the same light, the
Islamic State portrays its desire to use Shari’a Law as a way of identifying itself away
from all enemies. With this mindset, the Islamic State claims that any attack against it
(since it is the prophetic caliphate) is a declaration of nonbelief and thus justifiable to kill.
343
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O you afflicted by fitna [strife], before embarking to fight the Islamic State, that
there is no place on the face of the Earth where the Shari’ah of Allah is
implemented and the rule is entirely for Allah except for the lands of the Islamic
State…Then ask yourself, ‘What is the ruling on someone who replaces or is a
cause for the replacement of the law of Allah with the law of man?’ Yes, you
become a kafir because of that. So beware, for by fighting the Islamic State you
fall into kufr whether you realize it or not.346
In this manner the Islamic State positions its use of Shari’a Law as being the decree
from God and that anyone attacking ISIS is attempting to establish human laws instead.
Here we see that the Islamic State is clearly framing its goals and ambitions in a religious
context, and a religious war. This is important to note because it shows that the Islamic
State, much like the quote on the Kurds previously, is attempting to portray actions as
being belief vs. nonbelief. The apocalyptic addition to the framework provides the
evidence and justification for conducting violence against those deemed as kufr or
nonbelievers. The implement of Shari’a Law is designed to function as a test for the
individual, a test that can either result in one of two options—victory and belief or death
and disbelief.
More recently the Islamic State has begun to interpret its use of Shari’a Law a
fulfillment of prophecy. In this manner its use of such strict interpretations of Shari’a
Law are actually perceived as fulfilling its apocalyptic narrative. Such was the case when
the Islamic State began enslaving an ancient religious community in the Syrian
mountains known as the Yazidis. In 2014 the Islamic State sieged a mountain range in
Syria housing thousands of Yazidis and claimed that since the Yazidi’s were devil
worshipers they were not a part of the protected religious communities mentioned in the
Qur’an—due to the how the “Yazidis believe the devil was a fallen angel who eventually
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repented.”347
With this announcement coming from Islamic State ‘scholars,’ the Islamic State
decided that the Yazidi women could now begin to be legally enslaved and distributed
amongst ISIS soldiers as war booty. In Issue 4 of Dabiq under a section titled Revival of
Slavery before the Hour, the Islamic State discussed and defended its reasoning behind
such a decision. In wake of the capturing the region hosting the Yazidi community the
Islamic State declared,
This large-scale enslavement of apostate families is probably the first since the
abandonment of this Shari’ah law…The enslaved Yazidi families are now sold by
the Islamic State soldiers as the mushrikin were sold by the Companions before
them…Many of the apostate women and children are willingly accepted Islam
and now race to practice it with evident sincerity after their exit from the darkness
of shirk [apostasy]…After this discussion and as we approach al-Malhamah alKubra (the greatest battle before the Hour)—whenever its time comes by Allah’s
decree—it is interesting to note that slavery has been mentioned as one of the
signs of the Hour as well as one of the causes behind al-Malhamah al-Kubra.
Rasulullah mentioned that one of the signs of the Hour was that ‘the slave girl
gives birth to her master.’ This was reported by al-Bukhari and Muslim on the
authority of Abu Hurayrah and by Muslim on the authority of Umar.348

Here the Islamic State openly declared that the legitimately of its decision for
initiating slavery came both from actions conducted by the Prophet Muhammad and as a
clear sign that the end of the world was at hand. The Islamic State clarifies this decision
stemmed from its interpretation of how the legalization of slavery is another step in
fulfilling prophecy. It further argues that this is how Shari’a Law was “supposed to
function” and that the end of slavery was only a result from humanity removing itself
from the laws of God. Dabiq reads, “Again, it appears that those who drift away from the
literal interpretation of slavery do so because it already existed and common in their era
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in such a manner that they found it hard to understand it as referring to actual slavery. But
after the abandonment of slavery by Muslims and its subsequent revival, this literal
interpretation becomes much more plausible.”349
It would appear, again, that the Islamic State has used the A’maq Cycle as further
evidence of slavery being a sign of the Final Hour and a fulfilment of prophecy.
According to the A’maq Cycle (and Dabiq), “the Romans say to the Muslims after the
Romans have lined up the ranks near Dabiq, Leave us and those who were enslaved
amongst us so we can fight them. The Muslims then respond, Nay, by Allah, we will not
abandon our brothers to you.”350 Although only a slight mention, Dabiq points to this
mention of there being slaves during the final confrontation with the Christians as
evidence that slavery must be legalized prior to the Hour. ISIS unmistakably believes
that by legalizing slavery it will further separate itself from other Islamist movements,
and it will provide further legitimacy for fulfilling its apocalyptic narrative. In Issue 9
Dabiq elaborates upon the revitalization of slavery:
I write this whole the letters drip of pride. Yes, O religions of kufr [nonbelief]
altogether, we have indeed raided and captured the kafir [nonbelieving] women,
and drove them like sheep by the edge of the sword. And glory belongs to Allah,
to His Messenger, and the believers, but the hypocrites do not know! Or did you
and your supporters think we were joking on the day we announced the Khilafah
upon the prophetic methodology? It is Khilafah with everything it contains of
honor and pride for the Muslim and humiliation and degradation for the kafir. Our
Prophet said, as narrated by Ibn Umar, ‘I was sent with the sword before the Hour
so that Allah alone is worshipped without partners. And my provision was placed
beneath the shade of my spear. And humiliation and degradation was made for
those who oppose my command.’ Therefore, I further increase the spiteful ones in
anger by saying that I and those with me at home prostrated to Allah in gratitude
on the day the first slave-girl entered our home. Yes, we thanked our Lord for
having let us live to the day we saw kufr [nonbelief] humiliated and its banner
destroyed. Here we are today, and after centuries, reviving a prophetic Sunnah,
which both the Arab and non-Arab enemies of Allah had buried. By Allah, we
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brought it back by the edge of the sword, and we did not do so through pacifism,
negotiations, democracy, or elections. We established it according to the
prophetic way, with blood-red swords, not with fingers for voting or tweeting.351
In this manner, Dabiq understands that that the use of Shari’a Law is a strategy of
showing piety and legitimacy of the caliphate’s establishment. Actions, such as the
legalization of slavery, are then interpreted as being the fulfillment of prophecy. Dabiq
continuously uses these notions to argue that what is currently occurring across the world
is a religious war—between Christians/apostates/nonbelievers and Muslims. Dabiq uses
the classic sources to show that prophecy depicts there being an absence of “true” Islam
prior to the Hour, that it would appear again as something “strange,” and that ISIS is
persecuted and attacked because of its attempt to conduct Islamic Law as conservatively
as possible. Dabiq uses these arguments, stemming from an apocalyptic context, to
appeal to Western Muslims in particular—who may be under attack due to their faith. In
this way, the Islamic State has purposely begun to attempt to separate the world into only
two camps—one of belief and one of disbelief.

Violence and the Two Camps of the Final Hour
Along with this strict interpretation of Shari’a Law enforced by the Islamic State
remains the question for why the Islamic State has been so open in showing its violent
actions to a global audience in appeals of recruitment. The most popular characteristic of
the Islamic State’s media publications has arguably been its open broadcasting of
beheadings and mass executions. While the video of James Foley’s beheading certainly
caught the attention of media outlets across the world, it was not the first beheading video
to ever appear. As discussed in the previous chapter, such a strategy had an extensive
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history within AQI under the authority of Abu Mus’ab Zaqarwi during the early 21st
century. Yet with the increase in social media and the advancement of the Internet, ISIS
has been able to reach a much wider audience than Zarqawi ever could in the early 21st
century.
The Islamic State through the Internet has been able to provide images to a global
audience with the click of a mouse. Recruits who may have been unable to find or sift
through the materials of Bin Laden and Zarqawi now had Twitter (130 characters a tweet)
to begin to examine the Islamic State’s media distributions. Dabiq is also no stranger to
portraying the violence conducted by ISIS, and is littered with graphic images of dead
bodies. Publically broadcasting such violence and graphic material, as discussed in the
previous chapter, has often been criticized by jihadists as an ineffective strategy for
recruitment, yet for unknown reasons such has remained a staple of ISIS’s media
campaign.352
Much like its early founder Zaqarwi, ISIS does not hesitate to upload any number of
violent acts on-line. In spite of this widespread criticism, even amongst other jihadist
organizations such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS’s media has continued to use these violent
publications in pursuit of recruitment and as a way to emphasize its commitment to its
goals and ambitions. The question to this point has remained unanswered for why ISIS
does this. I posit that one solution may come directly from the Islamic State’s apocalyptic
narrative and how ISIS understands itself and its actions prior to the Final Hour.
Videos released such as, Flames of War: Fighting has just begun, even depict violence
new with high quality graphics and slow motion sequences as a way of further appealing
to the masses. Executions and battle sequences are also often surrounded with Qur’anic
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recitation in the background—highlighting that the Islamic State seems to place violence
with religion. I argue that the nature of the Islamic State’s violence is not solely used to
draw in the occasional recruit looking for his or her chance to “freely” conduct violent
acts. Rather the portrayal of such violence, much as the previous section discussed, has
become the method of showing a higher level of “authenticity” and “piety” amongst
members for recruits to latch onto. More importantly, these displays of violence are an
added attempt to clearly separate believers and non-believers prior to the Day of
Judgment.
The display of such violence against Muslims in particular may be a direct attempt to
initiate the prophesized fitna to occur during the Final Hour. This fitna, according to
classic sources, is understood as being a way of identifying the “true” and “pious”
Muslims from unbelievers and those that refuse to submit to the Islamic tradition. The
Islamic State’s media, as I argue, may be attempting to use this propagandized violence
in expectation that it will convey, as they put it, the “extinction of the gray-zone”—
between apostate and Muslim, the sacred and the profane, the nonbeliever of dar al-harb
[land of war] and the believer of dar al-Islam [land of Islam], and finally between
followers of the Dajjal and the followers of God.353
In a similar manner of Hisham Muhammad Abu Hakima’s The Antichrist and the
Battle of Armageddon where prior to the Final Hour there would appear both the “camp
of faith and the camp of godlessness,” Dabiq also narrates that a separation between these
two camps would become increasingly apparent prior to the Final Hour.354 The actions
being conducted by ISIS, in this way, are attempts to further divide the world into two
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camps—one of faith and the other of disbelief. The Islamic State may be using
unrestricted violence in order to make the separation more apparent. Most especially
since Dabiq’s narrative is a reflection of the A’maq Cycle, which argues that only a small
group of believers would be fighting against the Christian and Dajjal’s armies. Echoing
the story of the Flood, ISIS believes that prior to the Final Hour there will no longer be
room for individuals to remain on the fence, or as they state the “grayzone.” Each
individual must either join the Islamic State or become an enemy who is justified in
killing. The latter does not make discrepancies between Muslim and non-Muslim or
combatant and citizen. Instead it only makes separation between ISIS and everyone else.
In The Fading Grayzone, Dabiq elaborates upon this notion:
If one wants to know the people of truth, then let him observe where the enemies’
arrows are aimed. Most of them—if not all—are now pointed at the Islamic State,
its leaders, soldiers, and subjects. This crusade against the Islamic State is the
greatest testimony from Allah...Anyone who says otherwise now should review
his faith before death suddenly takes him while he stands with one foot in the
trench of the crusaders and the other in the trench of the hypocrites while claiming
he is in the grayzone! The mujahidin [one performing jihad] knows no grayzone.
As the liar Bush truthfully said, ‘either you are with us or are with the terrorists.’
One with sincerity will realize there is no grayzone in this crusade against the
Islamic State, and that the world has split into two encampments, one for the
people of faith, the other for the people of kufr [disbelief], all in preparation for
the final Malhamah….Finally, do not forget that Allah is with the Muslims and
will never abandon them to His enemies. And the Islamic State will remain until
its banner flies over Rome.355
Here the Islamic State makes reference to both the grayzone being separated into the
people of faith and the people of kufr (disbelief), and also declaring that it is “all in
preparation for the final Malhamah…and the Islamic State will remain until its banner
flies over Rome.” The latter part of the statement, again, is a direct reference to the
A’maq Cycle and the conquering of Rome that will take place. The Islamic State implies
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that the destruction of this “grayzone” will help initiate the end times and make
distinction between enemy and ally. Dabiq points to the beginning of the 21st century and
the attacks of 9/11 as when the grayzone first began to instability:

The grayzone is critically endangered, rather on the brink of extinction. Its
endangerment began with the blessed operations of September 11th, as these
operations manifested two camps before the world for mankind to choose
between, a camp of Islam—without the body of Khilafah to represent it at the
time—and a camp of kufr [disbelief]—the crusader coalition. The operations
quickly exposed the different deviant “Islamic” movements, the palace
“scholars”…as all of them rushed to serve the crusaders led by Bush in the war
against Islam. And so the grayzone began to wither.356
Here again we find that the Islamic State is framing the attacks against it as a part of
the “war against Islam.” Dabiq Issue 7 begins to discuss and predict what will happen
after the grayzone is completely dissolved:
Eventually, the grayzone will become extinct and there will be no place for
grayish calls and movements. There will only be the camp of Iman [faith] vs the
camp of kufr [disbelief]. Then, when Isa [Jesus] descends, breaks the cross…there
will not be any place for the camp of kufr to exist on Earth, not even as humbled
dhimmi subjects amongst the Muslims in the camp of truth…Therefore, the Beast
will appear and mark the hypocrites who remained as individuals hidden in the
camp of truth, thereby bringing an end to hypocrisy of the individual level after
the Malahim had finished hypocrisy on the level of calls and movements.357

Here the Islamic State refers to how the extinction of the grayzone will release the
series of events provided from the Qur’an prior to Final Hour—including the appearance
of the Beast. In this way, the Islamic State may be using violent imagery to gain the
initial attention of recruits, but I find that conducting un-restricted violence is not the
entire source of inspiration for those who join. Beyond the viciousness, the beheadings,
and mass killings is also a strategic attempt to place the reader and/or viewer into a
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personal test of one’s piety. The test of one’s faith comes from joining the Islamic State
despite the violence since the Final Hour is at hand. The violence, according to ISIS, is
all justified and is being done in accordance of fulfilling prophecy. Time, we find, within
the Islamic State’s narrative is tremendously short with meaning found everywhere and in
everything.
The grayzone is rapidly diminishing according to what is found Dabiq and will
continue to do so until the appearance of Jesus. A similar argument comes in Issue 11
where another reference is made to the A’maq Cycle’s narrative,
Finally, it is not the apostasy and deviance of the weak hearted and the hypocrites
that will lead to the truce with the Romans before the Hour; rather it is the
patience and perseverance of the mujahidin [those conducting jihad] on their way
to further consolidation and greater expansion in the face of the integration
crusade against Islam that will achieve such. O Allah, turner of hearts, keep our
hearts firm upon Your path until the last of us fights under the banner of al-Masih
[Jesus] against ad-Dajjal [the Antichrist].358

The reader is left with a choice of being a believer and joining the Islamic State or
remain a disbeliever and on the side of Dajjal. The separation between these two distinct
camps remains one of if not the most fundamental part of its apocalyptic recruitment
strategy. There is no longer middle room for indecisiveness because of how short time
has become. By doing this, Dabiq is forcing individuals to choose between these two
increasingly distinctive camps. The use of Shari’a Law with Hudud punishments is only
to further separate believers from nonbelievers and apostates. It is takfirsm magnified
tenfold, but now with apocalyptic implications and results. The declaration of a Muslim
being a nonbeliever or apostate is no longer restricted to just Shi’a Muslims, but now
includes all who refuse to give ba’yah (allegiance) to the caliphate. By further expanding
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this concept into being a part of the battle of Malhamah (Final battle prior to the Hour)
between Jesus and the Dajjal, the Islamic State has been able to provide readers with the
cosmological consequences of their choice—while promising the greatest of rewards.
There is no middle ground in this narrative—it is the “true” Muslims against everyone
else. Discussing this argument Issue 7 states, “As the world progresses towards alMalhamah al-Kubra, the option to stand on the sidelines as a mere observer is being lost.
As those with hearts disease by hypocrisy…are driven towards the camp of kufr
[disbelief], those with a mustard seed of sincerity…are driven towards the camp of Iman
[faith].”359
This is a strategy not uncommon to apocalyptic literature. Cook contends that
apocalyptic literature tends to formulate these two distinct camps prior to the Final Hour
as a way of conducting a test of the Muslim populations. He states, “The desire for a
fitna, a test of people’s faith in an ambiguous situation” is done because “the believer
could become complacent if everything is too cut and dried for him.”360 The distinction
between the two camps and the choice cannot be left as easy for the individual, but rather
must be a strong test of their piety. A choice, according to ISIS’s narrative, that reflects a
person’s religious identity and loyalty to the tradition. Muslims being killed are deemed
as apostates because they chose to not join the Islamic State. This, however, can be
overlooked when not taking its apocalyptic nature seriously.
It is essential to point out that the Dabiq propaganda serves a multitude of functions
for the group, some which discuss its apocalyptic theology directly, some that do not. It
is, however, important to note that every portion of Dabiq does discuss the end of the
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world and how ISIS understands it. A major portion of Dabiq does attempt to show that
the caliphate could function as a legitimate nation-state for the foreseeable future, but
does so in an apocalyptic frame. ISIS repeatedly makes reference to the idea of
“remaining and expanding” and even named Issue 5 of Dabiq this phrase.
Yet, when looking at all of the issues of Dabiq, the concept of “remaining and
expanding” is often followed by an apocalyptic reference or allusion to an apocalyptic
hadith. In Issue 12 Just Terror, Dabiq writes “May Allah keep the Islamic State
remaining and expanding until the mujahidin [participants in jihad] fight the armies of
the crusaders near Dabiq.”361 Then again in Issue 8 by writing “it is the rejection of
nationalism that will drive the Khilafah to continue expanding until it takes
Constantinople and Rome from the Crusades and their allies by Allah’s permission.”362
Here the Islamic State is making clear references to their apocalyptic narrative by
discussing Dabiq and the taking of the eschatological cities of Rome and Constantinople.
Within Issue 5, dedicated to discussing “Remaining and Expanding,” there is another
reference to the apocalyptic motivations behind its choice of terms. The end of this
particular section repeats the conquest of Rome while stating “May Allah protect the
Islamic State and support it until its army fights the crusaders near Dabiq.”363
I argue that the Islamic State would be the first to agree that it is in fact trying to
expand influence across the world, but not in pursuit of any political gain. As we have
seen, the Islamic State is trying to frame its narrative into a religious war—between
believer and nonbelievers. The remaining and expanding characteristic does not
necessarily mean that ISIS is secretly hoping the end of the world will not occur so it can
361
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hold political power over other nation-states. We have seen that the Islamic State is quite
adamant in using Shari’a Law as its basis of governing. Rather the notion expanding and
remaining may imply that ISIS is viewing its agendas and violence fulfillment of
prophecy. These references, however, can and have been overlooked by those
approaching the group without a previous grasp on Islamic eschatology and the A’maq
Cycle.

Conspiracies, Shi’a Plots, and the Jewish Dajjal
I attempted to use this chapter, so far, as a way of showing that Dabiq is an
apocalyptic text. A text that discusses current and future issues within a religious
framework, is heavily centered on the details of the A’maq Cycle, and provides how ISIS
believes the end of the world is going to occur. I attempted to highlight that ISIS wants to
ignite a religious war, is using Shari’a Law to portray its piety, and is attempting to
conduct violence in a manner to separate the world into two distinct camps—belief and
nonbelief. I also attempted to provide evidence that Dabiq is strongly influenced by
classic narratives for how the Final Hour is to occur, citing apocalyptic hadiths at the end
of every issue to encompass the magazines overall synopsis. Yet there are other angles of
approaching Dabiq as an apocalyptic text, including its understanding of who or what the
Dajjal is going to be during the Final Hour.
While it is true that the Islamic State’s apocalyptic narrative tends to stick as closely
as possible to the classical sources, I discovered that Dabiq dwells into what many today
would call conspiracy theories. Yet unlike the novels of the later 20th and early 21st
century, Dabiq avoids using any non-traditional source to support its view of the Dajjal in
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particular. I point out this tendency to dwell into speculation of who the Dajjal may be or
who may be working for the Dajjal in order to further highlight that Dabiq is an
apocalyptic literature. As an apocalyptic literature, as my first claim stated in my
introduction, we are able to understand that the formation of such texts tend to be fueled
by higher levels of anxiety, religious persecution, and/or increased levels of violence and
warfare. The latter two points have been emphasized throughout this chapter thus far.
The first point, however, only comes to fruition through analyzing how Dabiq
discusses the Dajjal and his influence on the world. According to Dabiq, the Dajjal is
particularly associated with both the Shi’a and Jewish traditions in attempt to attack the
Islamic tradition and its followers. In an eerily similar manner of the modern literatures
claiming a world-wide conspiracy against the Islamic tradition led by the Dajjal and
Jews, the Islamic State also believes that the Dajjal is using Jews and Shi’a Muslims, as
well as all other nations, in pursuit of destroying the Islamic tradition. For example Issue
11 of Dabiq notes:
Although the Western crusaders’ cooperation with Iran, Syria, and Russia, is
undeniable, they attempt to downplay it officially to conceal their role in the war
against the Muslims…and just as the Companions had to face coalitions of
various Jewish, pagan, and hypocrite parties in the battle of al-Ahzab [battles
thought to occur during the life of the Prophet Muhammad], the Muslims of the
Islamic State face various coalitions of kuffar [disbelief] having a common
interest in seeing the Khilafah [caliphate] destroyed. And just as the Companions
reaction to the parties was one of faith…so too should the reaction of the Muslims
be when seeing these numerous coalitions gathering and mobilizing.364
Through this line of reasoning, the Islamic State portrays its current battles against
American and its allies as similar to what the Prophet Muhammad faced during his own
life. While appealing to be acting as the Prophet Muhammad did centuries prior, this
statement clues us into the idea that the Islamic State believes there is a wider conspiracy
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occurring against them—including Russia, Iran, and Israel. In this way, the Islamic State
further expands upon its ideas that a religious war is occurring, Muslims are under attack,
and that two camps are manifesting prior to the Final Hour.
Dabiq’s narrative, however, is not limited to just making such claims on the current
events occurring today. At other points Dabiq claims it was really Shi’a Muslims and
Jews who were behind particular historical instances that led to war and destruction in
Muslim society. This became most vibrant in Issue 13 of Dabiq The Rafidah: From Ibn
Saba to the Dajjal. In this issue, heavily plagued with speculation of the Dajjal, ISIS
spends time claiming that Shi’a Muslims were responsible for nearly every tragedy
throughout Islamic history.
On page 44 Dabiq states,
The Rafidah [derogatory term for Shi’a Muslims] were behind the early fitan
[civil war/strife] during the reigns of Uthman, Ali, and Mu’awiyah. The Rafidah
waged war against the Abbasid Khilafah via the so-call “Fatimi” state. They
supported the Mongols...They supported the Franks and the Crusaders in their
invasions of Sham and Palestine…They aided the Americans in their invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq. They supported the Nusayri regime in Sham and
established a Rafidi [Shi’a] militia-state in Yemen. They will continue to wage
war against the Muslims until the Rafidah [Shi’a] ultimately unite with the Jews
under the banner of the Dajjal.365
Here Dabiq claims that it was really the Shi’a Muslims who were behind the crusades,
Mongol invasions, and the increase of American forces in Iraq. Despite this outlandish
claim, Dabiq refuses to cite any source outside of the Islamic tradition. Dabiq does not,
as modern authors have done, incorporate non-traditional sources in order to support its
claims. In this way, Dabiq’s argument continues on and develops upon the claim that
Shi’a Muslims were conspiring with the Dajjal to destroy the Islamic Tradition:
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Throughout history, they have never hesitated to cooperate with the Jews,
Christians, and pagans against Islam and the Muslims. Thus, the Rafidah [Shi’a]
are apostates who must be killed wherever they are to be found, until no Rafidi
walks on the face of the earth, even if the jihad claimants despise such and even if
the jihad claimants defend the Rafidah with their words day and night…It is
therefore not surprising that the jihad claimants now wage war against the Islamic
State while condemning the targeting of Rafidi temples, markets, and
neighborhoods. Finally, the Rafidah await the Jewish Dajjal who they plot to
support alongside the Jews against the Muslims. Thus, as the signs of the Hour
approach, a Muslim should ignore the confusion spread by the callers to Hellfire
and instead—while performing jihad—reflect upon the condition of the Rafidah,
those who imitate them, and those who defend them, thereafter ask Allah to keep
his heart firm upon Islam, protect him from the evil of the Dajjal and all other
fitnah, and enlighten his heart with truth, until he meets Allah while He is pleased
with him.366
The Islamic State spends a substantial amount of this issue arguing why it is that Shi’a
Muslims (whom they refer to in the derogatory phrase Rafidah) should be the most
targeted group. Rather than the typical takfiri argument, previously seen by ISI and AQI,
Dabiq frames its argument against the Shi’a as being a final confrontation between the
Dajjal and the Islamic tradition. Suddenly all Shi’a can be killed because they are in
alignment with the Dajjal—according to ISIS’s apocalyptic narrative. Furthermore,
according to the Islamic State, Shi’a Muslims have been the basis of all the problems
facing the Muslim community. Echoing the arguments of Zarqawi years prior, ISIS views
the Shi’a as the “near enemy” that must be dealt with first.
Along this understanding of the Dajjal being in control of Shi’a Muslims, there is also
claim that Jews are under the guidance of the Dajjal as well. In Issue 11 Dabiq claims,
Their plan is to continue waging war against Islam until the emergence of the
“Mahdi” of the Rafidah [Shi’a], who, according to them, will speak Hebrew, rule
by the Torah, be followed by the Jews, and kill all the Arabs—attributes
undoubtedly befitting the Jewish Dajjal not the Muslim Mahdi…The Rafidah
overall are more barbaric and united than the crusaders themselves, but the
mujahidin [those participating in jihad] of the Khilafah have sharpened many
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knives and prepared many car bombs to slaughter the flocks of Rafidi sheep until
the last Rafidi under the banner of ad-Dajjal [the Antichrist] dies.367
In this way, Shi’a attacks become justifiable and Jews are understood as being under
the control of the Dajjal as well. At the end of Issue 13 the apocalyptic hadith provided
expands upon this anxiety existing amongst ISIS members, “Rasulullah said, ‘The Dajjal
will be followed by seventy thousand Jews from Asbahan [Isfahan] wearing talisman
[shoulder-draped shawls]’ [Reported by Muslim from Anas].”368 Here we again find that
Dabiq attempts to make its entire issue relate to the classic apocalyptic hadith. This
“conspiracy” is based on a belief a that it was a Jew who had created the Shi’a sect of
Muslims. As the title of Issue 13 implies, the Shi’a were formed by the Jew Ibn Sabba. In
regard to who Ibn Sabba is Dabiq claims,
About him, Ibn Taymiyyah said, ‘The first to innovate Rafd [Shi’a] was a
heretical hypocrite named ‘Abdullah Ibn Saba’. He wanted thereby to corrupt the
religion of the Muslims like Paul—the author of the letters read by the
Christians—innovated for the Christians heresies by which he corrupted their
religion. Paul was a Jew who hypocritically faked Christianity with the intent to
corrupt it. Ibn Saba was also a Jew intending the same. He strived to spread
falsehood aiming to corrupt the religion, but was unable to do so. However, some
discord and strife occurred amongst the Muslims, strife in which Uthman was
killed. Thereafter the fitna transpired’ [Majmu al-Fatawa].369

Similar to conspiracy theories rampant in modern apocalyptic novels, Dabiq attempts
to claim that there is a larger force behind historical occurrences against the Islamic
tradition—due largely to the influence of the Dajjal. This point, when understanding
Dabiq as an apocalyptic text, is highlighting the high mistrust and anxiety held towards
the Shi’a leaders of Iraq and Syria. This anxiety, however, is not limited to just Shi’a
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Muslims or Jews. Rather, Sunni Muslims who oppose ISIS or live in nations that are
combatting ISIS become a part of the Dajjal’s plans and are thus justifiable to be killed
and combatted (recall the burning of the Jordanian pilot). The apocalyptic frame of Dabiq
helps emphasize the anxiety existing within and the tactics being conducted by the
Islamic State. Without understanding Dabiq as an apocalyptic literature such an analysis
is dismissed.
The purpose of global fitna remains an initial place to start in hope of understanding
ISIS as an apocalyptically, not nationalistically or politically, motivated terrorist
organization. Certainly the Islamic State is concerned with America, Israel, and other
enemies such as Russia, but these fall behind what is seen as the closest enemy to ISIS’s
theology—Muslims (Sunni, Shi’a, Sufi) who are deemed apostates. The final battles with
the Christians remain at the end of the apocalyptic narrative, but prior to that there must
first be a clear separation between believer and nonbeliever. This notion then plays
directly into the Islamic State’s adamant attempt to “purify” the Islamic religion from all
they deem as apostates. This conception of purification, however, can also be missed by
those dismissing the religious motivations of the Islamic State.
Viewing the Islamic State from a “monolithic” analysis, which Wood has claimed has
been occurring so far, scholars attempt to remove Dabiq and ISIS from any apocalyptic
context. Rather ISIS motives are simplified to only really be nationalistic motivations, but
this is contradictory to what Dabiq is saying. ISIS states that nationalistic motivations and
agendas were actually the doings of the West in order to delegitimize the “unity” that
could arise from a religiously motivated jihadist moment that attempts to unite all
believers against all nonbelievers. Dabiq claims the West used tactics, such as
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nationalism and democracy, in attempt of destabilizing the Middle East and removing all
“pious” Muslims from positions of power—again pointing to a level of anxiety and
skepticism existing amongst its members. For example Dabiq references the dissolution
of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the State of Israel as evidence:
The historical origin of the ‘Arab Spring’ banners—rather most of the flags raised
by various Arab apostate regimes—is a flag designed by the British crusader
Mark Sykes. Yes, Mark Sykes of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided the
Muslims’ lands into nationalist states, the same crusader who promoted the
infamous Balfour Declaration behind the establishment of the Jewish State…
Sykes, together with his peers and leaders, devised a plan to further divide the
broken Muslims’ lands into nationalist states. The Muslims’ lands had been
polluted by pagan domes and plagued by manmade laws at the hands of Ottoman
rules.370

Dabiq concludes by reiterating that all of this, despite the planning of Western leaders, is
only a part of a series of events to occur prior to the Final Hour:
As the nonbelieving factions continue executing the orders of puppet regimes, and
Nusayri forces step up their bombing campaign…in a desperate attempt to stop
the Islamic State’s advance, the armies of the Khilafah will continue marching
towards Dabiq, and soon after that, towards al-Aqsa by Allah’s
permission….“The Prophet said, ‘The stronghold of the Muslims on the day of alMalhamah will be in al-Ghitah, next to a city called Dabiq, one of the biggest
cities of Sham’ [Reported by Abu Dawud from Abud-Darda].371
The Islamic State’s apocalyptic narrative, and understanding of the West and the
Dajjal, also introduces Russia and China into this worldwide agenda being led against the
Islamic Tradition. Dabiq writes, “And after centuries of Western conflict with Persia and
Russia, we find that two Western leaders—Bush and Obama—are determined to do
everything possible to strengthen Persian and Russian influence in the Middle East.”372
Here again is another sign of ISIS anxiety and skepticism towards the way the world is
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currently functioning. This theory is elaborated upon by discussing how it relates to the
current events happening against the Islamic State:
Most significantly, Russia—Iran’s biggest ally as well as an ally of China—has
entered the Ukraine, which is supposedly claimed by the West. Russia continues
to arm the Assad regime against the Muslims of Sham…And yet Obama insists
upon strengthening “the Persian Crescent” and Russian influence in the region. It
seems American leaders are blinded by their love of the Jewish State into doing
things that only damage supposed Western influences.373
Here Dabiq’s apocalyptic narrative becomes more like the narratives found in modern
literatures than the classic sources. Yet throughout this all there remains only Islamic
sources and speculation used to support such claims. Dabiq attempts to keep classic
apocalyptic hadiths away from these speculations on current events in order of avoiding
any misconceptions or inaccurate claims to be discovered. This strategy, I argue, was
done in order for the reader to come to their own conclusions on what was occurring
around them, while also avoiding making incorrect predictions that would damage its
apocalyptic narrative.
In Issue 12 Dabiq further elaborates upon its apocalyptic narrative/theory that
everyone is teaming up against the Islamic State as a part of the Dajjal’s agenda, “Despite
the rivalries between the Rafidah [Shi’a] and the Jewish state, they will have more in
common with each other than other religions of kufr. They both await a “savior” whom
they allege will wipe out the followers of Allah’s Messenger. And the Russian
intervention in Sham has brought an opportunity for the Rafidah and the Jewish state to
get closer to each other through Russia.”374
There begins to be an emphasis on proving to its audience that the real reason behind
the constant attacks on the Islamic State is because they are the final Muslims
373
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prophesized in the A’maq Cycle. Beyond this initial layer of analysis, however, is the
view that ISIS possesses a high level of skepticism towards what is occurring around its
territory today. There is anxiety and fear that Muslims are being attacked because of their
faith. These perceived attacks are then redirected as fulfillment of prophecy. By
referencing yet another hadith, the Islamic State hopes to fully articulate to its audience
that everything occurring will result in the return of Jesus prior to the Day of Judgement.
He explained that the Muslims would not cease to fight parties of the kuffar
[disbelief] until Isa [Jesus] descends and leads the Muslim armies. He said,
‘Indeed, fighting the kuffar, Hijrah [migration], and jihad will remain until the
establishment of the Hour.’ Allah’s Messenger said, ‘Hijrah will not cease to exist
until repentance ceases to be accepted, and repentance will not cease to be
accepted until the sun rises from the West’ [Reported by Abu Dawud from
Mu’awiyah]…He also said, ‘There will not cease to exist a group of my nation
fighting upon the truth, manifest until the Day of Judgment. [Reported by Muslim
from Jabir].375

Concluding Remarks on Dabiq
The examples provided in this chapter were picked from amongst nearly sixty-five
pages of notes taken from the thirteen issues of Dabiq. Due to the scope of this research it
would be impossible to list every passage that mentioned the Dajjal, Jesus, or the alMalhamah al-Kubra. Isa [Jesus] plays a colossal role in the Islamic State’s new narrative
and helps articulate that ISIS has placed itself at the end of Islamic history and is using
the A’maq Cycle to make sense of its actions and the events occurring around ISIS. In
Dabiq, the Mahdi is no longer desirable because the caliphate has been established in his
place and will remain and expand until the return of Jesus. It is of course important to
note that Dabiq is quite extensive in length and often is separated into a variety of
sections, chapters, and topics. This makes it easy to look past the Islamic State’s
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apocalyptic narrative, especially without a baseline understanding of Islamic eschatology
and the hadiths that ISIS references. By pulling out proponents of its apocalyptic
narrative from Dabiq, I attempted to emphasize that there is a strong influence of the
A’maq Cycle on the actions and motivations of the Islamic State.
Understanding the Islamic State’s magazine as an apocalyptic literature in this way
helps make sense of the group in two distinct ways. First, it provides evidence and insight
into why ISIS has enacted such high levels of violence against Muslim and non-Muslims
alike, why ISIS is implementing a strict version of Shari’a Law, and why the Islamic
State is attempting to separate the world into two distinct camps. Second when Dabiq is
understood as an apocalyptic text, new analysis can be formed for why messianic
speculation would arise in the 21st century and be at the forefront and a terrorist
organization.
The latter part can be seen in how Dabiq perceives the role of the Islamic tradition, as
ISIS defines it, in a modernizing and secularizing world. The increase of Western powers
and styles of government are in direct contrast with how ISIS understands the way the
world should be governed and ruled. The skepticism towards Shi’a Muslims (Iran in
particular), America, and even Muslim leaders depicted in Dabiq as a part of the Dajjal’s
plan, can also be understood as insights into the anxiety that Sunni Muslims may be
possessing towards all three powers. View Dabiq as an apocalyptic text does not imply it
provides any truth claims for ISIS or its theology, but rather is an attempted analysis at
why apocalyptic speculation could arise and popularize so quickly in the first place.
For this reason, I found it beneficial to take ISIS and Dabiq at its word—that both are
inspired by apocalyptic and messianic speculation for the future. As Cook as stated, and I
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continuously reference, that “the very adoption of a worldview that leads to a messianic
future implies that the present system is at least partially a failure.”376 In this manner,
Dabiq is a text depicting why the present is a failure and how the Islamic State attempts
to correct it.
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Conclusion: Where do we go from here?
Predictions of violence made on the basis of beliefs alone are notoriously
unreliable….it does appear, however, that apocalyptists are more likely to engage in
violence if they believe themselves to be trapped or under attack. Both conditions are as
much the product of their own perception as of outside forces.377
Michael Barkun
In this thesis, I have attempted to highlight a range of topics concerning why taking
the Islamic State’s apocalyptic nature as a serious motivating factor in its ongoing
development is needed for the broader discussion of what the group is attempting to
achieve. While this is not the only angle of approaching the Islamic State’s motivations
and aspirations, I attempted to highlight the benefits and additional perspectives that can
be provided through such an analysis. This thesis has been an attempt to uncover why the
group has formed and its ongoing development rather than solely on how the group
should be combatted and destroyed. Recent approaches for understanding the Islamic
State have attempted to divorce the group from its religious identification and the classic
Islamic texts ISIS is referencing. Yet by refusing to acknowledge the Islamic State’s
religious identity, a major proponent of the group may have been completely dismissed
so far—namely an apocalyptic nature that is being used as a source of inspiration for the
group’s formation, development, recruitment, style of governing, use of unrestricted
violence, and possible end goals
By analyzing the Islamic State through its apocalyptic narrative, I have been able to
help illustrate how ISIS seems to have been profoundly inspired by the Final Hour, and
how it will continue to conduct activities in attempt to bring it about. In this same
process, I have also shown that apocalyptic speculation and literature (within the Islamic
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tradition) tends to arise during moments when Muslims possess high levels of anxiety,
distrust of foreign powers or governments, religious persecution, and/or are moments of
extensive warfare and violence. Iraq and Syria, during the 21st century, seem to have been
the breeding ground for all of these issues to exist alongside heavily violent jihadist
organizations like Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Islamic State in Iraq. By understanding the
Islamic State as an apocalyptically inspired jihadist organization bent on purifying the
Islamic religion, we are able to see an additional perspective for who the Islamic State is,
what members are attempting to join, and why ISIS has resorted in such high levels of
publicized violence against Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
I began my thesis by first highlighting what could be found within the Qur’an, and
early extra-Quranic literatures, as well as how the latter has influenced the development
of Islamic eschatology through modernity. As discussed in chapter one, the Qur’an’s
early Meccan Surahs tended to be heavily focused on the Day of Judgement, the Final
Hour’s imminence, and natural disasters. These early references, I argue, may have been
the direct outcome of the social, religious, and political environment that the Prophet
Muhammad and early Muslim community were living a part of in Mecca prior to the
Hijrah in 622 C.E. It was during this time period that the early Muslim community faced
high levels of religious persecution and oppression for their monotheistic message, even
to the point of enduring violent threats and economic sanctions from the leading Quraysh
tribe in control of Mecca. Much like other moments of apocalyptic literature forming in
Islamic history, this early period highlights that there were widespread feelings of anxiety
towards the future, persecution for belief, and an inherent distrust of the governing
powers.
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Yet the Qur’an itself, as Cook noted, should be understood and analyzed today as
eschatological rather than an apocalyptic. This slight difference is due to how the Qur’an
lacks specific details on what will occur during the Final Hour—especially in regard to
what will transpire within Islamic societies and the Muslims that inhabit them. Instead the
Qur’an functions more as a moral guide to the individual who needs to constantly work
on his or her piousness before the Final Hour—since it could occur at any moment. In
this manner, we find that it would be early extra-Qur’anic sources (hadith collections and
Kitab al-Fitan) that provided the missing details concerning the Hour. These extraQur’anic sources would soon become the leading narratives for apocalypse as history
progressed, and the details within them seem to have been heavily influenced by the
sociocultural, political, and theological events of the time in which they written.
Much like apocalyptic authors have done today, these early literatures attempted to
provide answers for the doubts and fears rampant in the time they were written. Anxiety
from internal strife among Muslims, as well as constant warfare with the Byzantines,
would allow for early authors to develop one of the most popular end time narratives in
Islamic eschatology—referred to as the A’maq Cycle. This narrative would periodically
recycle itself as a leading authority on the end times during moments where Islamic
societies were in confrontation with Christians, including during the crusades in the
Middle Ages. It would also be during this period in Islamic history that the word fitna
developed an apocalyptic connotation and became a major Sign of the Hour for which to
watch for. This idea has now been fully expanded upon by the Islamic State, which seems
to be heavily fixated on “purifying” the religion in order to separate itself from all other
Muslims and nonbelievers.
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Chapter two then proceeded to the modern era (beginning at the end of the 19th
century) and highlighted three messianic inspired revolutions that occurred in the Middle
East and North Africa. These revolutions would be spurred by the events happening
around them and became reactions to an increased level of anxiety and alarm on what
many saw as Western society impeding upon the values of the Islamic tradition. The
inherent increase of Western power across the Middle East and North Africa, by way of
colonization, would reignite similar feelings that had plagued the earlies Muslim
communities. In this way, widespread fear and anxiety would stir revolutions or armed
insurgencies against the leading government establishments of Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and
Iran. In wake of 1979, year 1400 of the Islamic calendar, the Siege of Mecca, Iranian
Revolution, and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would all spur the most recent
apocalyptic speculation in the Middle East. The decades following 1979 would spawn a
new genre of literature across—apocalyptic fiction.
This new genre of literature, written by a multitude of different authors with a variety
of backgrounds, would over only a short time period become a top selling genre for
Middle Eastern book publishing companies. The reason for this popularity would come
from how authors continuously attempted to connect nearly every current event with a
Sign of the Hour mentioned in the classic end time sources discussed in chapter one.
Unlike the earliest literatures, however, these modern works often incorporated an
assortment of non-traditional sources into their narratives. This strategy soon became the
standard for how these novels would function, allowing the genre to become filled with
“conspiracy theories” discussing UFOs, the Bermuda Triangle, and Freemasonry to name
a few. The focal point of these novels, however, was typically dedicated to discussing
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Israel and America as both being the servants of the Dajjal—who was attempting to take
over the world by attacking the Islamic tradition. This development and popularization of
such novels would bizarrely begin to transpire at nearly the same time as the
revitalization of global jihad, the 9/11 attack in New York, and American Wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. This would allow for the authors of modern novels the ability to begin
drawing connections between all of the events to further fuel apocalyptic speculation
across the region.
In Chapter three, I shifted focus away from Islamic eschatology and began analyzing
the early formation of the Islamic State beginning with Abu Mus’ab al-Zaqarwi. From
there I moved forward in history and pinpointed instants where apocalyptic speculation
influenced the development and trajectory of the group from AQI to ISIS. By
highlighting the Islamic State’s shift from belief in the Mahdi’s appearance to state
building and awaiting the return of Jesus, I found that the Islamic State reconstructed its
narrative around the details of the A’maq Cycle—filled with fitna, the Dajjal, and battles
with Christians (now interpreted as the United States of America). It would be after this
shift that the group began to heavily reference and be inspired by the classic narration for
how the end times was going to transpire. Under the guidance of the A’maq Cycle, ISIS
began focusing its attention on administrating Shari’a Law, attacking Shi’a Muslims and
Sunni tribes that refused allegiance, and conducting a variety of strategies in tune with
what was foretold to happen—including legalizing slavery, igniting a religious war, and a
final battle against the Christians/Byzantines/Romans (now understood as America) in
Dabiq.
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After this analysis of the apocalyptic development of ISIS, I looked exclusively at a
primary source released by the Islamic State in chapter four. In my research of Dabiq, I
discovered that the Islamic State was undoubtedly referencing the A’maq Cycle and
seems to have been motivated by and openly discussing the details found within it.
Advances on taking control of regions like Dabiq, the use of Shari’a Law with strict
hudud punishments, and the legalization of slavery were now justified as vital actions for
not only showing piety but also fulfilling prophecy. Also, Dabiq’s apocalyptic narrative
appears to have been constructed in a manner that places every incident, speech, attack,
victory, and defeat as being justified in order to fulfil prophecy and usher in the Final
Hour.
I discovered Dabiq also adopted similar conspirator undertones that had become
rampant in modern novels—this was done in order highlight that Dabiq is an apocalyptic
text. We find Dabiq continuously references the Dajjal, his influence on the world’s
morality, and his perceived ability to use Jewish and Shi’a traditions to undermine the
“true” message of Islam. While Dabiq does not fall prey to discussing UFOs or the
Bermuda Triangle, the magazine is no stranger to making claims that there has been a
plotted agenda throughout history against the Islamic tradition—led by the Dajjal. This
included the notion that a Jew purposely formed the Shi’a sect to lead Muslims astray
from the example of Muhammad, and is why Shi’a and Sunni Muslims must fight each
other prior to the Hour. In this manner Dabiq is an apocalyptic text—one that lays out the
Islamic State’s view of the world, how it plans to fix it, and how every individual will be
a participant in events prior to the Final Hour. The end goals, theology, motivations,
recruitment strategies, and broadcasting of violent acts are all depicted in Dabiq as clear
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pursuit of separating the “land of Islam” from the” land of disbelief” prior to the Final
Hour.
The destruction of ancient monuments, the mass killing of Sunni and Shi’a Muslims,
and the devastation brought to the region is depicted as the pursuit of purifying the
Islamic tradition. These strategies, I argue, are not solely in pursuit of a political or
nationalistic government that will discard its religious attire as soon as it stops being
attacked from outside forces. Rather, the additional insight provided from the method of
approach used in this thesis, brings to light exactly how the Islamic State’s caliphate will
(as of now) remain to be run solely by Shari’a Law—a religious motivation.
This thesis finds that the group is attempting to establish a religious war in an attempt
to (re)establish God’s Law over the laws of man, which ISIS believes has been removed
by Western styles of government. This argument is made most clear in how ISIS
references the Great Flood of Noah. On this topic, according to ISIS’s apocalyptic
narrative, there is another flood coming to earth, but this time it will be the caliphate (not
the ark) that has been sent to save humanity from death and punishment. In this manner,
the Islamic State’s apocalyptic narrative claims everything destroyed currently will soon
be fixed or re-created in the future.
The Islamic State’s strategy, under this impression of the role of the caliphate, then
attempts to separate the world into two distinct camps—belief and disbelief. This
analysis, however, can be easily glossed over by approaches that do not take religious
motivations as serious factors in the Islamic State’s actions and aspirations. In Dabiq, the
Islamic State has constructed its role and battles against its enemies as religious in nature,
not politically or nationalistically interested. For example in Issue 10 Dabiq states, “Our
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war with the Kurds is a religious war. It is not a nationalistic war—we seek the refuge of
Allah. We do not fight Kurds because they are Kurds. Rather we fight the kuffar amongst
them, the allies of the crusaders and Jews in their war against the Muslims. As for the
Muslim Kurds, then they are our people and brothers wherever they may be.” 378
The Islamic State’s apocalyptic narrative places the group at the end of Islamic
history for this particular reason. The end of the world is thought to bear witness,
especially in regards to the A’maq Cycle, a final religious war between believers and
nonbelievers. For it is during the Final Hour that there is perceived to be a clear
separation made between belief and disbelief—much like there was thought to have been
during the life of Noah prior to the Flood. According to Dabiq, the present world has
failed to such a degree that the only option left is to destroy it and make way for what
comes next—a world ruled under God’s Law. These are not the aspirations of only just
politics, but rather echo religious rhetoric and a distinct view the world through a
theological lens.
David Cook in Studies of Muslim Apocalyptic notes that a strong desire to transform
society through religion is perhaps the most essential and shared feature of Islamic
apocalyptic literature. He writes:
The apocalyptist is saying that the present order is not sufficient, and that this
“formal” Islam has failed to bring the messianic golden age. He is not satisfied
with the present, and so he must give hope for the future. This is the very essence
of the restoration myth: at the End the things that have been degraded and
destroyed during the interim period will be rebuilt and restored. The call for just
government was, and is today, the hallmark of every revolutionary apocalyptic
and messianic Muslim group and needs to be recognized as such. Closely
connected to this is the apocalypticist’s indictment of their own society. Though
one is tempted to say that these attacks are exaggerated, doubtless for that
particular time they represent the views of a certain alienated group, which during
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periodic intervals of messianic and apocalyptic fervor was joined by a much
larger group.379
In this way, the Islamic State’s apocalyptic nature should not be viewed as crazed
speculations of the coming Hour. In this way, the Islamic State’s apocalyptic belief
should not be dismissed as political aims disguised as religious belief in order to exploit
ancient texts. In this way, the Islamic State’s battles and violence should not be
understood as pursuit of nationalistic agendas. For ISIS, Dabiq is a direct reflection for
how it views the current state of the world, its society, and its religious tradition as being
far removed from how the messianic future was supposed to look. It would appear that
the Islamic State’s apocalyptic narrative has been quite successful in grabbing the
attention of thousands across the world who share a similar reflection of the current
world. Dismissing the Islamic State’s theological and apocalyptic view of the world
avoids taking the Islamic State at its word, and may prove to be a strategy that only
further supports its claims and narrative in a region filled with constant warfare and
destruction.
I argue that this approach provides an additional analysis of the group’s origins,
development, and future aspirations that can then be included in the wider discussion of
what ISIS really wants. Dismissing this serious component and inspiration of the Islamic
State may lead to tactics and strategies that only play right into the Islamic State’s
narrative. For example, Western politicians and presidential candidates who view the
group as not being religiously motivated may be providing ample support for the group’s
claims across the world. Recently one presidential candidate stated, “If I am elected
president, we will utterly destroy ISIS. We won't weaken them. We won't degrade them.
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We will utterly destroy them. We will carpet bomb them into oblivion,” while also
promising increased surveillance of Muslim neighborhoods in America. Another
candidate publically declared “Islam hates us,” whole also promising to deport immigrant
Muslims from the United States, and acknowledged that he wants to deny all Syrian
immigrants (fleeing the Islamic State) access and safety in the United States. Such
rhetoric in combatting the Islamic State may prove to be quite dangerous in how it plays
right into the Islamic State’s narrative there is a prevalent and widespread attack on the
Islamic tradition—not just the Islamic State.
The ability for ISIS to redirect every action and speech to support its claim of being
the final group of fighters, I argue, makes eliminating the group more difficult than just
trying to “destroy and degrade” the group out of existence. The latter strategy has
appeared to be the tactic of choice for combatting Al-Qaeda, yet time has shown that
even this group has been able to adapt and evolve in the wake such a strategy so far. The
apocalyptic speculation existing within ISIS, however, makes the group even more
dangerous and worrisome for the future by how it is heavily focused on destruction and
violence. An increase of attacks on the Islamic State may result in the group becoming
more likely to resort to drastic options and wide scale attacks outside of Iraq and Syria.
Forcing the hand of an apocalyptically inspired group may only ignite further apocalyptic
speculation, increase its recruitment appeal, and may force the group to conduct untold
amounts of violence and destruction throughout its controlled regions in hopes of
ushering in the appearance of the Final Hour.
In this same light, an appearance of “boots on the ground” from American forces
could also prove to be most detrimental for a long term resolution. This strategy of
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attacking ISIS by way of American soldiers has become the greatest desire from the
Islamic State—despite the clear difference between the two militarily. For ISIS, the
appearance of American forces will ignite the Final Hour and will be the beginning of the
“Last Crusade.” The Islamic State wants a religious war between the “Crusader” West
and a group of Muslims attempting to establish a caliphate, because the appearance of
Western forces (especially in Dabiq) would further amplify ISIS’s notion the West is
attempting to target the Islamic tradition. By basing its apocalyptic narrative around the
A’maq Cycle, ISIS has been able to view the appearance of the West, who ISIS defines
as the Romans or Byzantines, as the fulfillment of prophecy and with it could ignite a
sudden wave of energy and appeal across the world.
In this way, the Islamic State capitalizes on the actions of the West and Muslim
governments unlike that of previous Islamist jihadist movements. Rather than attempt to
remove the West from Saudi Arabia, the Islamic State encourages more attacks from the
West and then re-directs them into its apocalyptic narrative. The A’maq Cycle, in this
way, became the perfect narrative to follow for ISIS in regards to current events. A major
aspect for ISIS remains a discussion of what will happen during the final battles against
the Christians, “They will then fight and a third (part) of the army would run away, whom
Allah will never forgive. A third (part of the army) which would be constituted of
excellent martyrs in Allah's eye, would be killed and the third who would never be put to
trial would win and they would be conquerors of Constantinople.”380
With this constantly being the main point of its narrative, i.e. victory by the will of
God against the greatest of odds, the Islamic State has placed the Western world into a
complex scenario where any action or speech can come across as fulfillment of prophecy.
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Much like how the Branch Davidian Cult of the late 20th century used the American
federal government raid on its Waco compound as fulfillment of apocalyptic belief, the
appearance of American troops in Syria (at this moment in time) could prove only to
magnify the Islamic State’s narrative and recruitment tenfold.
These complications, however, can easily be over looked by those dismissing religious
motivation being another factor to consider when analyzing the Islamic State. Dismissing
the Islamic State from the Islamic tradition also terminates any additional insight that can
be provided through analyzing the group’s Dabiq magazine—i.e. its apocalyptic
literature. It is important to note that apocalyptic belief certainly did not originate with
ISIS nor is it implicitly tied to the interpretation that the Islamic State has given it. What
should be recognized is that apocalyptic speculation and produced literature seems to
arise at distinct moments of time where there are high levels of anxiety and speculation
that the present state of the world has utterly failed. The Islamic State is simply the latest
group to tap into such belief as a source of inspiration and direction for how to correct the
failed status of the world.
I do not hope to downplay the reality of how dangerous the Islamic State remains
through this analysis or provide any justification for the acts it has committed. The threat
of the group conducting large-scale attacks in Western cities remains real, its mass killing
of Sunni and Shi’a tribes across Iraq and Syria remains real, and the awareness that the
group would quickly use a nuclear bomb against its enemies, if ever in possession of one,
remains quite real. The reasons for conducting any of these attacks, however, all play into
the Islamic State’s apocalyptic nature and how it understands itself. To this point,
however, such an analysis of the Islamic State has largely been dismissed.
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Understanding the Islamic State through its apocalyptic nature provides additional
viewpoints into why the group has been able to form, become popular, and helps provide
insight into why it has conducted such high levels of violence. Religious motivations are
certainly not the only reason for the Islamic State’s choice to establish the caliphate and
conduct such wide scale violence, but in the same light they should not be so easily
dismissed either. Instead, the apocalyptic analysis should be included into the wider
discussion of what ISIS is and what it is fighting to achieve. Understanding the Islamic
State in this way provides fresh insight into why the group has been able to flourish at a
level unlike that of other jihadist movements.
The annihilation of the current “entity” calling itself the Islamic State will not
necessarily mean the destruction of apocalyptic speculation from reoccurring. This is
especially the case in regions of civil unrest, high anxiety, living under constant warfare,
and fear of Western nations and the drone strikes being conducted throughout Iraq and
Syria. The “collateral damage” from drone strikes intrinsically may only add more reason
to distrust the West, and this makes tackling a group like the Islamic State nearly
impossible without sending un-intended ripple effects across the Middle East. Each attack
from the West can now be referenced as attacks against the Islamic tradition and will
continue to be exploited by apocalyptic minded believers—who have a wide variety of
classic sources depicting a final confrontation with “Christian Rome.”
The Islamic State, in this way, has been able to already continuously fuel itself off of
the actions and words of the West and even Middle Eastern government leaders. This
strategy may have opened the floodgates for similar tactics being incorporated by Islamist
jihadist organizations in the future. The Islamic State may have only been the first
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modern manifestation of an apocalyptically inspired revolution, and in this way it may
have only provided the blueprint for what to do and what to avoid. Recall how the
Islamic State was able to quickly learn from its earliest mistakes when claiming that the
Mahdi was going to appear at any moment. In the wake of being proven wrong and
losing credence among other jihadist groups and members, ISI nearly destroyed itself by
focusing all of its efforts and appeal on the intimate return of the Mahdi.
In a very short time, however, the group, under the leadership of Abu Bakr alBaghdadi, evolved its narrative and began to suddenly focus on the establishment of the
caliphate, state building, and the return of Jesus prior to the Final Hour—but refused to
acknowledge exactly when such events would occur. If the Islamic State was able to
evolve and learn from its mistakes made only years prior, the same could prove true for
another Islamist militant organization coming after ISIS. The destruction of the Islamic
State does not necessarily mean the destruction of apocalyptic speculation. This is vital to
recognize. As long as there remains distrust of the West, anxiety towards the future role
of the Islamic tradition in a secularizing world, wide scale violence and years of warfare,
and a shared belief that the current world is a failure, apocalyptic speculation will
continue to thrive and be exploited.
In this way, I argue, the death of Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi or the removal of the
caliphate from Iraq and Syria will not mean the end of apocalyptic thought, distrust of
Western nations, or the use of jihad. Al-Qaeda, as an example of the persistence of
jihadist movements, has been able to remain relevant even after the death of Osama Bin
Laden. In the same way, the death of al-Baghdadi or the removal of the Islamic State
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does not automatically remove the root problem of why the Islamic State has become so
powerful and popular in such a short time frame.
Approaching the group as only being able to be defeated by bombs, Western armies,
and drone strikes remains a very short sighted approach for analyzing the underlining
issue for why ISIS was able to develop in the first place. Dismissing the Islamic State’s
apocalyptic beliefs and constructed narrative has become problematic by attempting to
continuously “degrade and destroy” a group that only encourages more opponents to
attack it, glorifies the deaths of its members, and continues to depict violent actions
through its media as validated through religious sources and prophecies. This analysis of
the Islamic State has been an attempt to highlight additional viewpoints for why a group
as violent and destructive as ISIS has been able to draw in thousands of foreign recruits,
take control of regions across Iraq and Syria, and for why it has attempted so adamantly
attack other Muslim populations.
In the time that has elapsed since first beginning this research, the Islamic State has
conducted planned attacks in Paris and Brussels, taken claim of being behind the San
Bernardino attacks, and has been targeted by a variety of military strikes from both
America and now Russia. Rumors have been spread and then adamantly denied by ISIS
on claims of death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and there have been towns and regions
across Syria and Iraq that have been re-taken by Syrian and Iraqi forces from ISIS
control. Over the course of the next months, years, or even decades there may be a
complete annihilation of the Islamic State or perhaps they will continue to exist as AlQaeda has been able to—not as a state but as another jihadist organization in diaspora
with members spread out across the Middle East and possibly the world.
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The narrative of ISIS is under constant flux and this makes analyzing the group in real
time quite difficult, if not impossible. The results of certain actions and strategies cannot
be known until time has progressed significantly, both on the part of America and the
Islamic State. There remains no underlying single cause for the Islamic State’s
development and formation, but I find that the apocalyptic narrative it has constructed is
a good starting point. The rapid advancement of technology, mass media’s increasing
popularity, and constant airtime provided on TV for every action conducted has provided
the Islamic State a new ability to spread its message to a global audience.
Migrating to the Middle East or being able to come across a long drawn out video of
Bin Laden in a cave are no longer requirements needed in order to hear the messages of
jihadist organizations. ISIS, to this point, has been the most successful in this way and
such a tactic has undoubtedly led to its increased amount of recruits and widespread
appeal. Yet it is the message that ISIS is communicating that should be understood and
tackled, not just tactics for “degrading and destroying” them. Apocalyptic views of the
world are nothing new to the Islamic tradition and have long been used as sources of
inspiration and revolution. I end with a quote from David Cook, to whom I owe much of
my ability to study ISIS from an apocalyptic viewpoint, with how he summarizes the
history of apocalypticism within the Islamic tradition:
Though ultimately Islam as a whole did not treat apocalyptic favorably, the scholar, after
a judicious examination of this material [classic apocalyptic literature], should be able to
come to the conclusion that here we have material that, when first used, provided one of
the principal sources of the energy needed to conquer the enormous territory conquered
by the Muslims during the first century of Islam, and to establish it as a vital
religion…This material proves that the power that drove the first Muslims was belief that
they were living in the Last Days, and had to accomplish these things before the Day of
Judgement. The material investigated in this study was an integral part of the ideological
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foundations of early Islam, and continues to this day to provide Muslims with the energy
and inspiration to accomplish incredible deeds.”381

To dismiss the possibility of the Islamic State possessing similar apocalyptic
inspirations, and the energy that it can be produced amongst believers, may only prove
quite detrimental in future actions against the Islamic State.

381
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APPENDIX A: Apocalyptic Hadiths in Dabiq
Issue 1: The Return of the Khalifah
Abu Hurayrah reported that Allah’s messenger said, ‘The Hour will not be established
until the Romans land at al-A’maq or Dabiq. Then an army from al-Madinah of the best
people on the earth at that time will leave for them. When they line up in ranks, the Roans
will say, ‘Leave us and those who were taken as prisoners from amongst us so we can
fight them.’ The Muslims will say, ‘Nay, by Allah, we will not abandon our brothers to
you.’ So they will fight them. The one third of them will flee; Allah will never forgive
them. One third will be killed; they will be the best martyrs with Allah. And one third
will conquer them; they will never be afflicted with fitnah. Then they will conquer
Constantinople. Whole they are dividing the war boot, having hung their swords on olive
trees, Shaytan will shout, ‘The [false] Messiah has followed after your families [who
were left behind].’ So they will leave [for their families], but Shaytan’s claim is false.
When they arrive to Sham he comes out. Then while they are preparing for battle and
filing their ranks, the prayer is called. So ‘Isa Ibn Maryam will descend and lead them.
When the enemy of Allah sees him, he will melt until he perished, but he kills him with
his own hand, and then shows them his blood upon his spear. [Sahih Muslim].

Issue 2: The Flood-It’s either IS or the Flood
Allah’s Messenger said, ‘You will invade the Arabian Peninsula and Allah will enable
you to conquer it. You will invade Persia, and Allah will enable you to conquer it. You
will then invade Rome, and Allah will enable you to conquer it. Then you will fight the
Dajjal, and Allah will enable you to conquer him.’ [Sahih Muslim].

Issue 3: A Call to Hijrah
Abdullah Ibn Amr said that Allah’s Messenger said, ‘There will be Hijrah after Hijrah.
The best people on earth will be those who keep to the land of Ibrahim’s Hijrah. Then
there will remain on the earth the worst of its people. Their lands will cast them out,
Allah will hate them, and the fire with gather them together with the apes and swine.
[Hasan—Reported by Imam Ahmad, Abu Dawud, and al-Hakim].

Issue 4: The Failed Crusade: Reflections on the Final Crusade
Allah’s Messenger said, ‘You will have a treaty of security with the Romans until you
both fight an enemy beyond them. And you will be victorious, you will gain war booty,
and you will achieve such without losses. Thereafter you will return until you lodge at a
pastureland full of rocky mounds. A man from the Roman Christians will then raise the
cross. He will say, ‘The cross has prevailed!’ A man from the Muslims will then say,
‘Rather Allah has prevailed,’ and then he will angrily rise and crush the cross which is
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not at a distance from him. Then the Romans will betray the treaty by rising against the
breaker of the cross and striking his neck. The Muslims will then rise and rush to their
arms. They will then battle. Allah will bless this party of Muslims with shahadah. The
Romans will say to the Roman leader, ‘We are sufficient for you against the Arabs.’ They
will gather for the Malhamah (the grand battle before the Hour). They will come for you
under eighty banners, with each banner there will be twelve thousand people. [Sahih:
reported by Imam Ahmad, Abu Dawud, Ibn Majah, and Ibn Hibban on the authority of
Dhi Maikhmar].”

Issue 5: Remaining & Expanding
Ibn Mas’ud narrated that Rasulullah said, ‘If there were not left except a day from the
dunya, Allah would lengthen that day to send forth on it a man from my family whose
name matches my Name [Muhammad] and whose father’s name matches my father’s
name [Abdullah]. He will fill the earth with justice and fairness as it was filled with
opposition and tyranny’ [Sahih: Reported by Abu Dawud].

Issue 6: Al-Qaidah of Waziristian
Anas Ibn Malik narrated that Rasulullah said, ‘Prior to the Dajjal there will be deceptive
years in which the truthful person is belied, the liar is believed, the trustworthy is accused
of treachery, the treacherous person is trusted, and the ruwaybidah speaks.’ It was said to
him, ‘What is the ruwaybidah?’ He said, ‘The fuwaysiq (worthless fasiq) who speaks
concerning the affairs of the general public.’ [Hasan: Reported by Imam Ahmad and
others].

Issue 7: From Hypocrisy to Apostasy-The Extinction of the Grey-Zone
The Hour will not be established until seventy thousand from the children of Ishaq attack
Constantinople” Abu Hurayrah said, “The prophet said, ‘Have you heard of a city
[Constantinople] a side of which is on the land and a side of which is on the sea?’ They
said, ‘Yes, o Rasulullah.’ He Said, ‘The Hour will not be established until seventy
thousand from the Children of Ishaq attack it. When they’ve reached it and camped, they
do not fight with arms nor do they shoot arrows. They say ‘la ilaha illallah wallahu akbar.
And thus one side of the city falls. They say ‘la ilaha illallah wallahu akbar a second
time, and thus the other side falls. They say a third time, ‘la ilaha illallah wallahu akbar,
so a break is made for them, and thus they enter the city and collect ghanimah. While
they are dividing the ghanimah, a shout reaches them saying ‘The Dajjal has emerged.’
So they leave everything and return. [Sahih Muslim].
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Issue 8: Shariah Alone Will Rule Africa
Abdullah Ibn Hawalah said, “Allah’s Messenger said, ‘You will be granted conquest over
Sham, Rome, and Persia, until one of you will possess such and such number of camels,
such and such number of cows, and such and such number of sheep, to the extent if one
were to be given a hundred dinars, he would be discontent with it.’ He then placed his
hand on my head and said, ‘O Ibn Hawalah, if you see that the Khilafah has come to the
Holy Land [Sham], then the earthquakes, tribulations, and great matters have approached.
The Hour will be closer that day to the people than this hand of mine from your
head.”{Sahih: Reported by Imam Ahmad, Abu Dawudd, and al- Hakim}.

Issue 9: They Plot and Allah Plots
Adullah Ibn Mas’ud said, ‘The Last Hour will not be established until inheritance is not
divided and booty is not rejoiced over.’ The he said, while pointing to Sham,’ An enemy
will gather against the people of Islam and the people of Islam will gather against them.’
He was asked, ‘You mean the Romans?’ He replied, ‘Yes, and there will be a severe
retreat. The Muslims will prepare a detachment for fighting unto death that will not return
but victorious. They will fight until night will intervene between them; both sides will
return without being victorious and the detachment will be wiped out. The Muslims will
again prepare a detachment for fighting unto death that will not return but victorious.
They will fight until night will intervene between them; both sides will return without
being victorious, and the detachment will be wiped out. The Muslims will again prepare a
detachment for fighting unto death that will not return but victorious. They will fight until
night comes upon them; both sides will return without being victorious and the
detachment will be wiped out. On the fourth day, the remnants of the people of Islam will
arise and fight them and Allah will bring defeat upon the enemy. They will fight such a
fight the like of which will not be seen (or which has not been seen), so much so that if a
bird were to pass through their areas, it would fall dead before passing them. Thereafter,
paternal relatives will count each other and find that after being one hundred, only one
man is left from them. So what booty can be rejoiced over! And what inheritance can be
divided! While they are in this condition, they will hear of a danger greater than this. A
cry will reach them, ‘The Dajjal has taken your place among your families.’ They will
then abandon what is in their hands, advance, and dispatch ten horsemen as a scouting
party. Rasulullah said, ‘I know their names, the names of their fathers, and the colors of
their horses. They will be the best horsemen on the face of the Earth on that day or
amongst the best horsemen on the face of the Earth on that day’ [Sahih Mutslim].

Issue 10: The Law of Allah or the Laws of Man
Allah’s Messenger recited, {When the victory of Allah has come and the conquest, and
you see the people entering into the religion of Allah in multitudes…} [An Nasr: 1-2]. He
then said, ‘Indeed, they will leave it in multitudes just as they entered into it in
multitudes’ [Reported by ad-Darimi and al-Hakim from Abu Hurayrah; Al-Hakim and
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adh-Dhahabi both decaled it sahih].”
Allah’s Messenger said, ‘Indeed, what I fear most for my Ummah are the misguiding
imams. And the Hour will not be established until tribes from my Ummah join the
mushrikin and until tribes from my Ummah worship idols. And there will be in my
Ummah thirty liars of who claim to be prophets. And I am the last of the prophets. There
is no prophet after me. And there will always be a party of my Ummah manifest upon the
truth not harmed by those who oppose them until there comes the command of Allah’
[Sahih: Reported by Abu Dawud, at-Tirmidhi, and Ibn Majah from Thawban].

Issue 11: From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions
Allah’s Messenger said, ‘Prior to the Hour there will be days in which Knowledge will be
lifted away and Ignorance will descend [Upon the people]’ [Reported by Al-Bukhari and
Muslim from Abu Musa].
Jubayr Ibn Nufayr reported that Abud-Darda reported that he as with Allah’s Messenger
when he looked up towards the sky and said, ‘A time will come soon when knowledge is
taken away from the people until they are no longer able to grasp any of it.’ Ziyad Ibn
Labid al-Ansari said, ‘How will it be taken away from us while we have read the Qur’an,
for by Allah, we will read it and have our women and children read it.’ He Said, ‘May
your mother bereave you O Ziyad! I used to count you from the fuqaha of al-Madinah.
Are not the Tawrah and Injil with the Jews and Christians? What have their books availed
them?’ Jubary then met Ubadah Ibn as-Samit and said to him, ‘Have you not heard what
your brother Abud-Darda says?’ He then informed him of what Abud-Dara said. Ubadah
said, ‘Abud-Darda spoke the truth. If you like, I will inform you of the first knowledge
that will be taken from the people—Khushu. A time will come soon in which you enter a
grand masjid and will not find a single person with khushu. [Hasan: Reported by atTirmidhi and others].

Issue 12: Just Terror
Allah’s Messenger said, ‘The Euphrates is on the verge of uncovering a mountain of
gold. He who is present there should not take anything from it’ [Reported by al-Bukhari
and Muslim from Abu Hurayrah].
In another narration he said, ‘The Hour will not be established until the Euphrates
uncovers a mountain of gold over which the people will fight. Ninety-nine out of each
hone hundred wil be killed, but every man amongst them will say, “Perhaps I myself will
survive”’ [Reported by Muslim from Abu Hurayrah.]
In another narration, he said, ‘The Euphrates is on the verge of uncovering a mountain of
gold and when the people hear of it they will proceed towards it. The people who are
there will say, ‘If we allow these people to take some of it, they will take it all away.’ So
they will fight and ninety-nine out of one hundred will be killed.’ [Reported by Muslim
from Ubayy Ibn Ka’b].
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Issue 13: The Rafidah: From Ibn Saba to the Dajjal
Rasulullah said, ‘The Dajjal will be followed by seventy thousand Jews from Asbahan
[Isfahan] wearing talisman [shoulder-draped shawls]’ [Reported by Muslim from Anas].”

211

APPENDIX B: Dabiq on Jesus
History repeats itself by Allah’s divine decree…There is no escape from this divine
decree. It must happen and certainly will…. the bulk of all jihad was against the crossworshipping Romans with Sham playing an important role in all the wars between the
Muslims and crusaders. And this will be the case until their taghut cross is broken by the
Masih Isa. As this final crusade carries on and prior to its short pause followed by
crusader treachery (whenever that occurs), it is important to reflect over a number of
matters.382

A number of the narrations concerning the events that take place in Sham as the Hour
draws closer include the mention of Isa Ibn Maryam…These narrations typically speak of
the final battles that the Muslims will engage in with the Christians and Jews, including
the confrontation in which the Muslims are led by Isa against the Dajjal. If Allah had
willed, He could have left the Muslims to witness this epic engagement under the
leadership of an ordinary man from amongst them. Instead, He decreed that it would be a
Prophet…who would deal the decisive blow to the Dajjal and his followers, the cursed
Jews, who have a history of betraying and even killing the prophets of Allah. It would be
one of the very Prophets whom they tried, but failed; to kill that would slay their ‘awaited
king.’” “Thus, the return of Isa would immediately be followed, not by peace, but by a
confrontation with the enemies of Allah. It would be a fitting end to the legacy of His
Prophets on the earth, a legacy that was filled with Prophets who stood for the truth and
did not back down in the face of the disbelievers’ threats.383

It is clear then that salam (peace) is not the basis of the word Islam, the sword will
continue to be drawn, raised, and swung until Isa kills the Dajjal (the Antichrist) and
abolishes the jizyah. Thereafter, kufr and its tyranny will be destroyed Islam and its
justice will prevail on the entire Earth.384

Eventually, the grayzone will become extinct and there will be no place for grayish
calls and movements. There will only be the camp of Iman vs the camp of kufr. Then,
when Isa descends, breaks the cross, and abolishes the jizya, there will not be any place
for the camp of kufr to exist on Earth, not even as humbled dhimmi subjects amongst the
Muslims in the camp of truth…Therefore, the Beast will appear and mark the hypocrites
who remained as individuals hidden in the camp of truth, thereby bringing an end to
hypocrisy of the individual level after the Malahim had finished hypocrisy on the level of
calls and movements…385
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He explained that the Muslims would not cease to fight parties of the kuffar until Isa
descends and leads the Muslim armies. He said, ‘Indeed, fighting the kuffar, hijrah, and
jihad will remain until the establishment of the Hour.’ Allah’s Messenger said, ‘Hijrah
will not cease to exist until repentance ceases to be accepted, and repentance will not
cease to be accepted until the sun rises from the West’ [Reported by Abu Dawud from
Mu’awiyah]…He also said, ‘There will not cease to exist a group of my nation fighting
upon the truth, manifest until the Day of Judgment. Then Isa, Son of Maryam, will
descend, and the leader will say, ‘Come and lead us in prayer.’ So he will say. ‘No. You
are leaders over one another as an honor from Allah for this nation’ [Reported by Muslim
from Jabir].386

The severe strangeness has been lifted. The only strangeness to confront was that of
the crusader alliance, the Sahwah alliance, and the Safawi alliance. But this strangeness
was welcome, as it was the key to shahadah and Jannah. O Allah, what comes to us of
good is from You alone; You have no partner; To You is due all praise and thanks. O
Allah, preserve the great blessing of the Khilafah for us until Prophet Isa descends to lead
us. O Allah, make us from Your thankful slaves.387

May Allah united him and his cousin in Paradise and allow us to follow them. May
Allah look after his family and protect his children in the shade of the Khilafah, so that
they only live by tawhid and so that they are amongst the ranks of Prophet Isa when he
descends to lead the armies of the Muslims.388
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APPENDIX C: Dabiq on al-Malhamah al-Kubra:
Sham is the Land of Malahim: “Then, these nuzza gathered in Sham, the land of
malahim and the land of al-Malhamah al-Kubra. Allah’s Messenger has informed of
battle that will occur in places within Sham and its vicinity, such as al-Ghutah,
Damascus, Dabiq (or al-A’maq), the Euphrates River, and Constantinople…And he
linked this blessed land with many of the events related to al-Mashi, al-Mahdi, and the
Dajjal.389

So those who left their tribes…fathered together in the land of malahim shortly before
the occurrence of al-Malhamah al-Kubra, announce their enmity and hatred for the cross
worshippers, the apostates, their crosses, their borders, and their ballot boxes, and
pledged allegiance to the Khilafah, promising to die defending it.390

As mentioned in the introduction of our first issue, the name of our magazine was
taken from the area named Dabiq in the northern countryside of Halab, due to the
significant role it will play during the events of al-Malhamah al-Kubra (The Grand
Battle) against the crusaders.” “We ask Allah to place us in the camp of believers on the
day of al-Malhamah and keep us firm until he grants us either victory or shahadah.391

After this discussion and as we approach al-Malhamah al-Kubra (the greatest battle
before the Hour)—whenever its time comes by Allah’s decree—it is interesting to note
that slavery has been mentioned as one of the signs of the Hour as well as one of the
causes behind al-Malhamah al-Kubra. Rasulullah mentioned that one of the signs of the
Hour was that ‘the slave girl gives birth to her master.’ This was reported by al-Bukhari
and Muslim on the authority of Abu Hurayrah and by Muslim on the authority of
Umar.392

Then the Romans will commit treachery by raising the cross and killing a Muslim.
This will lead to the continuation of the war between the Muslims and the Romans. They
will demand access to those who enslaved some of them or the former captives
themselves who accepted Islam so as to fight them. This enslavement will have taken
place either before the signing of the truce or after the treachery, and Allah knows best.
These battles all lead up to the final, greatest, and bloodiest battle—al-Malhamah alKubra—between the Muslims and the Romans prior to the appearance of the Dajjal and
the descent of al-Mashi. This battle ends the era of the Roman Christians, as the Muslims
will then advance upon Constantinople and thereafter Rome, to conquer the two cities
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and raise the flag of the Khilafah over them.393

He expresses without any doubt that if the mujahidin hold on to their covenant with
their Lord while relying upon Him alone, then this weak, pitiful, and abortive crusade
will be the final one encompassing the eventual truce and crusader treachery leading up
to al-Malhamah al-Kubra, and Allah knows best.394

One with sincerity will realize there is no grayzone in this crusade against the Islamic
State, and that the world has split into two encampments, one for the people of faith, the
other for the people of kufr, all in preparation for the final Malhamah.” “Finally, do not
forget that Allah is with the Muslims and will never abandon them to His enemies. And
the Islamic State will remain until its banner flies over Rome.395

As the world progresses towards al-Malhamah al-Kubra, the option to stand on the
sidelines as a mere observer is being lost. As those with hearts disease by hypocrisy and
bid’ah are driven towards the camp of kufr those with a mustard seed of sincerity and
Sunnah are driven towards the camp of Iman. Muslims in the crusader countries will find
themselves driven to abandon their homes for a place to live in the Khilafah, as the
crusaders increase persecution against Muslims living in Western lands so as to force
them into a tolerable sect of apostasy in the name of “Islam” before forcing them into
blatant Christianity and democracy.396

In his words there is a summary of this final plot of the crusaders and their apostate
allies before the major malhamah. First, the crusaders have become too weak to wage
their own wars. This is due to the blessed operations of September 11th and the
subsequent jihad in both Afghanistan and Iraq. They are too weak financially, militarily,
and psychologically to fight another war, although there is no doubt that they will
eventually fight the Muslims at Dabiq after the crusaders’ betrayal of an impending
truce.397

The crusaders will ultimately find they cannot face the Islamic State except directly,
fact-to-face, or else—due to their nonstop bleeding—the crusaders will be forced to
disengage from their war against the Muslims until the time decreed by Allah for alMalhamah al-Kubra.398
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You know the importance of Dabiq towards the future of Islam, the Malahim, and alMalhamah al-Kubra. How can the Muslim support the mujahidin in Dabiq now?399

Our role model and noble Messenger praised Dabiq very much, and this was
mentioned in a number of authentic narrations. Dabiq is the camp of the Muslims during
the great battle (al-Malhamah al-Kubra). But every Muslim who cannot come and wants
to perform jihad and support the Islamic State can do so where he may be, just as he was
ordered by the Khalifah in his latest address. A simple supplication from our Muslim
brothers practicing ribat is in itself support—a great support for us. Any advance of the
Khilafah against the Nusayriyyah and Rafidah, any manifestation of unity through new
bay’at to the Khilafah, and any attack against the supporters of the Sahwah—the
crusaders and Al Salul—strengthens the mujahidin in Dabiq. May Allah facilitate for the
armies of the Khilafah to liberate Dabiq.400

And nothing changes for the Islamic State, as it will continue to pronounce takfir upon
the Jews, the Christians, the pagans, and the apostates from the Rafidah, the Nusayriyyah,
the Sahwah, and the tawaghit. It will continue to wage war against the apostates until
they repent from apostasy. It will continue to wage war against the pagans until they
accept Islam. It will continue to wage war against the Jewish state until the Jews hide
behind their gharqad trees. And it will continue to wage war against the Christians until
the truce is decreed sometime before the Malhamah. Thereafter, the slave markets will
commence in Rome by Allah’s power and might. May Allah continue to break and
shatter the ranks of the kafir coalitions and alliances all over the earth.401
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ʻAbbāsid Caliphate in the Early Ninth Century. Columbia, SC: University of South
Carolina Press, 2009.

218

